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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Human factors play an inevitable role in working contexts and the 
occurrence of human errors impacts on system reliability and safety, 
equipment performance and economic results. If human fallibility contributes 
to majority of incidents and accidents in high-risk systems, it mainly affects 
the quality and productivity in low-risk systems. Due to the prevalence of 
human error and the huge and often costly consequences, a considerable effort 
has been made in the field of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), thus arriving 
to develop methods with the common purpose to predict the human error 
probability (HEP) and to enable safer and more productive designs. The 
purpose of each HRA method should be the HEP quantification to reduce and 
prevent possible conditions of error in a working context. However, existing 
HRA methods do not always pursue this aim in an efficient way, focusing on 
the qualitative error evaluation and on high-risk contexts. Moreover, several 
working aspects have been considered to prevent accidents and improve 
human performance in human-intensive working contexts, as for example the 
selection of adequate work-rest policies. It is well-known that introducing 
breaks is a key intervention to provide recovery after fatiguing physical work, 
prevent the growth of accident risks, and improve human reliability and 
productivity for individuals engaged in either mental or physical tasks. This is 
a very efficient approach even if it is not widely applied.  
Starting from these research gaps, the thesis focuses on the development 
of a HRA model for the break scheduling management in human-intensive 
working activities. The Simulator for Human Error Probability Analysis 
(SHERPA) model provides for a theoretical framework that exploits the 
advantages of the simulation tools and the traditional HRA methods to model 
human behaviour, to predict the error probability for a given scenario in every 
kind of working system and to manage the work-rest policies. Human 
reliability is estimated as function of the performed task, the Performance 
Shaping Factors (PSF) and the time worked, with the purpose of considering 
how reliability depends on the time that a worker has already spent on his 
work. Knowing the HEP distribution allows to understand the nature of the 
factors that influence human performance and to intervene, from the 
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perspective of reducing the errors and their huge monetary costs, with re-
design tasks or other interventions, such as the management of the worker’s 
psycho-physical recovery through appropriate work-rest policies. SHERPA is 
not limited to the reliability assessment, as many existing HRA methods, but 
uses it in the operator recovery modelling and breaks scheduling management. 
The main focuses of SHERPA are the HEP quantification, the assessment of 
the impact of context via PSFs, the management of break scheduling through 
an economic model that identifies the best configuration among those possible 
to reduce errors and increase productivity and efficiencies. As shown in the 
case studies, SHERPA is able to predict the HEP, to assess the impacts of 
individual features and working environments on human reliability for every 
kind of working context. Furthermore, the model is useful in assessing the 
impact of different work- break policies, with different placement and 
duration of breaks, on human performance (HEP and recovery after the break) 
and on the overall system performance in terms of percentage of compliant 
performed tasks and economic results. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Human error is here to stay (Kirwan, 1994). This perhaps obvious 
statement has a more profound implication if we consider how common 
human errors are in everyday life and in the working environment.  
The vast majority of current catastrophes arises by a combination of many 
small events, system faults and human errors that would be irrelevant 
individually, but – when combined in a special time sequence of 
circumstances and actions – can lead to unrecoverable situations (Cacciabue, 
1998). In recent years, there has been a decrease in accidents due to technical 
failures through high reliability of mechanical and electronic components, 
combined with a design suitable and technological developments of 
redundancy and protection, which have made systems more reliable. 
However, despite the possibilities of automation, human labour is still needed 
in many working environments and it is not possible to talk about system 
reliability without addressing the failure rate of all its components; among 
these components, "man" – because his rate of error changes the rate of failure 
of components with which he interacts. 
The contribution of the human factor in the dynamics of accidents – both 
statistically and in terms of severity of consequences – is high. For this reason, 
wrong and inappropriate human actions are source of great concern and create 
efficiency and safety issues for every kind of working context. Although valid 
values are difficult to obtain, evidence in literature indicate that errors 
committed by man are responsible for 60–90% of the accidents; the remainder 
of accidents are attributable to technical deficiencies (Hollnagel, 1998; 
Griffith and Mahadevan, 2011). The percentage of incidents connected with 
human error in several industries is listed in Table 1. The accidents are, of 
course, the most obvious human errors in the industrial systems, but minor 
faults can seriously reduce the operation performance in terms of productivity 
and efficiency. In fact, human error has a direct impact on productivity 
because errors affect the rates of rejection of the product, thereby increasing 
the cost of production and possibly reduce subsequent sales. Human error 
affects the production cost because of internal costs (scraps, reworks, product 
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and process revisions) and external costs (recall of products, loss of image and 
repair and replacement warranty).  
Table 1: Estimates of human error in various sectors as percentages of 
all failures (Griffith and Mahadevan, 2011). 
Sectors % Human Error 
Automobile 65 
Heavy truck 80 
Aviation 70-80 
Jet transport 65-85 
Air traffic control 90 
Maritime vessels 80-85 
Chemical industry 60-90 
Nuclear power plants (US) 50-70 
The evidence that human actions are a source of vulnerability for industrial 
systems gave birth to the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), which aims at 
further examination of the human factor through the prediction of when an 
operator is more likely to make an incorrect action and which type of action 
is most probable (Hollnagel, 1996). The study of HRA is approximately 60 
years old and has always been a hybrid discipline, involving reliability 
experts, engineers and human factors specialists or psychologists. Bell and 
Holroyd (2009) identified 72 human reliability related tools developed since 
the early 60s and classified them into three categories: first, second, and third 
generation. All these methods have the purpose of assessing the likelihood of 
human error – in working systems, for a given operation, in a certain interval 
of time and in a particular context – on the basis of models that describe, in a 
more or less simplistic way, the complex mechanism that underlies the single 
human action that is potentially subject to error. Despite the efforts of HRA 
experts to develop an advanced method, many of the limitations and problems 
of these approaches have not yet been resolved due to the complexity of 
human nature and the difficulty in predicting and simulating human 
behaviour. 
At the same time, several aspects of the work were considered to prevent 
and/or reduce the number of accidents and incidents and to improve the human 
performance. Rest breaks are an aspect of considerable importance in this 
sense. Introducing breaks is a key intervention to provide recovery after 
fatiguing physical work to prevent growth of accident risks during working 
activities and improve human reliability (Dababneh, Swanson and Shell, 
2001; Jansen, Kant and van den Brandt, 2002; Demerouti et al., 2012). It is 
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well-known that work–break configurations influence the performance of 
individuals and can result in different productivity levels for individuals 
engaged in either mental or physical tasks (Bechtold and Thompson, 1993). 
Finding an optimal distribution across time of work breaks has been a 
challenge in ergonomics and operational research for almost an entire century, 
and it has also engaged management scientists (Bechtold and Thompson, 
1993; Aykin, 1996; Schafhauser, Musliu and Wild, 2009; Rekik, Cordeau and 
Soumis, 2010). To date the break scheduling problem has been addressed 
within the more general shift scheduling problem and numerous optimization 
algorithms and heuristic techniques have been proposed (Schafhauser, Musliu 
and Wild, 2009; Rekik, Cordeau and Soumis, 2010). None of existing methods 
considers human reliability in assessing worker performance due to the 
complexity of HRA approaches and given the difficulty of integrating this 
type of modelling in an exact algorithmic or heuristic technique. Furthermore, 
many of the studies in the literature have addressed the break scheduling 
problem only from the point of view of productivity. They do not address the 
problem of break management regarding the quality aspect, namely the impact 
of human errors on the system performance in terms of quality of the 
performed activities (e.g. non-compliant items and reworking). The impact of 
breaks, in fact, was investigated with respect on the loss of productivity, due 
to the decrease of work rate, without considering the effect on the human error 
probability. 
Considering the current state of the art of HRA methods and the model for 
the break scheduling management, the two main research questions of the 
thesis are: 
 The development of a HRA approach able to predict the human error 
probability (HEP), to assess the impacts of individual features and 
working environments, via PSF, on human reliability for every kind of 
human intensive working context. 
 The study of impact of different work-break policies in order to assess 
the qualitative and quantitative effects of human reliability on the 
system performance and to identify the best work-break configuration. 
A new HRA model is proposed in this thesis: the Simulator for Human 
Error Probability Analysis (SHERPA) model. SHERPA provides a theoretical 
framework that exploits the advantages of the simulation tools and the 
traditional HRA methods in order to model human behaviour and to predict 
the error probability for a given scenario in every kind of industrial system. 
Human reliability is estimated as function of the performed task, the 
Performance Shaping Factors and the worked time, with the purpose of 
considering how reliability depends not only on the task and working context, 
but also on the time that the operator has already spent on the work. The model 
is able to provide for the following functions: 
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1) Estimating human reliability, as function of time, work context conditions, 
physical and mental employee conditions and break scheduling. 
2) Assessing the effects due to different human reliability levels, through 
evaluation of processes, activities or tasks performed more or less 
correctly. 
3) Assessing the impact of environment on human reliability, via performance 
shaping factors. 
4) Simulating a large numbers of break scheduling with several locations and 
duration of breaks, in order to assess their impact of different work-break 
policies on human performance (HEP and recovery after the break) and the 
overall system performance in terms of percentage of compliant performed 
tasks and economic results (e.g. profits, revenues, quality costs, rework 
costs and break costs).  
Chapter I provides for a detailed and complete overview of the state of the 
art of HE taxonomies and HRA methods, beginning with the quantitative 
methods of the first generation and the qualitative methods of the second one 
and extending to the third generation HRA approaches and new dynamic HRA 
methods. Chapter II analysis the role of break in working field, giving an 
overview of the work-break literature, considering the impact of breaks on 
human performance (well-being, recovery, and risk) and the break scheduling 
problems. Chapter III presents the SHERPA theoretical framework based on 
the integration of traditional and simulative/dynamic HRA methods. Its 
logical foundations, the HRA principles, the evaluation and quantification of 
psycho-physical recovery and the break scheduling management system are 
described. Chapter IV presents a detailed description of the implementation of 
the theoretical model in the two simulation tools developed in Arena and 
Anylogic. Then the operating principles are discussed in some numerical 
experiments and case studies in Chapter V, where the simulation results are 
presented and analysed. Finally, the main findings and conclusion are 
discussed. 
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I Chapter I: Human error and 
human reliability in human-
intensive working activities 
 
 
 
 
I.1 Introduction 
Human errors in the workplace can have severe consequences such as 
accidents, malfunctions and quality defects in the performed task. The 
problem of human error is substantive, and many researchers have focused on 
trying to understand and evaluate the concept of human error (Reason, 1990; 
Hollnagel, 1993; Czaja, Nair and Salvendy, 2012) and considerable efforts 
have been made in order to predict human performance in working contexts. 
Human errors, in fact, can have several causes and produce different effects: 
if you know the probable causes, you can try to prevent it; if you know the 
error consequences you can try to limit them.  
This Chapter provides for a detailed and complete overview of the state of 
the art of HE taxonomies and HRA methods, beginning with the quantitative 
methods of the first generation and the qualitative methods of the second one 
and extending to the third generation HRA approaches and new dynamic HRA 
methods. Furthermore, HE assessment and the applications of HRA methods 
in several human intensive working contexts, such as manufacturing systems, 
industrial maintenance and healthcare systems, are investigated. 
I.2 Human errors and human reliability analysis 
There are various definitions for human error. Hollnagel (1993) favoured 
the term erroneous action to human error, which he defined as “an action 
which fails to produce the expected result, and which therefore leads to an 
unwanted consequence”. Reason (1990) provides a broad definition proposing 
it as a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned 
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sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, 
and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance 
agency.  
Two major approaches can be taken to characterizing human error: 
probabilistic and causal (Rouse and Rouse, 1983). The probabilistic approach 
is typically pursued by those who are interested in the human reliability 
aspects of risk analysis. In these analyses, human error is treated in a manner 
quite like that used for hardware failures. The use of this approach is often 
dictated by requirements that system reliability meet some specified level. On 
the contrary, the causal approach to characterizing human error assumes that 
errors are seldom random, and in fact, can be traced to causes and contributing 
factors which, once isolated, can perhaps be eliminated or at least ameliorated. 
Thus, the causal approach can be useful for evaluating and subsequently 
modifying system designs and training programs. This focus on why errors 
occur is rather different from the typical studies of human error which solely 
emphasize what occurs, a point of view that has received considerable 
criticism (Rouse and Rouse, 1983). 
A core issue dealt with by many studies on human error is the classification 
scheme or taxonomy of error types. An effective taxonomy can be of value in 
organizing data on human errors and for giving advantageous insights into the 
ways in which errors are caused and how they might be prevented. A literature 
review revealed that no single taxonomy of human error is generally accepted 
for addressing all causal factors. Norman (1981) distinguishes between 
mistakes and slips, where a mistake reflects an inappropriate intention and a 
slip is an unintentional error that occurs when a person does an action that is 
not intended. Focusing on slips, Norman utilizes a human information 
processing perspective to develop a schema-oriented theory involving 
formation of intentions as well as activation and triggering of schema. The 
three-major category of slips are: (i) errors in the formation of intention (which 
considers the mode and description errors), (ii) faulty activation schemas 
(which considers capture errors, data driven, loss of intention and misordering 
of action components); and (iii) faulty triggering (which considers blends, 
intrusions of thoughts and premature triggering). 
Rasmussen was the first to divide human behaviours into three levels: skill-
based behaviour, rule-based behaviour, and knowledge-based behaviour (or 
the Skill-Rule-Knowledge SRK framework) (Rasmussen et al., 1981; 
Rasmussen, 1982). The proposed Model of Internal Human Malfunction 
differentiates three basic levels of human performance:  
 Skill-based, when automated actions follow an intention (sensory–motor 
behaviour), actions are routinely practiced and highly automatic. 
Conscious thought is used sporadically to verify progress. 
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 Rule-based, when there is a procedure or technique guiding the action, 
actions are a combination of conscious and unconscious processes to 
determine responses for situations that have been encountered before, 
either through experience or training. Unconscious pattern recognition 
matches the indicators of a problem to a potential solution. 
 Knowledge-based, represented by actions developed to deal with an 
unfamiliar situation, actions require slow, demanding, and highly-error 
prone conscious thought to determine a response when other methods 
have proven unsuccessful. 
Further, he distinguishes among causes, mechanisms, and modes of human 
error (Rasmussen, 1982). His overall goals include developing a 
comprehensive classification scheme for reporting events involving human 
error. The attention and conscious thought that an individual give to activities 
taking place decreases moving from the third to first level (Figure I.1). 
 
Figure I.1: Rasmussen's SRK model. 
Human error has been extensively researched and classified in the 
reliability engineering and system safety field. Swain and Guttmann (1983) 
divide human errors into errors of omission (EOOs) and errors of commission 
(EOCs); EOOs are defined as the failure to perform an action, whereas EOCs 
are defined as unintended or unplanned actions. 
Unlike Swan’s classification method, Model of Unsafe Acts (Reason, 
1990) divides human errors in slips and lapses, when an execution failure or 
an omission occurs, and mistakes, which result from judgement processes 
used to select an objective, or the means to accomplish it. A slip is an incorrect 
execution with a correct intention; lapse is an unintended or unplanned action 
with a correct intention; and a mistake is incorrect execution with an incorrect 
intention. Reason also highlights an alternative behaviour from a social 
context, called violation, which emerges from an intentional deviation from 
operating procedures, codes of practice or standards. Errors differ from 
violations in that errors are unintended whereas violations are deliberate. 
Human error and human reliability in human-intensive working activities 
 
39 
Despite there are many classifications, it is not easy arriving at a satisfying 
and unambiguous definition and classification of human error and literature 
provides little guidance on how to systematically classify an event into error 
categories. The error taxonomies previously described underline how human 
performance models can be used to predict human error. HEP is defined as the 
probability that a certain task within observation period was accomplished 
faulty, as a relative frequency (Bubb, 2005): 
HEP=
number of observed errors
number of the possibilities for an error
 (1.1) 
Human reliability (HR), instead, is the mathematical complement (HR=1-
HEP), and it is the human ability to accomplish a given task under given 
conditions in a given time interval within the acceptance limits. The standard 
definition of human reliability is the probability that a person will perform 
according to the requirements of the task for a specified period and not 
perform any extraneous activity that can degrade the system (Hollnagel, 
1998). Human reliability is, also, defined as the probability that each human 
component will perform successfully for an extended period (Czaja, Nair and 
Salvendy, 2012). 
Due to the prevalence of human error and the huge and often costly 
consequences, its study has become an increasingly important research 
concern and an important focus within HRA, which has emerged as a well-
defined discipline. The HRA goals defined by Swain and Guttmann (1983) in 
discussing the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
approach, one of the first HRA methods developed, are still valid: “the 
objective of HRA is to evaluate the operator’s contribution to system 
reliability. More precisely, the aim is to predict human error rates and to 
evaluate the degradation of human–machine systems likely to be caused by 
human errors in association with equipment functioning, operational 
procedures and practices which influence the system behaviour”.  
Human Reliability Analysis is carried out, as part of the Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA), to identify and to quantify human actions and the 
associated impacts on structures, systems, and components of complex 
facilities, through the forecast of the events that can occur during the working 
activity. HRA has evolved into a discipline that encompasses theoretical and 
analytic tools needed for understanding how human actions and decisions are 
influenced by the system’s complexity and dynamics, the assessment of 
human errors that may arise during the work, and design interventions in the 
form of various barriers that can eliminate or mitigate these negative effects 
(Sharit, 2012). The purpose is to pursue quantitative estimates of human error 
probabilities during professional activity and their contribution to system 
risks. HRA typically encompasses three phases (Figure I.2), ranging from 
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identifying error sources, to modelling these errors as part of a systemic 
analysis including hardware failures, to quantifying the HEPs (Boring, 2010).  
 
Figure I.2: Three Phases of Human Reliability Analysis (Boring, 2010). 
The 10-step HRA process proposed by Kirwan (1994) deeply highlights 
the role of task and human error analyses in its earlier stages (Figure I.3). 
 
Figure I.3: The HRA Process (Kirwan, 1994). 
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In the traditional HRA process, task analysis is used to describe and 
understand the human interactions with the system. The results of this phase 
allow error identification through appropriate error taxonomy. The analysts 
first define human failure events (HFEs), which are analysed qualitatively and 
quantitatively, and then they assign relative nominal HEPs to events.  
Nominal HEP is calculated on the basis of operator’s activities and, to 
obtain a quantitative estimate of HEP, many HRA methods utilize 
performance shaping factors (PSF), which characterize significant facets of 
human error and provide a numerical basis for modifying nominal HEP levels 
(Boring, 2006). The qualitative analysis, in fact, determines the influencing 
factors that enhance or degrade human performance and that might lead to the 
failure of the activity. These influencing factors include the features of the 
plant and the PSFs; these last are determined by the individual characteristics 
of the human being, environment, organization, or activity. Their goal is to 
provide measures to account for human performance. There is no consensus 
to date on which PSFs should be used in HRA nor on the appropriate number 
of PSFs to include in an analysis. Some of the earliest HRA approaches 
adopted a single PSF, while a recent study commissioned by the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability 
Analysis) identified the fourteen essential PSFs for HRA (Kolaczkowski et 
al., 2005). This list of PSFs is not exhaustive but rather represents the 
minimum set of PSFs that should be considered in an HRA. There are 
numerous approaches to quantify HRA methods (Boring, 2015): 
 Scenario matching methods: This approach, adopted by THERP 
(Swain and Guttmann, 1983), entails matching the HFE to the best 
fitting example scenario in a table and using the HEP associated with 
that template event as the basis for quantification.  
 PSF adjustment methods: In methods, such as the standardized plant 
analysis risk-human reliability analysis method (SPAR-H) (Gertman 
et al., 2005) or cognitive reliability and error analysis (CREAM) 
method (Hollnagel, 1998), PSFs modify the nominal error rates. The 
effects of the PSF on the HEP in SPAR-H are summarized in the 
following equation as follows (Boring, 2010). 
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑐 = 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛 ∙ 𝑃𝑆𝐹 = {
0 < 𝑃𝑆𝐹 < 1 →  𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛
𝑃𝑆𝐹 = 1     →  𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑐 = 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛 
𝑃𝑆𝐹 > 1    →  𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑐 > 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛
 (1.2) 
 Where 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑐 and 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛 are the contextual and nominal HEPs, 
respectively. Each PSF can have both positive and negative effects on 
performance, respectively decreasing or increasing the overall HEP.  
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 Expert estimation methods: These tools provide a structured means for 
experts to consider how likely it is for an error to occur in a scenario. 
 Simulation based methods: Although currently uncommon, these 
methods use cognitive modelling and simulation to produce a data 
framework that may be used in quantifying the likelihood of human 
error (Boring, 2007; Chang and Mosleh, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 
2007e). 
I.3 State-of-the-art HRA methodologies 
The first HRA methods date back to the early 60s in the field of missile 
applications and US defence, but most techniques for assessment of the human 
factor, in terms of propensity to fail, have been developed since the mid-’80s. 
The greatest development of these techniques has been closely linked to 
catastrophic events in high-risk industries, such as Seveso (1976), Bhopal 
(1983), Chernobyl (1986). These events came to understand how accidents are 
not only caused by technical causes or failures or human causes and failures 
interaction of several components: technological, human, organizational, in 
relation to each other and with the external environment in which the 
organization operates. The problem of human dependence has since raised its 
level of complexity. The methods implemented over time contain appropriate 
and enforceable procedures and user manuals for the identification of the most 
appropriate data and the application of the methodology, which invariably 
leads to the probability distributions and the uncertainty associated with 
human failure.  
The development of human reliability methods occurred over time in three 
stages. HRA techniques or approaches can, in fact, be divided essentially into 
three categories: first, second and third generation. Figure I.4 shows the 
distribution of HRA methods over the years, starting from the early methods 
to the most recent developments.  
I.3.1 First generation HRA methods 
The first stage lasted twenty years (1970–1990) and was the first human 
reliability method generation that focused on human error probabilities and 
operational human error.  
The first generation HRA methods have been strongly influenced by the 
viewpoint of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and have identified man 
as a mechanical component, thus losing all aspects of dynamic interaction with 
the working environment, both as a physical environment and as a social 
environment. First generation methods, in fact, include 35–40 methods for 
human reliability, many of which are variations on a single method. Many of 
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these methods – such as THERP (Swain and Guttmann, 1983), Accident 
Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP) (Swain, 1987), and Human Cognition 
Reliability (HCR) (Hannaman, Spurgin and Lukic, 1984) – have the basic 
assumption that the natural deficiencies of humans cause them logically to fail 
to perform tasks, just as is seen with mechanical or electrical components. 
Thus, HEP can be assigned based on the characteristics of the operator’s task 
and then modified by performance shaping factors. In the first HRA 
generation, the characteristics of a task, represented by HEPs, are regarded as 
major factors; the context, which is represented by PSFs, is considered a minor 
factor in estimating the probability of human failure (Kim, Seong and 
Hollnagel, 2006). 
 
Figure I.4: HRA methods timeline. 
Each approach of this generation focuses on quantification in terms of 
success/failure of actions, with less attention paid to in-depth causes and 
reasons of observable human behaviour, which for these techniques is 
borrowed from psychological studies in behavioural sciences (Cacciabue, 
2004). These traditional approaches determine the human error probability by 
using established tables, human reliability models or expert judgment. The 
characterization of human failure modes is usually very simple, such as in 
terms of error of omission and errors of commission (Swain and Guttmann, 
1983), which represent, respectively, the lack of realization of operations 
required to achieve the result and the execution of an operation, not related to 
that request, which prevents the obtainment of the result (Hollnagel, 1998). 
The main characteristics of the methods can be summarized as follows: 
 Binary representation of human actions (success/failure); 
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 Attention on the phenomenology of human action; 
 Low concentration on human cognitive actions (lack of a cognitive 
model); 
 Emphasis on quantifying the likelihood of incorrect performance of 
human actions; 
 Dichotomy between errors of omission and commission; 
 Indirect treatment of context. 
Among the first-generation techniques, in addition to the methods already 
mentioned, there are: Absolute Probability Judgement (APJ) (Kirwan, 1994), 
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 
1985; B Kirwan, 1997), Justified Human Error Data Information (JHEDI) 
(Kirwan, 1994), Probabilistic Human Reliability Analysis (PHRA) (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009), Operator Action Tree System (OATS) (Bell and Holroyd, 
2009), and Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) (Embrey, 1986). 
Among these, the most popular and effectively method used is THERP, 
characterized as other first generation approaches by an accurate mathematical 
treatment of the probability and error rates, as well as computer programs 
well-structured for interfacing with the trees for evaluation of human error of 
a fault event and trees (Boring and Blackman, 2007). The base of THERP is 
event tree modelling, where each limb represents a combination of human 
activities, influences upon these activities, and results of these activities 
(Griffith and Mahadevan, 2011).  
First generation HRA methods are demonstrated with experience and use, 
not able to provide sufficient prevention and adequately perform their duties. 
The criticism of is that these approaches tend to be descriptive of events in 
which only the formal aspects of external behaviour are observed and studied 
in terms of errors, without considering reasons and mechanisms that made 
them level of cognition. These methods ignore the cognitive processes that 
underlie human performance and, in fact, possess a cognitive model without 
adequate human and psychological realism. They are often criticized for not 
having considered the impact of factors such as environment, organizational 
factors, and other relevant PSFs; and for not using proper methods of judging 
experts (Hollnagel, 1998; Mosleh and Chang, 2004). Swain remarked that “all 
of the above HRA inadequacies often lead to HRA analysts assessing 
deliberately higher estimates of HEPs and greater uncertainty bounds, to 
compensate, at least in part, for these problems” (Hollnagel, 1998). This is 
clearly not a desirable solution. Despite the criticisms and inefficiencies of 
some first-generation methods, such as THERP and HCR, they are regularly 
used in many industrial fields, thanks to their ease of use and highly 
quantitative aspects. 
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I.3.2 Second generation HRA methods 
In the early 1990s, the need to improve HRA approaches interested many 
important research and development activities around the world. These efforts 
led to much progress in first generation methods and the birth of new 
techniques during the second phase (1990–2005), known as second human 
reliability method generation, focused on human performance factors and 
cognitive processes. Human performance factors are internal or external and 
in general are everything that influences human performance, like workload, 
stress, sociological issues, psychological issues, illness, etc. (Calixto, Lima 
and Firmino, 2013). These HRA methods have been immediately unclear and 
uncertain, substantially because the methods have been defined in terms of 
what should not be – that is, they should be as the first generation of HRA 
methods (Hollnagel, 1996). 
While the first generation HRA methods are mostly behavioural 
approaches, the second generation HRA methods aspire to be of conceptual 
type (Chang and Mosleh, 2007e). The separation between generations is 
evident in the abandonment of the quantitative approach of PRA/PSA in 
favour of a greater attention to qualitative assessment of human error. The 
focus of the second generation shifted to cognitive aspects of humans, causes 
of errors rather than their frequency, study of factor interactions that increase 
the probability of error, and interdependencies of PSFs.  
Second generation HRA methods are based on a cognitive model more 
appropriate to explain human behaviour. It is evident that any attempt at 
understanding human performance needs to include the role of human 
cognition, defined as “the act or process of knowing including both awareness 
and judgement” by an operator. From the HRA practitioner’s perspective, the 
immediate solution to take into consideration human cognition in HRA 
methods was to introduce a new category of error: “cognitive error”, defined 
both as failure of an activity that is predominantly of a cognitive nature and as 
the inferred cause of an activity that fails (Hollnagel, 1998). For example, in 
CREAM, developed by Erik Hollnagel in 1993, maintained division between 
logical causes and consequences of human error (Hollnagel, 1996). The causes 
of misbehaviour (genotypes) are the reasons that determine the occurrence of 
certain behaviours, and the effects (phenotypes) are represented by the 
incorrect forms of cognitive process and inappropriate actions (Mosleh and 
Chang, 2004).  
Moreover, advanced cognitive models have been developed, which 
represent the process of logic operator and synthesize the dependence on 
personal factors (such as stress, incompetence, etc.) and by the current 
situation (normal conduction system, abnormal conditions, or even emergency 
conditions), and models of man–machine interface, which reflect the control 
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system of the production process. One of the more widely used second 
generation techniques, CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998), has an operator model that 
is more significant and less simplistic than in the first generation methods; 
HEP is derived from four Contextual Control Modes (CoCoMs): Scrambled, 
Opportunistic, Tactical and Strategic. CoCoM assumes that human behaviour 
is guided by two basic principles: the cyclical nature of human cognition and 
the dependence of cognitive processes from context and working 
environment. The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk–Human Reliability 
Analysis method (SPAR-H) (Gertman et al., 2005) is, instead, built on an 
explicit information processing model of human performance derived from 
the behavioural sciences literature. An information-processing model is a 
representation of perception and perceptual elements, memory, sensory 
storage, working memory, search strategy, long-term memory, and decision-
making.  
Additionally, second generation considers the context in which humans 
make errors and derive relative PSFs. A major difference between two 
generations can be simply stated as consideration of the PSF impact on 
operators. None of the first generation HRA approaches tries to explain how 
PSFs exert their effect on performance; moreover, PSFs – such as managerial 
methods and attitudes, organizational factors, cultural differences, and 
irrational behaviour – are not adequately treated in these methods. PSFs in the 
first generation were mainly derived by focusing on the environmental 
impacts on operators, whereas PSFs in the second generation were derived by 
focusing on the cognitive impacts on operators (Lee et al., 2011). The context 
is carefully incorporated into the behavioural patterns, considering all the 
factors that may affect human performance. This is evident in SPAR-H, where 
its eight operational factors can be directly associated with the human 
performance model and show the human information processing model with 
which they are associated (Figure I.5). The PSFs of both generations were 
reviewed and collected in a single taxonomy of performance influencing 
factors for HRA (Kim and Jung, 2003). 
 
Figure I.5: SPAR-H Performance Shaping Factors in the Information 
Processing Context (Whaley et al., 2011). 
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Among the methods of the second generation can be mentioned: A 
Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) (Cooper et al., 1996), 
Cognitive Environmental Simulation (CES) (Woods, Roth and People, 1987), 
Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability (CAHR) (Strater, 1996; 
Strater and Reer, 1999) and Méthode d’Evaluation De La Réalisation des 
Missions Opérateur Pour La Sûreté (MERMOS) (Bieder and Le Bot, 1998; 
Serdet and Le Bot, 2012). 
Many proposed second-generation methods still lack sufficient theoretical 
or experimental bases for their key parts. Missing from all is a fully 
implemented model of the underlying causal mechanisms linking measurable 
PSFs or other characteristics of the context of operator response. The problem 
extends to the quantification side, where the majority of the proposed 
approaches still rely on implicit functions relating PSFs to probabilities 
(Mosleh and Chang, 2004). In short, some key shortcomings that motivated 
the development of new methods still remain unfulfilled. Furthermore, unlike 
first generation methods, which have been largely validated (B Kirwan, 1997), 
the second generation has yet to be empirically validated. There are four main 
sources of deficiencies in current HRA methods (Griffith and Mahadevan, 
2011): 
 Lack of empirical data for model development and validation; 
 Lack of inclusion of human cognition (i.e. need for better human 
behaviour modelling); 
 Large variability in implementation (the parameters for HRA strongly 
depend on the methodology used) 
 Heavy reliance on expert judgement in selecting PSFs and use of these 
PSFs to obtain the HEP in human reliability analysis. 
I.3.3 Third generation HRA methods 
In recent years, the limitations and shortcomings of the second generation 
HRA methods have led to further developments related to the improvement of 
pre-existing methods. The third phase, started in 2005 and still in progress, is 
represented by methods that focus on human performance factor relations and 
dependencies. While some experts have focused on the development of third 
generation methods, others have carried out studies on the so-called dynamic 
HRA, as reported in the next section.  
The Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment (NARA) (Kirwan et al., 2004) 
method and the Bayesian networks (Droguett and Menêzes, 2007) are defined 
as the only current HRA tools of the third generation.  
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On one hand, NARA recaptures and improves the first-generation method 
HEART, trying to overcome some limitations of the same, while on the other 
hand, Bayesian networks use qualitative analysis, which emphasizes the 
importance of representing interactions between human actions and the 
dynamics between them.  
I.4 Simulation and modelling for dynamic HRA 
methods 
Cacciabue (1998) has outlined the importance of simulation and modelling 
of human performance for the field of human reliability. Specifically, 
simulation and modelling address the dynamic nature of human performance 
in a way that has not been possible in most HRA methods. Many efforts have 
been recently directed towards simulation, to assess human behaviour and 
calculate the reliability for the performed activity. Boring (2007) posits that 
the key to dynamic HRA is not in the development of specific methods but in 
the using of cognitive modelling and simulation to produce a data framework 
that may be used in quantifying likelihood of human error. A cognitive 
simulation consists of the reproduction of a cognition model using a numerical 
application or computation (Trucco and Leva, 2007; Leva et al., 2009). 
Simulator experiments can produce important basic information for HRA 
method development and data for informing the use of existing HRA methods. 
Simulators allow the study of variations in context and how this impacts 
human performance (Bye et al., 2006). As depicted in Figure I.6, simulation 
and modelling may be used in three ways to capture and generate data that are 
meaningful to HRA (Boring, 2007): 
 The simulation runs produce logs, which may be analysed by subject 
matter experts and used to form an estimate of the likelihood of human 
error. This approach builds heavily on expert estimation techniques 
that are commonly used in HRA.  
 The simulation may be used to produce estimates of performance 
shaping factors, which can be quantified to produce human error 
probabilities based on specific HRA methods. For example, Boring 
(Boring, 2006) postulated a mapping of performance measures 
produced by the Man Machine Integration Design and Analysis system 
(MIDAS) to the eight influencing factors utilized by the SPAR-H 
method. 
 A final approach is to set specific performance criteria by which the 
virtual performers in the simulation are able to succeed or fail at given 
tasks. A common performance criterion is time to complete a task, 
whereby failure to complete the task within a prescribed limit is 
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considered unsatisfactory performance. Through iterations of the task 
that systematically explore the range of human performance, it is 
possible to arrive at a frequency of failure (or success).  
 
 
Figure I.6: Simulation and modelling in Human Reliability Analysis 
(Boring, 2007). 
No modelling or simulation tool currently exists that completely or 
perfectly combines all elements of simulation-based HRA. Significant work 
is, however, already underway. A list of the main simulation projects and 
some of their main features are reported in Table I.1. Some of these, such as 
CES (Woods, Roth and People, 1987) and COSIMO (Cognitive Simulation 
Model) (Cacciabue et al., 1992), have been developed in the nuclear field and 
are computer simulation methods that could potentially be useful, but no use 
or development is evident since the late 90s (Hollnagel, 1996). Unlike CES 
and COSIMO, the environment simulation MIDAS (Man Machine Integration 
Design and Analysis system) (Boring, 2006) was developed in 1986 in field 
of aerospace and aeronautic and has seen ongoing developments and 
applications over the years. Among the latest the integration efforts with HRA 
is the use of SPAR-H performance shaping factors (Boring, 2006).  
Another system, the Information, Decision, Action in Crew context 
(IDAC) model (Chang and Mosleh, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e) 
combines a realistic plant simulator with a cognitive simulation system 
capable of modelling PSFs. The IDAC model is an operator behaviour model 
developed based on many relevant findings from cognitive psychology, 
behavioural science, neuroscience, human factors, field observations, and 
various first and second generation HRA approaches. Three generic types of 
operators are modelled: decision maker (e.g. shift supervisor), action taker 
(e.g. operators at the control panel), and consultant (e.g. resource experts in 
the control room). IDAC covers the operator’s various dynamic response 
phases, including situation assessment, diagnosis, and recovery actions in 
dealing with an abnormal situation. Due to the variety, quantity and detail of 
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the input information, as well as complexity of applying its internal rules, the 
IDAC model is best implemented through a computer simulation such as the 
Accident Dynamics Simulator (ADS) environment.  
Trucco and Leva(2007)  developed a new probabilistic cognitive simulator 
(PROCOS) for approaching human errors in complex operational frameworks 
(Trucco and Leva, 2007; Leva et al., 2009). The PROCOS simulator attempts 
integration of the quantification of first generation HRA methods in safety 
assessment (e.g. THERP) with a cognitive evaluation of the operators 
involved in the context under examination. Its focus is mainly in conveying a 
quantitative result, comparable to those of a traditional HRA method and 
taking into account a cognitive analysis of the operator as well. The simulation 
model comprised two cognitive flow charts, reproducing the behaviour of a 
process industry operator. The model used for the configuration of the flow 
diagram that represents the operators is based on a combination of PIPE 
(Cacciabue, 1998) and SHELL (Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware, 
Liveware; Edwards, 1998). The PIPE model is based on the cognitive 
functions: Perception, Interpretation, Planning and Execution. The two 
combined models allow for representation of the main cognitive processes that 
an operator can carry out to perform an action (PIPE) and describe the 
interaction among procedures, equipment, environment and plants present in 
the working environment, and the operator, as well as taking into account the 
possibility of interaction of the operator with other operators or supervisors 
(SHELL). As a further step, the simulator considers the evaluation of error 
management as part of the overall assessment from the same cognitive point 
of view. PROCOS does not imply the development of a detailed model for the 
operator–context interaction; the context is taken into account mainly through 
the input coming from the PSA framework to which it belongs, and through 
the use of performance shaping factors, as proposed in traditional HRA 
methods. 
Table I.1: Review of main simulators developed for simulating human 
behaviour in HRA field. 
SIMULATOR TYPE DESCRIPTION FIELD 
CES (Cognitive 
Environment 
Simulation) 
 
(Woods, Roth 
and People, 
1987) 
Quantitative 
and 
qualitative 
It simulates the behaviour of a control 
room operator in a nuclear power plant in 
emergency scenarios. The purpose of 
CES is to imitate the way in which 
operators decide to respond, as a basis for 
quantification (Hollnagel, 1996). 
Developed using artificial intelligence 
programming. 
Nuclear 
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SIMULATOR TYPE DESCRIPTION FIELD 
COSIMO 
(Cognitive 
Simulation 
Model) 
 
(Cacciabue et 
al., 1992) 
Quantitative 
and 
qualitative 
It simulates the behaviour of an operator 
reproduced through the Fallible Machine 
model by Reason (1990), combined with 
a model for the specific system to be 
considered. Study the operator actions in 
abnormal plant conditions (accident 
scenarios) in a nuclear power plant. 
Nuclear 
ADS-IDAC 
(Accident 
Dynamics 
Simulator- 
Information, 
Decision, and 
Action in Crew 
context model) 
 
(Chang and 
Mosleh, 2007a, 
b, c, d, e) 
Quantitative Developed for probabilistic prediction of 
the responses of the nuclear power plant 
control room-operating crew during an 
accident for use in probabilistic risk 
assessments (Chang and Mosleh, 2007e). 
The operator response spectrum includes 
cognitive, emotional and physical 
activities during the accident. Within the 
crew context, each individual operator’s 
behaviours are simulated through a 
cognitive model under the influence of a 
number of explicitly modelled PSFs. 
Nuclear 
MIDAS 
(Man Machine 
Integration 
Design and 
Analysis 
system) 
 
(Boring, 2006) 
Quantitative An integrated suite of software developed 
to aid designers and analysts to apply 
human factor principles and human 
performance models to the design of 
complex human–machine systems in 
aviation. It can simulate the behaviour of 
a pilot for civil aviation or an air traffic 
controller. The model of the operator is 
based on Rasmussen’s model (Rasmussen 
et al., 1981). 
Aviation 
PROCOS 
(Probabilistic 
Cognitive 
Simulator) 
 
(Trucco and 
Leva, 2007) 
Quantitative It supports human reliability analysis in 
complex operational contexts. It 
integrates cognitive human error analysis 
with standard hazard analysis methods 
(Hazop and event tree) by means of a 
semi static approach (Trucco and Leva, 
2007; Leva et al., 2009). The simulation 
model comprised two cognitive flow 
charts reproducing the behaviour of a 
process industry operator. The simulator 
allows analysis of both error prevention 
and error recovery. 
General 
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SIMULATOR TYPE DESCRIPTION FIELD 
SYBORG 
(Simulation 
System for 
Behaviour of an 
Operating 
group) 
 
(Takano, Sasou 
and Yoshimura, 
1995) 
Qualitative It simulates a group of nuclear power 
plant operators. It needs input coming 
from a specific plant simulator. It 
highlights some possible combinations of 
operator errors and plant condition that 
can lead to accident sequences; it 
proposes different strategies to improve 
the collaboration within the group 
(Trucco and Leva, 2007; Leva et al., 
2009). 
Nuclear 
Simulators implemented over time are, above all, cognitive simulators; 
their aim is to simulate operator or crew behaviour in terms of correct and 
incorrect actions. These simulations model the operator’s thought processes 
and offer potentially powerful ways of determining how human operators will 
respond in emergency scenarios, typically in complex environments such as 
nuclear power plants. The cognitive simulators developed to date have been 
mainly used for qualitative analysis, and they have not found substantial 
applications in the quantitative risk assessment framework. The models are 
sometimes not easy to understand and therefore are not used by HRA 
specialists that have not been directly involved in their development.  
I.5 Performance shaping factors 
One of the undisputed assumptions in all HRA method is that the human 
performance depends on the conditions under which the tasks or activities are 
carried out (De Ambroggi and Trucco, 2011). In the HRA methods, conditions 
that influence human performance are often referred by term performance 
shaping factor (PSF), but also with alternative synonyms such as Contributing 
factors (CF), Individual related factor, Common Performance Condition 
(CPC), Error promoting condition (EPC), Error inducing factors or 
Performance influencing factors (PIF). They are used in qualitative 
approaches in order to identify contributors to human performance, while in 
quantitative ones, they are used to estimating a more realistic HEP. These 
contextual factors characterize significant facets of human error, and they are 
determined by the individual characteristics of the human being, the 
environment, the organization or the activity that enhances or decreases 
human performance and increases or decreases the likelihood of human error. 
Their modelling and quantification is one of the most complex issues in 
the HRA field, to which many researchers recently are concentrating their 
efforts. While completing an HRA, an analyst may review a list of possible 
PSFs to identify possible sources of human error. The analyst may 
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subsequently use predefined error rates associated with specific PSFs to 
determine a human error probability for a given task or situation (Boring, 
Griffith and Joe, 2007).  
The first-generation HRA methods are less concerned with what people are 
likely to do than with whether they will succeed or fail (Lee et al., 2011). None 
of these approaches consider explaining how the PSFs exert their effect on 
performance. PSFs such as managerial methods and attitudes, organizational 
factors, cultural differences, and irrational behaviour are not adequately 
treated in the first-generation. On the contrary, the second-generation 
considers the context in which humans make errors and derives PSFs based 
on these contexts. PSFs in the first-generation HRA methods were mainly 
derived by focusing on the environmental impacts on operators, whereas in 
the second one they were derived by focusing on the cognitive impacts on 
operators (Lee et al., 2011). 
Within HRA, PSFs are often categorized as internal or external, 
corresponding to the individual vs. situational or environmental 
circumstances, respectively, that brings to bear on performance. The research 
literature divides the PSFs into two other categories: direct and indirect 
measures of human performance (Boring, Griffith and Joe, 2007). While some 
popular PSFs such as “time needed to complete a task” are directly 
measurable, other PSFs, such as “fitness for duty,” can primarily be measured 
indirectly through other measures and PSFs, for example through fatigue 
measures.  
Their definition and classification, although complex and variable, have 
been carefully detailed by researchers who have proposed over time numerous 
taxonomies, as reported in Table I.2. There has been a greater emphasis 
recently to catalogue ways in which PSFs might also enhance performance 
and to develop taxonomy of performance influencing factors for HRA of 
emergency tasks (Kim and Jung, 2003; Boring, 2010; Lee et al., 2011). Kim 
and Jung (2003), for example, have collected and ordered the eighteen 
taxonomies in Table I.2 in a new series of PSF, consisting of about 220 
detailed PSFs. These PSFs were classified the collated PIFs are classified into 
four main groups:  
 Human: Personal characteristics and working capabilities of the 
human operator. 
 System: Man-Machine Interface (MMI), plant hardware system, and 
physical characteristics of the plant process. 
 Task: Procedures and task characteristics required of the operator. 
 Environment: Team and organization factors, and physical working 
environment. 
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Table I.2: Summary of PSFs taxonomies (Kim and Jung, 2003). 
PSF TAXONOMIES FOR HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS 
CSNI taxonomy (Rasmussen 
et al., 1981) 
PSF taxonomy (Bellamy, 1991) 
THERP (Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983) 
Influencing factors (Gerdes, 1997) 
HEART (Williams, 1985) 
K-HPES (Kim, 1997) 
PHECA (Whalley, 1987) 
PSF TAXONOMIES FOR HRA 
HEP quantification Analysis of commission errors 
SLIM (Embrey, 1986) 
PLGSLIM (Chu, Musicki 
and Others, 1994) 
Macwan’s PIF taxonomy for errors of 
commission (Macwan and Mosleh, 1994) 
INTENT (Gertman et al., 
1992) 
Julius’ PIF taxonomy for errors of 
commission (Julius et al., 1995) 
STAHR (Philips et al., 1990) 
ATHEANA (Cooper et al., 1996) 
HRMS (Barry Kirwan, 1997) 
Evaluation of the global 
context and analysis of 
errors 
HRA database 
CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) 
Taylor-Adams’ PSF taxonomy for 
CORE-DATA (Taylor-Adams, 
1995)(Taylor-Adams, 1995) 
INCORECT (Kontogiannis, 
1997) 
Rogers’ PSF taxonomy for CORE-DATA 
(Kirwan, Basra and Taylor-Adams, 1997) 
On the other hand, the interrelationships between PSFs gain much attention 
from the HRA community. Despite continuing advances in research and 
applications, one of the main weaknesses of current HRA methods is their 
limited ability to model the mutual influence among PSFs, intended both as a 
dependency among the states of the PSFs dependency among PSFs influences 
on human performance, as shown in Figure I.7 (De Ambroggi and Trucco, 
2011). Very different conceptual and analytical models are proposed for 
describing how these factors exert their influence on the human error 
probability; indeed, if a PSF influences human performance it is crucial to 
account for how this influence comes about. Several studies argued that the 
dependency between PSFs should be included in the quantification of HRA 
Human error and human reliability in human-intensive working activities 
 
55 
and suggested that the Bayesian network (BN) would be a promising 
technique because it can describe the casual relationship between PSFs (Groth 
and Swiler, 2013). 
Some HRA methods – such as CREAM, SPAR-H, and IDAC – try to 
provide guidance on how to treat dependencies at the level of the factor 
assessments but do not consider that a PSF category might depend on itself 
and that the presence of a specific PSF might modulate the impact of another 
PSF on HEP; therefore, they do not adequately consider the relationships and 
dependencies between PSFs (De Ambroggi and Trucco, 2011). The study of 
De Ambroggi and Trucco (2011), instead, deals with the development of a 
framework for modelling the mutual influences existing among PSFs and a 
related method to assess the importance of each PSF in influencing 
performance of an operator, in a specific context, considering these 
interactions. 
 
Figure I.7: Possible types of dependency between PSFs: (A) dependency 
between the states/presence of the PSFs and (B) dependency between the 
state of PSFj and the impact of PSFi over the HEP. 
Another limitation of current HRA methods is the strong dependence on 
expert opinion to assign values to the PSFs; in fact, during this assignment 
process, subjectivity plays a significant role, causing difficulties in assuring 
consistency. To overcome this problem and obtain a more precise estimation, 
Park and Lee (2008) suggest a new and simple method: AHP– SLIM. This 
method combines the decision-making tool AHP – a multicriteria decision 
method for complex problems in which both qualitative and quantitative 
aspects are considered to provide objective and realistic results – with success 
likelihood index method (SLIM), a simple, flexible method of the expert 
judgement for estimating HEPs (Park and Lee, 2008). Therefore, through a 
type of HEP estimation using an analytic hierarchy process (AHP), it is 
possible to quantify the subjective judgement and confirm the consistency of 
collected data.  
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I.6 Shortcomings and limitations in HRA methods  
Despite the efforts of HRA experts to develop an advanced method, many 
of the limitations and problems of these approaches have not yet been resolved 
due to the complexity of human nature and the difficulty in predicting and 
simulating human behaviour. Currently, no methodology has a consensus, and 
most of them have not been very attractive to the practitioners and managers 
due to the complexity of the techniques developed and the lack of information 
that allows implementation in a comprehensive manner. Over 70 human 
reliability tools were developed since 1960 for the same aim: human error 
quantification. Every method has the same purpose but uses different 
methodological frameworks, priority, operator models and performance 
shaping factors. HRA methods and simulation tools, proposed over the years, 
have not always been particularly useful to the purpose for which they were 
developed. 
The review processes (Griffith and Mahadevan, 2011) demonstrated that 
HRA criticism may be classified into key issues: 
1) lack of empirical data for model development and validation; 
2) model’s theoretical basis (including taxonomy and concept’s specificity),  
3) definition and use of PSFs with heavy reliance on expert judgment in 
selecting PSFs, and use of these PSFs to obtain the HEP,  
4) large variability in implementation (i.e. HRA parameters are different 
depending on the method used); 
5) HRA quantification.  
In particular, the quantification method is weak, and the quantitative results 
are unsubstantiated since many methods pay attention only to the responses of 
humans in accident scenarios. Other tools, such as THERP, include levels of 
detail that may be excessive for many assessments. The existing HRA tools 
allow very thorough evaluations of human behaviour in high-risk 
environments but can be resource intensive and time-consuming.  
Furthermore, HRA approaches have been mainly developed for high-risk 
contexts (e.g., aviation or nuclear power plants) wherein only the typical 
accident scenarios are considered. Methods, as THERP or CREAM, were born 
as approaches for nuclear power plant, considering only the typical accident 
scenarios in this context. In the same way the major HRA simulation tools, 
seen in previous section, are adapted to specific field, such as aviation and 
control rooms of nuclear power plants. For this reason, the use of methods and 
simulators in other working areas is strongly restricted. Traditional HRA 
approaches need several efforts to be applied in different fields such as manual 
assembly or manufacturing systems or medical context (Schemeleva et al., 
Human error and human reliability in human-intensive working activities 
 
57 
2012; Yang et al., 2012). The specificity of the models can also be considered 
a weak point since it means that they are difficult to be applied to task analysis 
different from the one they have been developed for. Mosleh and Chang 
(2004) have analysed the limitations of the existing HRA methods and 
outlined the guidelines for future methods, emphasizing the importance of 
having methods that: 
 identify human response (errors are the focus), 
 estimate response probabilities, 
 identify causes of errors to support development of preventive or 
mitigating measures. 
 have explicit role for ‘context’ both in error identification and 
probability estimation; 
 be applicable by different users for different problems; 
 be traceable, consistent and repeatable. 
I.7 Human error in manual assembly systems 
Human error in manual assembly systems affects system reliability, safety 
and is one of the most important causes of quality defects. The assembly 
process is often the final stage of the production process, which implies that 
the products have a lot of accumulated value hence making errors is expensive 
at this point that the products have a lot of accumulated value hence making 
errors is expensive at this point of the product life-cycle (Claeys et al., 2015). 
In particular, the major part of the active manufacturing workforce is currently 
involved in assembly line systems (Claeys et al., 2015). Assembly errors are 
associated with worker’s capabilities such as knowledge and skills; 
psychophysical fatigue; task parameters such as workload and repetitiveness; 
and the work environment (Elmaraghy, Nada and Elmaraghy, 2008). The 
occurrence of human errors in manual assembly line can be affected by several 
factors, such as (Mura, Dini and Failli, 2016): 
 Assembly system factors: workplaces with high repetitiveness of 
tasks, high noise and poor ergonomics can cause both mental and 
physical stress and reduce the attention of the operator. 
 Product factor: over time products with many or similar components 
can cause an increase in the number of errors; the increasing variety of 
products was also identified as the main cause of the complexity 
perceived by an operator in carrying out his tasks. 
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 Operator factors: worker's memory, mental and physical abilities, 
skills, training level and experience are some factors that determine the 
probability of mistakes during the assembly phase. 
General error mode includes tasks performed non-sequentially, use of the 
wrong part/object, application of the wrong force and other types (Michalos, 
Makris and Chryssolouris, 2013), which can cause accidents, quality defects 
or delays. Accidents, as the most obvious kind of errors, are easily traceable, 
however, minor faults can dramatically reduce the operation performance and 
increase remarkably production time, cost, rework and scrap rate. Moreover, 
it may cause significant loss in the quality image and global profitability of 
the company.  
The assembly errors and the application of HRA techniques in this field 
has focused the attention of researchers only in recent years. Most of the 
papers that presented empirical evidence on the relationship between human 
reliability and assembly system, focusing on the assembler performance or the 
application of new and existing HRA techniques to assembly tasks were 
published in the last 5 years.  
Several scholars applied existing HRA technique, such as CREAM 
(Schemeleva et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2012; Wang, Zhang and Xue, 2014), 
THERP (Bubb, 2005) and ESAT - Expert System for Task Taxonomy (Kern 
and Refflinghaus, 2011, 2013, 2017; Neumayr et al., 2015). For example, 
Schemeleva et al. (2012) use CREAM to create a simulation model capable 
to reproduce a real automobile assembly line with a high degree of details and 
to assess the qualitative and quantitative lack of operator’s assurance. Kern et 
al. (2011, 2013, 2017), instead, create an assembly specific HRA-model based 
on ESAT method to evaluate potential human error rates quantitatively in 
advance associated with cost and time early analysis (Kern and Refflinghaus, 
2011, 2013, 2017; Neumayr et al., 2015). This new method allows quantifying 
potential human error rates in assembly operations before the start of 
production and it allows comparing planning alternatives under time and cost 
aspects early.  
Original approaches to assess human reliability and quantify human error 
probability, not considering the typical HRA principle but focusing on some 
specific features of the manual assembly tasks are also proposed in literature. 
Baez et al. (2014) address operator’s failing behaviour and develop a human 
reliability model by using Cox’s Proportional Risk Model. The model 
describes the behaviour of the rate of human error, considering the effect of 
the operational environment and the time of the shift, namely the time passed 
before the errors are reported. The authors showed that cognitive and 
psychosocial risk factors (stress, motivation, memory and personality) have a 
significant influence in error occurrences of 120 assembly line operators of an 
electronic company in Mexico (Baez et al., 2014). Saptari, Leau and 
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Mohamad (2015) analyse specifically the effect of different parameters, like 
time pressure, working position, component bin position and gender, 
obtaining that time pressure is the most significant parameters followed by 
working position and gender (Saptari, Leau and Mohamad, 2015). Finally, 
Givi, Jaber and Neumann (2015), instead, developed a new human reliability 
model that estimates the human error rate while performing an assembly job 
under the influence of learning–forgetting and fatigue–recovery and can 
anticipate how and when an error occurs, dynamically measuring the human 
error rate and reliability with time. 
Current state-of-the-art underline that a prospective analysis of human 
reliability in the manual assembly systems until now has been neglected in 
literature, even if the variability of human behaviour and worker performance 
remain a pressing and relevant issue in this field. Nevertheless, the research 
results showed that HRA methods, both the first generation and the latest 
dynamic-based ones, which were developed for the high-risk industries, can 
be applied with success to manufacturing industries and its assembly systems. 
I.7.1 Modelling of error consequences on assembly 
systems 
The most serious problem for HRA approaches is the scarcity of empirical 
data on human performance (including data on basic human error probability 
and the effect of individual and contextual factors that impact on human 
performance) for model development and validation (Liu and Li, 2014). A 
wide range of domains have provided source data for studies of human error: 
aircraft; nuclear power plants and process control; ships and everyday routines 
including highly skilled tasks such as typing (Rouse and Rouse, 1983). The 
manufacturing systems, and in particular assembly systems, have become 
objects of study and application of HRA techniques only in recent years and 
for them data collection methods are not always applicable. Data collection 
methods, in fact, fall into two categories (Bubb, 2005): 
 Directly observable in the human actions: this is possible by observing 
worker’s activities except in artificial experimental situations; however 
direct observation is usually not available in practice. 
 Indirectly observable in the result: in this case the deviation of result 
from the demanded quality is assigned as error. In practice an accident 
is unambiguously the case of exceeding of limit of acceptance. 
Therefore, accident research is an essential source to get basic data of 
human error. 
Data collection in manufacturing systems to feed human reliability seems 
to have more severe constraints. The effort to directly collect human data is 
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time-resource consuming and accuracy of the collection method is very 
difficult to assess. In this field, human error translates and manifests itself not 
only in the form of accidents, which in fact represent a small portion, but also 
in different consequences as listed in the proposed taxonomy. Therefore, data 
sources should belong to different type of human error consequences: 
1) Non-compliants: is the failure to satisfy a requirement, a need or 
expectation that can be expressed, implied or obligatory. Non-compliants 
consist of rejected items and reworks offline. 
2) Incidents and injuries: derive from the aggregation of human actions with 
physical system behaviours. 
3) Machine’s failures: are systemic and not random due to design errors, 
omissions, wrong applications, but also to improper operation, incorrect 
use of the equipment, and more others.  
4) Machine’s slowdowns or delay: deceleration caused by re-working in-line 
or increase of processing times. 
5) Latent errors and near-miss: the first may lie dormant within the system 
for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with other 
factors to breach the system’s defences (Reason, 1990); whereas near miss 
event is a potential hazardous condition where the accident sequence was 
interrupted (Andriulo and Gnoni, 2014). 
The first two classes are more easily measurable and attributable to man. 
There are, in fact, several methods in the literature developed to distinguish 
causes of accidents between human error or technical and organizational 
factors as well as the management of non-compliance allows to know the 
causes of scraps or reworks offline. The other classes, instead, are more 
complex to identify, quantify and above all attribute to operator. 
I.8 Human error in healthcare systems 
The activities carried out in the healthcare sector are characterized by a 
strong human component: human operator can make a mistake that, in this 
case, has both a social implication, from the point of view of patient safety, 
and economic, from the point of view of the costs generated (Cuschieri, 2000).  
The consequence of an error is of crucial importance and the spectrum 
varies from no consequence to serious and fatal. For example, in endoscopic 
surgery, a surgeon may exert too much tenting force during use of an 
electrosurgical knife with inevitable follow- through of the hook knife once 
the tissue is cut. It is a matter of luck, where the hook knife stops or impinges 
- mid-air (no consequence), into bowel or large vessel (serious consequence). 
Thus, avoidance of all errors underlies safe execution and, in this respect, 
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inconsequential errors in surgery are rare. Therefore, it is essential the use of 
human error estimation techniques as a tool for risk analysis and decision 
support. The strongest influence of HRA approaches has been on the analysis 
of serious clinical incidents in healthcare, which have drawn on the critical 
incident technique, root cause analysis  and other methods (Lyons et al., 
2004). In the last few years, however, there has been growing interest in a 
wider range of safety and reliability techniques used in other industries. 
Lyons et al. (2004) performed a full literature review of HRA techniques 
in healthcare. This produced a brief list of fourteen primary HRA techniques 
(Table I.3), which have either had practical application in healthcare or which 
were well-established elsewhere and had potential application. Most of these 
techniques are based on an initial task analysis and a task simulation to 
identify a list of the potential errors that could occur associated with this task. 
Quantification is usually based on either fault trees or event trees, which 
provide the basis for quantification. 
Table I.3: HRA methods applied in healthcare sector (Lyons et al., 
2004). 
TECHNIQUE DEFINITION 
APPLICATION 
HEALTHCARE 
Absolute 
Probability 
Judgement 
(APJ) 
Experts provide for their judgement on the 
likelihood of specific human error and this 
information is gathered mathematically for 
inter-judge consistency. 
None reported in 
healthcare. 
Barrier Analysis 
Barrier analysis is used to examine the 
defences and controls that have been put in 
place to protect something or someone 
from harm, their effectiveness and 
suggestions for improvements. 
- 
Change Analysis 
Tool used to analyse the effect of process 
changes, considering the differences 
between normal practice and incidents. 
Applied to the 
process of care that 
leads to patient 
incidents. 
Cognitive 
Reliability and 
Error Analysis 
Method 
(CREAM) 
CREAM puts emphasis on defining and 
analysing the causes of human errors. The 
theoretical background of CREAM is the 
classifications of error modes and elements 
of humans, technology, and organization. 
Not yet applied in 
healthcare. 
Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) 
An event tree is a tree-like diagram that 
splits according to escalation and recovery 
events as well as an operator’s choices 
between responses at each stage. Usually 
Ambulance 
treatment of 
patients with 
suspected 
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TECHNIQUE DEFINITION 
APPLICATION 
HEALTHCARE 
the probability of given branches is 
calculated providing the expected 
probability of each outcome. 
Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis 
(FMEA)s 
A FMEA is a systematic method of 
identifying and preventing product and 
process problems before they occur. This 
involves using a team of multidisciplinary 
experts to evaluate the process, what 
failures could occur and the severity and 
probability of the effects and what actions 
can reduce these effects. 
Reducing risk in 
blood transfusion; 
Intravenous drug 
infusions; 
improving a drug 
distribution system; 
drug prescription in 
wards. 
Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) 
A fault tree is a tree diagram using 
AND/OR logic which is used to examine 
how an incident occurred or could occur 
due to contributing factors and events. 
Potential exposure 
risk for 
radiotherapy staff; 
medication error; 
medical device 
failure. 
Hazard and 
Operability 
Analysis 
(HAZOP) 
HAZOP involves a team of multi-
disciplinary experts evaluating processes 
using the application of guidewords – such 
as “task not done”, “task done too late”, 
“task done too much”. 
Medical imaging; 
cervical screening. 
Human Error 
Assessment and 
Reduction 
Technique 
(HEART) 
HEART is used to quantify error 
probability by applying weighting factors 
associated with error producing conditions 
to the relevant generic error probability 
associated with the types of task being 
examined. 
Widely used in 
industry but not yet 
applied in 
healthcare. 
Influence 
Diagrams 
Analysis (IDA) 
Influence Diagrams are a means of 
modelling and quantifying the effects of a 
number of contributory factors and human 
actions on outcome. 
Medical decisions, 
surgical problem 
solving. 
Management 
Oversight Risk 
Tree (MORT) 
MORT involves the applications of a 
toolbox approach to analyse incidents in 
terms of the adequacy of the safety 
management measures already in place. 
This involves the use of a fault-tree like 
structure to look at what happened, why it 
may have happened then examines these 
concepts in terms of systems and 
Not yet applied in 
healthcare. 
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TECHNIQUE DEFINITION 
APPLICATION 
HEALTHCARE 
organizational failures and precursor 
events. 
Paired 
Comparisons 
This is similar to the absolute probability 
judgement except the experts are provided 
with task descriptions with known error 
probabilities to use as a baseline 
None used in 
healthcare. 
Systematic 
human error 
reduction and 
prediction 
approach 
(SHERPA) 
SHERPA is a comprehensive technique 
involving task analysis. SHERPA 
identifies error modes. (not done, partially 
done, too little) and “psychological error 
mechanisms” – the thought processes that 
may fail or lead to errors, potential for 
recovery from error, the consequences of 
error and error reduction strategies. 
Errors in 
endoscopic 
surgery. 
Technique for 
human error 
rate prediction 
(THERP) 
THERP is a total methodology for human 
reliability analysis – from task analysis, 
development of event trees to error 
quantification. Like HEART, for 
quantification, this involves the use of 
nominal human error probabilities adapted 
by the relative effects of Performance 
Shaping Factors to determine success and 
failure probabilities as well as looking at 
the effect of recovery effects. 
Widely used in 
industry but not yet 
applied in 
healthcare. 
Most analyses have gone little further than the relatively simplistic incident 
decision trees. HEART and THERP, for instance, are both well-validated error 
analysis and quantification techniques and whilst they have been primarily 
applied in the nuclear industry, the detailed level of behaviour that they have 
considered makes them at least conceptually useful to apply in healthcare. 
HEART uses an estimation of error based on the familiarity and complexity 
of the task modified by estimates of the influence of “error- producing 
conditions” such as time shortage, stress or ambiguity in the required 
performance standards. Although many of HRA techniques (e.g. THERP & 
HEART) rely on expert judgement to assign probabilities of error to the task 
being performed, it has been found that the reliability and accuracy of these 
judgments made by trained human factors personnel is incredibly accurate. 
These methodologies take performance shaping factors into account. There 
are situational, contextual or environmental factors that may impact on an 
individual or system and make errors more or less likely to occur. Onofrio, 
Trucco and Torchio (2015) developed an ad hoc taxonomy of Influencing 
Factors for surgery (Table I.4). 
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Table I.4: Influencing Factors in Surgery Applications. 
Influencing factors Valence 
Noise & back- ground talk not related to the task +/- 
Safety Culture and Safety Climate +/- 
Standardization +/- 
Equipment, HMI and space design +/- 
Communication and team- work +/- 
Experience and Team Training + 
Fatigue - 
Leadership +/- 
Staffing and team member familiarity +/- 
Workload - 
HRA techniques might be used, for instance, in the design of surgical 
instruments; in decisions about the labelling of dangerous drugs; in designing 
a system of double checks for drug administration; in the design of work 
processes such as booking appointments or patient flow in Accident and 
Emergency; in identifying the factors that lead to high stress and liability to 
error in clinicians; and in the analysis of the range of factors involved in a 
serious incident and in the subsequent implementation of safety solutions 
across a clinical department or healthcare system. Specific applications are 
proposed in literature. Cox, Dolan and Macewen (2008) describe the 
application of HRA as a tool to quantify errors that occur during small incision 
cataract surgery. Malik, White and Macewen (2003) describe the nature of 
active skill-based errors occurring in endoscopic dacrocystorhinostomy 
surgery. A human reliability analysis methodology was used to assess surgical 
error from observational capture data. The breadth of application of HRA 
techniques suggests that the potential application of these techniques is very 
wide, encompassing design of equipment and procedures, organization of 
work processes, the manner in which tasks are carried out and the wider, less 
obvious, factors that contribute to error and patient harm. 
I.9 Human error in industrial maintenance 
The maintenance process is essential for a safe and reliable system and 
efficient performance of devices in different work environment, such as 
nuclear power plants, aviation, chemical plants, offshore facilities, 
manufacturing systems or other type of industries. Dhillon and Liu (2006) 
reported the impact of human errors in maintenance as found in the literature 
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as a pressing problem. In fact, although the equipment reliability has 
significantly improved, and the processes are becoming more and more 
automated, yet human factor continues to be fundamental and maintenance 
tasks, that are expected to be perfect, are vulnerable to human error. Human 
error in maintenance tasks may lead to incorrect decisions, actions, or checks 
and it is influenced by a variety of individual and contextual factors with a 
wide variability in the success of interventions. There are several reasons for 
the occurrence of human error in maintenance, like (Dhillon and Liu, 2006): 
 Complex maintenance task; 
 Inadequate or improper work tools; 
 Poor equipment design; 
 Poorly written maintenance procedures; 
 Poor work layout; 
 Outdated maintenance manuals;  
 Fatigued maintenance personnel;  
 Poor job environment (e.g., lighting, humidity, and temperature); 
 Inadequate training and experience. 
Bao and Ding (2014) show that, from maintainers perspective, HE number 
accounts to 91% and the most significant types of error are inspection and 
installation of system components. For these reasons, the assessment of the 
likelihood of human error is essential in maintenance field. The type of human 
error, its consequences, the main individual and contextual factors and their 
impact has been investigated trough a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) 
concerning human error in maintenance (HEM), following the guidelines 
presented by Neumann et al. (2016) and Pires et al. (2015). Systematic 
literature reviews aim at structuring a certain research area and synthesizing 
research findings, following a clearly defined, rigorous and reliable approach 
that allow presenting objective and reproducible results (Hochrein and Glock, 
2012). This search aims to identify peer-reviewed papers that presented 
evidence on the relationship between human performance and maintenance 
activities. Four research questions were addressed in this study: (1) What are 
the industrial sectors mainly investigated in the field of interest? (2) What are 
the main causes and contributing factors that lead to human error in 
maintenance? (3) What are the main HEM consequences? (4) How HE is 
evaluated and integrated within the maintenance management? The SLR was 
carried out through the listed steps below:  
 Identification of research databases and keywords definition: two 
scientific databases (Scopus and Web of Science) were used and a set 
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of keywords, structured in two distinct groups, was prepared for these 
databases: Group A, which includes “human error”, “human reliability 
analysis”, “human reliability assessment”, “human error probability”; 
and Group B which includes “maintenance”. The final keywords list 
used to search consisted of all possible combinations of keywords from 
Groups A and B using the Boolean operators. 
 Literature search and paper selection through specific exclusion 
criteria: only articles in English and published in peer-reviewed 
journals or conferences between 1997 and 2017 were screened. After 
running the search on the two databases, all papers were uploaded into 
a database manager (i.e., Mendeley) and all duplicates were removed. 
The selection process was divided into two phases. The first selection 
phase was the reading of the title, abstract, keywords. In this screening 
stage, articles were classified as included, excluded and undefined 
according to the specific exclusion criteria described below: 
 No full text is available; 
 Articles presenting only one of the main key concepts (maintenance and 
human error); 
 Papers do not establish a link between maintenance and human error. 
 HEM is a secondary aspect than the main purpose of the paper. 
 The second stage included the reading of the full text of the papers 
selected in the previous stage and therefore a definitive assessment 
based on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th exclusion criteria.  
 Analysis process and information extraction strategy: the analysis 
was performed using a pre-determined systematic methodology based 
on specific criteria to extract and structure the information:  
 industrial sectors; 
 methodologies for HE analysis; 
 types and typical HEs in maintenance; 
 error contributing factors; 
 maintenance policies; 
 maintenance error consequences.  
The total number of studies resulted from the database search was 576. 
After the first screening stage, 120 articles were identified as relevant. Among 
them, 63 papers were selected after the second screening stage. Table I.5 
reports the full list of the 63 selected papers. 
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Table I.5: Papers selected trough the Systematic Literature Review 
concerning human error in maintenance. 
ID REFERENCE ID REFERENCE ID REFERENCE 
1 
(Aalipour, Ayele and 
Barabadi, 2016) 
22 
(Hameed, Khan and 
Ahmed, 2016) 
43 
(McDonnell et al., 
2015) 
2 (Abbassi et al., 2015) 23 (Hayama et al., 2011) 44 
(Mc Leod and Rivera, 
2009) 
3 
(Achebo and Oghoore, 
2010) 
24 (Heo and Park, 2010) 45 
(Mc Leod and Rivera, 
2011) 
4 
(Asadzadeh and 
Azadeh, 2014) 
25 
(Hobbs and Williamson, 
2002) 
46 
(Mc Leod and Rivera, 
2013) 
5 (Bao and Ding, 2014) 26 
(Hobbs and Williamson, 
2003) 
47 (Nicholas, 2009) 
6 (Bao et al., 2015) 27 
(Hobbs, Williamson and 
Van Dongen, 2010) 
48 (Noroozi et al., 2013) 
7 
(Bozkurt and 
Kavsaoglu, 2010) 
28 (Islam et al., 2016) 49 
(Noroozi, Khan, et al., 
2014) 
8 
(Carr and Christer, 
2003) 
29 (Islam et al., 2017) 50 
(Noroozi, Abbassi, et 
al., 2014) 
9 
(Castiglia and 
Giardina, 2013) 
30 
(Khalaquzzaman et al. 
2010a) 
51 (Okoh, 2015) 
10 
(Chen and Huang, 
2013) 
31 
(Khalaquzzaman et al. 
2010b) 
52 
(Papic and Kovacevic, 
2016) 
11 
(Chen and Huang, 
2014) 
32 
(Khalaquzzaman et al., 
2011) 
53 (Rankin et al., 2000) 
12 
(Chiodo, Gagliardi and 
Pagano, 2004) 
33 (Kim and Park, 2008) 54 
(Rashid, Place and 
Braithwaite, 2013) 
13 
(Chiu and Hsieh, 
2016) 
34 (Kim and Park, 2009) 55 
(Rashid, Place and 
Braithwaite, 2014) 
14 
(Dhillon and Kirmizi, 
2003) 
35 (Kim and Park, 2012) 56 
(Razak, Kamaruddin 
and Azid, 2008) 
15 
(Dhillon and Liu, 
2006) 
36 (Kovacevic et al., 2016) 57 
(Sheikhalishahi, 
Azadeh, et al. 2016) 
16 
(Dhillon and Shah, 
2007) 
37 
(Kumar and Gandhi, 
2011) 
58 
(Sheikhalishahi, 
Pintelon, et al. 2016) 
17 (Dhillon, 2009) 38 
(Kumar, Gandhi and 
Gandhi, 2015) 
59 
(Sheikhalishahi et al. 
2016) 
18 (Dhillon, 2014) 39 
(Latorella and Prabhu, 
2000) 
60 
(Singh and Kumar, 
2015) 
19 
(Emami-Mehrgani et 
al., 2016) 
40 
(Lawrence and Gill, 
2007) 
61 
(Su, Hwang and Liu, 
2000) 
20 
(Geibel, Von Thaden 
and Suzuki, 2008) 
41 (Liang et al., 2010) 62 
(Wang and Hwang, 
2004) 
21 (Gibson, 2000) 42 (Lind, 2008) 63 (Zhou et al., 2015) 
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Different industrial sectors were identified showing that most of the papers 
are related to aviation (38%), nuclear industry (24%) and oil and gas offshore 
facilities (11%). 
Various methods and approaches to measure human reliability or human 
error were found. Most of them are based on the HRA theoretical principles, 
which aim to identify the causes and sources of human errors and to pursue 
quantitative HEP estimates during professional activity. For example, Islam 
et al. (2017) developed a monograph for assessing the likelihood of human 
error in marine operations that can be applied for instant decision-making. 
Kim and Park (2012) introduced human error analysis procedures for a 
predictive HE analysis when maintainers perform test or maintenance actions 
based on a work procedure or work plan. Each procedure consists of three 
steps: analysis of basic error potential, evaluation of possible impacts on the 
system, and identification of deficient work context or PSFs. Noroozi, Khan, 
et al. (2014) presented a revised version of HEART methodology to assess the 
effects of cold on the likelihood of human error in offshore oil and gas 
facilities. Instead, other papers applied the existing HRA techniques to real 
case studies for estimating human error probabilities, validating their 
consistency through the comparison of the obtained results (Castiglia and 
Giardina, 2013; Aalipour, Ayele and Barabadi, 2016) or integrating the HEP 
estimate within maintenance management methodologies (Asadzadeh and 
Azadeh, 2014; Bao et al., 2015; Hameed, Khan and Ahmed, 2016; M 
Sheikhalishahi et al., 2016). For example, Abbassi et al.(2015) integrated the 
Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) with the Technique of Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) for the HEP assessment in an offshore 
condensate pump maintenance task; whereas (Aalipour, Ayele and Barabadi, 
2016) compared three common HRA methods (HEART, SPAR-H and 
Bayesian Network) during the maintenance tasks in a cable manufacturing 
company in Iran. Among these 22 papers, the most common HRA methods 
are: SLIM (36%), THERP (23%), HEART (23%) and the Bayesian Network 
(3%).  
Other methodologies, not based on HRA principles, were developed over 
the years in order to quantify and integrate HE in maintenance management. 
Carr and Christer (2003) analysed the delay-time modelling of inspection 
maintenance, incorporating HE existence in the form of fault injection and 
evaluating HE impacts on system reliability or maintenance decisions. Chiu 
and Hsieh (2016) established a new analytic process for investigating latent 
human error and provided a strategy for analysing human error using fuzzy 
TOPSIS. Kumar and Gandhi (2011) applied graph theory for quantifying HE 
in maintenance activities modelling HE influencing factors and their 
interactions/ interrelationships based on a fuzzy cognitive map methodology.  
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From analysis of methodologies is evident that work environment, 
organization and individual features are considered as the major contributors 
to human error and are the key factors in analysing performance of maintainer. 
HRA methods use the PSFs for enhancing or degrading the HEP (Aalipour, 
Ayele and Barabadi, 2016; Hameed, Khan and Ahmed, 2016; Islam et al., 
2016, 2017), whereas the other methods consider these factors as HE 
influencing or contributing factors (Gibson, 2000; Dhillon, 2009). Moreover, 
SLR results underline that accidents are the most evident HEM consequence 
in terms of safety, while other consequences were not deeply analysed in 
literature respect to the modelling of HE and contributing factors. The human 
performance, in fact, can affect also the system reliability, the frequency of 
maintenance interventions, and the length of intervention time. For example, 
only Dhillon et al. (2003, 2007)  considered the impact of human errors on the 
system availability and on the probabilities of system being in unsafe working 
states; while (Achebo and Oghoore, 2010; Azadeh, Asadzadeh and Seif, 2014; 
Bao et al., 2015) evaluated how HE can impact on system reliability.  
The SLR results provide for a wide overview in the field of interest 
shedding light on relevance of considering HEM and its non-negligible effects 
on the systems.  
I.10 Impact of ageing on human error in 
manufacturing systems 
Population ageing is acknowledged as a global trend, and this trend affects 
the working population. Increasing longevity and declining fertility rates are 
shifting the age distribution of populations in industrialized countries toward 
older age groups (Anderson and Hussey, 2000; United States General 
Accunting Office, 2003). The International Labour Organization (ILO) has 
estimated that by the year 2025, the proportion of individuals over the age of 
55 years will be 32% in Europe, 30% in North America, 21% in Asia, and 
17% in Latin America (Ilmarinen, 2001). This demographic change has a 
significant impact on various dimensions of society, including the available 
workforce age structure. In Europe, the working population age trends indicate 
that the oldest age group (55–64 years) will expand by about 16.2% (9.9 
million) between 2010 and 2030, whereas all the other age groups show a 
declining trend (Fritzsche et al., 2014; Boenzi, Digiesi, et al., 2015; Kenny et 
al., 2016). For this reason, currently great attention is being paid to the age 
from scientific community, policy-makers and business leaders (Harper and 
Marcus, 2006; Ilmarinen, 2006; Thun, Größler and Miczka, 2007; Silverstein, 
2008; Backes-Gellner, Schneider and Veen, 2011; Boenzi, Mossa, et al., 2015; 
Börsch-Supan and Weiss, 2016).  
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Older workers have more serious, but less frequent, workplace injuries and 
illnesses than younger ones. Ageing is, also, associated with a progressive 
decrement in various aspects of human capabilities (motor, cognitive and 
sensory aspects), that may lead to increase of human errors during the working 
activity. However, older workers can often compensate for age-related losses 
with relatively age stable strategies and skills related to their experience, 
expertise, or learning ability. 
The impact of age on HF capabilities has been quantified, as reported in 
many studies in the psychological, gerontological and medical disciplines that 
examine how various abilities change over an individual’s lifetime (Chan, 
Tan, & Koh, 2000; Crawford, et al. 2010; De Zwart, Frings-Dresen, & Van 
Dijk, 1995; Salthouse, 2010; Salthouse, 2012; Shephard, 1999; Silverstein, 
2008). From a general psycho-physiological perspective, ageing means a 
progressive and universal deterioration of the various physiological systems. 
Changes in physical work capacity have often concentrated on the 
cardiovascular and musculoskeletal systems, body structure, and some 
important sensory systems (Ilmarinen, 2001). Studies about ageing workers 
demonstrated that the functional capacities, mainly physical, show a declining 
trend after the age of 30 years, and the trend can become critical after the next 
15–20 years, so that from 45 to 64 years old there is a significant decrease of 
their capacities, both physical and cognitive ones.  
To date, the ageing theory has been widely discussed in the literature from 
a physiological point of view. But little is known about the impact of age on 
HE, despite the inevitable role of ageing workers and human errors in 
manufacturing systems. In fact, chronological age impacts on human 
reliability and the occurrence of human errors strongly influences system 
reliability and safety, equipment performance and economic results. A 
systematic literature review, following the guidelines presented by Neumann 
et al. (2016) and Pires et al. (2015), has been conducted using three scientific 
databases (Scopus, Web of Science and Engineering Village) to identify peer-
reviewed papers that presented evidence on the relationship between ageing 
and human performance in manufacturing systems. To investigate this 
relationship, it is necessary to consider research from several disciplines. A 
set of keywords was prepared for the databases (Table I.6). Groups A, B, C 
and D list keywords related to age, human error, industry type and human 
field, respectively. The final keywords list used to search consists of all 
possible combinations of keywords from Groups A, B, C and D using the 
Boolean operators to make the relationship (AND) and the sum of words (OR) 
(e.g., Age AND Error AND Manufacturing AND Human).  
Articles that had the searched keywords in its title or abstract and were 
published between 1996 and 2017 were screened. As restrictions, only articles 
in English, published in peer-reviewed journals or conferences and with 
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available full text were considered. After running the search on the three 
databases, all articles were uploaded into a database manager (i.e., Mendeley) 
and all duplicates were removed.  
Table I.6: Set of keywords used in the systematic search of Engineering 
Village, Scopus and Web of Science. 
KEYWORDS 
A B C D 
Age (*) Error Manufacturing (*) Human 
Older (*) Reliability Industry (*) Worker 
Senior (*) Failure Production (*) Workforce 
Elder (*) Performance Assembly (*) Employee 
 Slip  Operator 
 Lapse   
 Mistake   
 Mismatch   
Papers identified by the systematic review went through two selection 
processes. The first selection (as a result of reading of the title, abstract, 
keywords) excluded: a) articles presented only one of the main key concepts 
(age and human error); b) they did not establish a link between age and human 
error; c) they were not related to manufacturing environments. The second 
stage included the reading of the full text and a definitive assessment as 
function of the exclusion criteria. The references from selected papers were 
examined as a further source of papers in a “snowball” approach. The selected 
papers were analysed through a pre-determined framework, to achieve the 
research objectives, based on these specific criteria to extract and structure the 
information: 
 Publication year; 
 Type of contribution (Development of method/methodology/model, 
State of the art, Proposition of framework, Other type of contribution); 
 Research method (Experimental Research; Simulation, Case study, 
Literature review, Other type of research method); 
 Demographic features; 
 Type of human error analysed; 
 HF capabilities link to age and human error; 
 Age effect on system performance. 
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The database search for the systematic literature review resulted in 6521 
possible articles. First and second screening and the additional snowball 
searching led to a final set of only 21 studies. Two articles are conference 
proceedings, whereas the others are published on scientific journals in the 
engineering, medical and social sciences areas. The final set of papers includes 
empirical studies and in-depth literature review that aim to establish a link 
between age and human error. The limited number of selected studies and 
empirical data in literature is due to the main challenge related to the study of 
the link between ageing and human error in working context. In fact, human 
errors are hard to measure directly in manufacturing contexts, because they 
may cause a quality defect, a productivity loss but also a latent error, which is 
complex to identify. Furthermore, HEs are influenced by many individual and 
contextual factors, that may additionally modify the assessment of ageing 
impact. True experimental work on ageing is not possible because age levels 
cannot be manipulated. Sophisticated theoretical frameworks and modelling 
techniques are required to reach valid inferences about age effects and age 
changes.  
The analysis process provided for evidence of age and human error 
relationship. The main results show a significant correlation between the 
human error rate and the operator’s age; such correlation is a function of the 
psycho-physical workload (Börsch-Supan & Weiss, 2016; Fritzsche, et al., 
2014; Haji Hosseini, et al., 2012; Pennathur, et al., 2003). The analysis of 
papers shows that age is highly associated with HE in a way that no simple 
linear decreasing effect exists, and a variety of mediating factors come into 
play. This outlines the relevance of considering the non-negligible effects of 
ageing workforce on system performance. Several age-related HF capabilities 
(vision and hearing loss; decrement of working memory, attention, reaction 
and response time; physical decline) that affect worker performance and its 
reliability, have arisen from the systematic review. However, the decrease of 
HF capabilities is sometimes compensated by the experience, that allows to 
better manage the performed tasks and reduce the number of human errors 
(Mehta and Agnew, 2010). 
Furthermore, human errors, due to ageing impact, affect industrial 
operations in terms of safety and system performance. In particular, eleven of 
the total paper describe the impact of human error on system performance 
(productivity, quality, efficiency), while 7 papers address the safety issue 
(occupational accidents, slips, trips and falls) with reference to age.  
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II Chapter II: Break scheduling 
management 
 
 
 
 
II.1 Introduction 
Introducing breaks is a key intervention to provide recovery after fatiguing 
physical work to prevent growth of accident risks during working activities 
and improve human reliability (Dababneh, Swanson and Shell, 2001; Jansen, 
Kant and van den Brandt, 2002; Demerouti et al., 2012). The selection of 
adequate work-rest policies through the introduction of appropriate breaks is 
a very efficient approach even if not very applied, because it is well-known 
that work–break configurations influence the performance of individuals and 
can result in different productivity levels for individuals engaged in either 
mental or physical tasks (Bechtold, Janaro and Sumners, 1984).  
This chapter analysis the role of break in working field, giving an overview 
of the work-break literature, considering the impact of breaks on human 
performance (well-being, recovery, and risk) and the break scheduling 
problems. 
II.2 Psycho-physical effects of continuous work 
Irregular or continuous working hours can have negative consequences for 
human health and well-being due to stress that interferes with 
psychophysiological functions and social life. Continuous work has several 
negative consequences, such as physical and mental fatigue, health problems, 
stress, decreased concentration resulting in reduced productivity and an 
increased risk of accidents and injuries in the workplace. The shift scheduling 
and the conditions of the working environment influence many aspects of 
human family and social life, determine the daily habits and rhythms, modify 
the biological clock and can ultimately generate problems, such as sleep 
disturbances, which hinder the natural recovery process. In the short term, 
individuals may experience symptoms similar to jet lag, such as fatigue, 
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insomnia and difficulty falling asleep, as well as gastrointestinal malfunction, 
reduced mental abilities and performance efficiency. In the longer term, 
rhythmic disorders may eventually translate, often in combination with other 
factors, in the manifestation of a wide range of disorders and diseases 
(Knutsson, 2003; Rouch et al., 2005). Working for prolonged periods of time 
subjects the human body to excessive stress and exposes the operator to an 
elevated risk of disturbances to the circulatory system or heart disease. 
The work performance decrements have generally been attributed to the 
concept of fatigue or stress at work. A tired or stressed employee is also an 
unreliable employee. Fatigue can be considered as a global concept, which 
may take several forms including sleepiness as well as mental, physical and/or 
muscular fatigue depending on the nature of its cause and can be defined as “a 
biological drive for recuperative rest” (Williamson et al., 2011). The muscular 
fatigue has been linked to the decline of performance, the increased reaction 
times, the slowing of the sensory abilities and the reductions in motor control 
and force fluctuations (Perez et al., 2014), while the mental fatigue results in 
a high psychological discomfort (nervousness, tiredness, dizziness and 
headache).  
 
Figure II.1: Fatigue model of Grandjean (1968). 
Fatigue induced by work derives from prolonged activities, but also from 
psychological, socio-economic and environmental factors that influence the 
mind and body. Grandjean (1968) compares fatigue to the level of a liquid 
present in a box that is continuously filled by the monotony of tasks, the 
environment, the intensity and duration of manual and mental work, and 
by psychological and physical factors, and which can be emptied only from 
recovery or rest, as shown in Figure II.1. 
Pimenta et al. (2014) details a non-invasive approach on the monitoring of 
fatigue of a human being, based on the analysis of the performance of his 
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interaction with the computer. The collected data cover a 30days-period of 
computer use and for each of them four periods were distinguished to evaluate 
the effect of circadian rhythm and fatigue in one working day: (1) the start of 
the day, when the user is mentally fresh; (2) immediately before lunch break; 
(3) after lunch break; and (4) the end of the day, when the individual is most 
fatigued. The study was carried out based on the measures of different 
variables: Time between keys (time span between two consecutive keys); 
Error for key (error in pressing a key); Mouse acceleration; Mouse velocity; 
Distance between two consecutive clicks; Click duration; and Average excess 
of distance.  
The analysis of the interaction of each individual with the computer shows 
that during the day fatigue involves a decrease in efficiency in the use of the 
mouse and keyboard, as well as a gradual and constant decrease in the speed 
of the mouse and a consequent increase the temporal distance between two 
consecutive clicks, as shown in Figure II.2. 
 
Figure II.2: Fatigue causes a gradual and consistent decrease in the 
mouse velocity over the day (Pimenta et al., 2014). 
The potential impact of long work hours on health and safety is a major 
concern that has resulted in various work hour regulations. Continuous work 
can, in fact, be associated with specific pathological disorders, such as 
headache, stomach ache, cardiovascular disease and others that can have a 
secondary impact on productivity and absenteeism. Furthermore, attention 
must be paid to work-related stress. According to European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work (2009) about 22% of European workers experience work 
stress, which, is the cause of about 60% of lost working days. A European 
worker, on average, is absent for about four and a half days a year from work 
due to health problems (Parent-Thirion et al., 2007). 
Likewise, prolonged work-hours are risky for the safety of operators 
(Tucker, Folkard and Macdonald, 2003; Folkard and Lombardi, 2006). 
Tucker, Folkard and Macdonald (2003), for example, assess the increase in 
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the risk of injuries because of work sessions of growing length, in which no 
breaks were made. After first working hours, the relative risk of accidents or 
injuries in the workplace increases by 33% compared to the first half hour with 
no risk. This probability increases up to 108% in the case of two hours of 
continuous work. 
The performance decreases, human errors, quality losses and health related 
problems associated with employee unreliability may translate into huge 
monetary costs for companies. There are different methods which may be used 
to improve the human performance and to reduce errors. Many studies have 
focused on ergonomic interventions for improving musculoskeletal health and 
postural comfort (Westgaard and Winkel, 1997; Battini et al., 2017) while 
others have focused on the impact of industrial shift systems with particular 
attention to long work hours and night shifts (Smith et al., 1998; Åkerstedt, 
2003; Folkard and Lombardi, 2006; Caruso, 2014). Rest breaks are a further 
aspect of considerable importance, as describe in the next section. 
II.3 Rest breaks 
Jett and George (2003) defined the rest break as “planned or spontaneous 
suspension from work on a task that interrupts the flow of activity and 
continuity”. Breaks can be formally planned by organizational practices (e.g., 
coffee and lunch breaks) or can be informally instituted by workers 
themselves. It may be noted that the work preferences, related to timing and 
length of breaks, are not equal for everyone. For instance, some people may 
schedule breaks at regular intervals throughout the day, whereas others may 
take breaks at random times throughout the day and follow a configuration of 
seemingly unproductive days punctuated by a highly productive day (Jett and 
George, 2003).  
Rest periods involve multiple and important positive functions for the 
person being interrupted, including stimulation for the individual who is 
performing a job that is routine or boring, opportunities to engage in activities 
that are essential to emotional well-being, job satisfaction, and sustained 
productivity and time for the subconscious to process complex problems that 
require creativity. In addition, the regular breaks seem to be an effective way 
to control the accumulation of risk during the industrial shift. They are 
recommended to prevent the accumulation of risk of accidents during the 
activities supported and results of laboratory tests and field give strong support 
to these recommendations (Tucker, Folkard and Macdonald, 2003). 
Nonetheless, they can potentially be disruptive to the flow of work and the 
completion of a task, because they can result in loss of available time to 
complete a task, a temporary disengagement from the task being performed, 
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the procrastination (i.e. excessive delays in starting or continuing work on a 
task) and the reduction in productivity (Jett and George, 2003). 
Traditionally, work breaks have been the subject of an exclusively sectoral 
discipline, marked both by collective bargaining and by some laws aimed at 
protecting certain categories of workers, such as, for example, video terminal 
workers, minors and drivers.  
The Italian legislator has established with the article n.8 of the legislative 
decree n.66/2003 a general regulation, that is, a minimum protection threshold 
valid for all workers, leaving to the collective bargaining the primary and 
punctual regulation of the temporal, modal and salary profiles of the work 
breaks. This article stats: "If the daily working time exceeds the limit of six 
hours, the worker must benefit from a rest break, whose procedures and 
duration are established by collective labour agreements, for recovery of 
psycho-physical energies and possible consumption of the meal also in order 
to reduce the monotonous and repetitive work ". In the absence of collective 
bargaining, a break cannot be less than ten minutes and it can be undertaken 
at any time of the work shift. The discipline referred to in article n.8 must 
necessarily be coordinated with the rules and provisions established to protect 
certain categories of workers: 
 workers, who use video terminals for at least twenty hours per week, 
are entitled to a 15-minute break every two hours of continuous 
application to the video (Article175, legislative decree. No. 81/2008); 
 children and adolescents cannot work more than four and a half hours 
without interruption; if this working period is exceeded, an 
intermediate break of one hour will be mandatory. Collective 
agreements, subject to authorization by the territorial labour 
departments, may reduce this break period to half an hour, if these are 
not unhealthy and dangerous works (Article 20, Law No. 977/1967); 
 domestic worker is entitled to a convenient rest period during the day 
and to no less than eight consecutive hours of night rest (Article 8, Law 
No. 339/1958).; 
 the working time of the personnel involved in the transport of goods 
or people must be interrupted by 30-minute intermediate rest periods, 
if the total hours worked are between six and nine hours, 45 minutes if 
greater than nine hours (Article 5, Legislative Decree No. 234/2007). 
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II.3.1 Breaks impact on the human performance: well-
being, recovery, risk. 
Most research on breaks has focused on the long‐term consequences of 
extensive breaks such as sabbaticals (Davidson et al., 2010), vacations (Fritz 
and Sonnentag, 2006), weekends (Fritz and Sonnentag, 2005; Ragsdale et al., 
2011), and evenings (Demerouti et al., 2009). Whereas most studies on daily 
recovery focus exclusively on the engagement in off‐job activities that may 
reduce fatigue and restore physiological and psychological readiness.  
Little is known about recovery from short breaks that occur during the 
working day. The relatively few studies that directly address breaks indicate 
that people need occasional changes in the time of work or an oscillation 
between work and recreation, particularly when they are fatigued or are 
working continuously for an extended period (Dababneh, Swanson and Shell, 
2001; Jett and George, 2003). The lines of research typically examined focus 
on different aspects as the frequency, the timing, and the length of the breaks, 
or the activity undertaken during the rest period (doing physical exercises, 
socializing, napping etc.). 
Surprisingly, a small number of studies have examined the function of 
recovery both at work and home. The recovery experience refers to the degree 
to which individuals perceive that the breaks they take help them to restore 
energy resources. Demerouti et al. (2012) examined the recovery experience 
after breaks at work and psychological detachment from work when being at 
home by investigating the role of recovery at work in the process of energy 
replenishment. The authors distinguish between two types of recovery: 
recovery during work, which takes place when the stressor factors are present, 
and recovery after work, which occurs when the stressor factors are absent 
(Demerouti et al., 2012). All examined relationships are summarized in Figure 
II.3.  
 
Figure II.3: Hypothesized relationships (Demerouti et al., 2012). 
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Results of the multilevel analysis indicated that recovery at work and 
detachment from work moderated the relationship between flow (specifically, 
the enjoyment component) and after‐work energy. An association between 
need for recovery from work, fatigue, and psychological distress in the 
working population was also observed in (Jansen, Kant and van den Brandt 
(2002). Need for recovery was higher in men than in women and in the higher 
age groups, as others have found (Mohren, Jansen and Kant, 2010). 
Evidence has recently highlighted that the beneficial effects of rest breaks 
on strain and mood are influenced by the nature of the activity undertaken 
during the breaks (Tucker and Folkard, 2012). Experimental field studies 
found that rest breaks were more likely to enhance subsequent mood if they 
involved respite activities (e.g., napping, relaxing, socializing) rather than 
chores (e.g., working with customers, running errands, and work preparation) 
(Tucker and Folkard, 2012; Mathiassen et al., 2014).  
The primary domain for exploring the benefits of within-day work breaks 
is ergonomics because of its role in preventing musculoskeletal problems, 
although systematic reviews suggest that there is only limited evidence of their 
effectiveness in this regard (Brewer et al., 2006; Kennedy et al., 2010). 
Many studies have focused on computer-based tasks. Researchers in this 
area have focused on standard and micro breaks as a means to alleviate 
musculoskeletal discomfort and strain associated with prolonged or repeated 
office-related tasks. Galinsky et al. (2000), Mclean et al. (2001), Balci and 
Aghazadeh (2004) found positive effects depending on the time between rest 
breaks and musculoskeletal outcomes. In Mclean’s. (2001) study, the authors 
examined the benefit of micro breaks by investigating myoelectric signal 
behaviour, perceived discomfort, and worker productivity while individuals 
performed their usual keying work. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three experimental groups: micro breaks at their own discretion, 
micro breaks at 20-min intervals, and micro breaks at 40-min intervals. It was 
determined, with p-value equal to 0.05, that micro breaks had a positive effect 
on reducing discomfort in all areas studied during computer terminal work, 
particularly when breaks were taken at 20-min intervals. Similarly, Balci and 
Aghazadeh (2004) investigated three different work-rest schedules (60-min 
work/10-min rest, 30-min work/5-min rest, 15/micro breaks four from each 
hour in addition to a 14-min break after 2 h) considering two types of task 
(cognitive task and data entry). The results indicated that the effect of the 
work-rest schedule was significant on various perceived discomfort categories 
and the performance of the participants, and the author suggested that the 
15/micro break schedule is preferable to the longer and infrequent rest break 
schedules considering upper extremity discomfort, eye strain, speed, 
accuracy, and performance of the participants. 
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Worker productivity takes advantage of short rest breaks. Balci and 
Aghazadeh (2004) reported that the performance in data entry tasks with the 
15/micro break schedule was 18% higher than the 30-min work/5-min rest 
schedule and 24% higher than the 60-min work/10-min rest schedule. Henning 
et al. (1997) and van de Heuvel, de Looze and Hildebrandt (2003) combined 
physical exercises with breaks in order to study their effect on human 
performance. Productivity growth and discomfort reduction were achieved 
with two 5-min rest breaks with exercises in addition to the normal rest breaks 
both in the mid-morning and mid-afternoon during an 8-h work day. Exercise 
breaks also improved workers’ well-being and eye, leg, and foot comfort 
(Henning et al., 1997). 
The impact of frequent short rest breaks on productivity and well-being has 
also been investigated in the manufacturing field. Dababneh, Swanson and 
Shell (2001) tested two rest break policies, both of which provided 36 minutes 
of extra break time over the regular break schedule (30-min lunch and two 15-
min breaks), in a meat-processing plant. In the first rest break configuration, 
the further break has been scheduled with 12 breaks of 3-min evenly 
distributed over the workday (3-min break for every 27 min of work). In the 
second schedule, workers were given four 9-min breaks evenly distributed 
over the workday (9-min break every 51 min of work). Results showed that 
neither of the two experimental rest break schedules had a negative effect on 
production rate, and the 9-min break schedule improved discomfort ratings for 
the lower extremities. 
Several studies have examined the impact of rest breaks during a shift on 
injury or accident risk (Folkard and Tucker, 2003; Tucker, Folkard and 
Macdonald, 2003; Folkard and Lombardi, 2006; Tucker et al., 2006; Tucker 
and Folkard, 2012). They agree that risk is reduced in the first half-hour 
following a rest break and that this effect is similar across all three shifts. The 
number of injuries within each of the four 30-min periods between breaks was 
calculated, and the risk in each 30-min period was expressed relative to that 
in the first 30-min period immediately following the break. Results are shown 
in Table II.1, and it is clear that injury risk rose substantially and 
approximately linearly between successive breaks such that risk had doubled 
by the last 30-min period before the next break.  
The trends over subsequent half-hours varied, possibly reflecting the extent 
to which the work was either self-paced or machine paced. It would therefore 
appear that the beneficial effects of rest breaks may be relatively short lived 
in at least some work environments. Tucker et al. (2006) analyse the trend in 
work-related injuries in relation to the timing of rest breaks in two separated 
studies. Risk increased from the first to the second half-hour of continuous 
work and then remained relatively constant in the third half-hour. In some 
data, there was also a decrease in risk in the period leading up to the end of a 
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work period. There was a sharp decline in reported injuries toward the very 
end of a shift, but otherwise, the observed trends did not differ between 
successive periods of continuous work or among morning, afternoon, and 
night shifts. However, no direct epidemiological evidence exists for the effect 
of rest breaks on the trend in risk as a function of time-on-task. 
Table II.1: Frequency (% of total per period) of accidents per half-hour 
for each work period and relative risks for all periods combined (Tucker et 
al., 2003). 
Time on task (min) 
 0-29 30-59 60-89 90-119 Total 
Period      
1 23 (13%) 41 (23%) 50 (29%) 61 (35%) 175 
2 28 (16%) 30 (18%) 47 (28%) 65 (38%) 170 
3 35 (19%) 43 (24%) 50 (28%) 53 (29%) 181 
All 
periods 
86 (16%) 114 (22%) 147 (28%) 179 (34%) 526 
Relative 
risk 
1 
(reference) 
1.33 1.71 2.08  
II.4 Break scheduling management 
Proper design of work–rest schedule that involves frequency, duration, and 
timing of rest breaks may be effective in improving workers’ comfort, health, 
and productivity. Break scheduling problems emerge in many working 
contexts where rest period is indispensable due to features of the tasks to be 
performed. These features include the requirement of high concentration 
during extended periods of time, continuous work in front of computer 
monitors, or other monotonic and exhaustive activities. Typically, break 
scheduling problems arise in call centres, security checking, or assembly lines. 
A major problem in this field, from both a research and practical perspective, 
has been with respect to the appropriate technique for the development of 
effective work-rest policies that can be described by the number, timing, and 
duration of rest periods.  
In literature, the break scheduling problems have hardly been addressed on 
their own, but they are part of the most famous shift scheduling problem, 
which has received a lot of attention in the operations research literature. Shift 
scheduling problems, in fact, deal with the assignment of employee starting 
and finishing times, and possibly the placement of relief and meal breaks 
within each shift in order to maximize work output per unit time or minimize 
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the costs of assigning an employee to alternative shifts (Aykin, 1996; Rekik, 
Cordeau and Soumis, 2010). The validity of approaches to scheduling breaks 
development over the years has been limited by the assumption of optimality 
of complete recovery, exclusion of rest break penalties, or restriction to a 
single break (Bechtold, Janaro and Sumners, 1984). 
The first work-rest model was developed by Eilon in 1964 to determine the 
optimal length and placement of one break over a finite time horizon for a 
single employee for a general work rate r (t), which was a decreasing function 
of time. Gentzler, Khalil and Sivazlian (1977) developed a multirest break 
model for an infinite time horizon based on the assumption that full recovery 
was optimal. Starting from this incorrect assumption and assuming linear 
performance decay during work and linear recovery of work-rate performance 
potential during rest, the selection of the optimal number, duration, and 
placement of rest breaks over a single finite time horizon became a mixed-
integer quadratic programming problem in Bechtold et al. (1984). This model 
was applied in experimental settings observing productivity improvements of 
around 8% for a mental task and around 3% for a physical task. Results 
suggested that it is likely that breaks of a given length may be more effective 
if taken earlier in the time horizon than when they are evenly spaced. Bechtold 
and Thompson (1993) extended this earlier research by considering the 
choices of placement for and during a single rest period that must be taken 
simultaneously by all employees in a work group through an appropriate 
model formulated as a mixed-binary, cubic programming problem. Aykin 
(1996) considered a more general shift scheduling problem with multiple 
breaks and disjoint break windows and developed an integer programming 
model for optimal shift scheduling with multiple rest and lunch breaks and 
break windows, which reduces the number of variables compared to the set-
covering formulation, typically used in the scheduling problems. Rekik, 
Cordeau and Soumis (2010) extended this formulation incorporating two other 
forms of flexibility: fractionable breaks and work stretch duration restrictions. 
This provides the possibility of fixing only the total duration of breaks that 
must be given within a shift without specifying which break length comes in 
which position. Experimental results prove that using fractionable breaks may 
yield, for some instances, a considerable saving of workforce. 
In addition to the exact methods, the meta-heuristics such as min-conflicts-
based local search algorithm, or memetic algorithm have been presented in 
literature for breaks scheduling. Schafhauser, Musliu and Wild (2009) 
proposed a memetic algorithm to obtain solutions of improved quality for the 
break scheduling problem for supervision personnel. This algorithm consists 
of the selection, crossover, and mutation of three standard operators and is 
hybridized with a min-conflicts search. Initial solutions are constructed with 
break patterns already fulfilling constraints representing labour rules and 
ergonomic criteria. For every iteration, the genetic operators generate a pool 
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of different solutions from the previous generation, and the best solutions are 
further optimized by the local search procedure. Wild and Musliu (2010) 
improved the previous method by proposing a new memetic representation, a 
new crossover and selection operator, and a penalty system that helps to select 
memes that have a better chance to be improved by a local search. Di Gaspero 
et al. (2010) devised a hybrid strategy that combines a local search method for 
determining the shifts with a constraint programming model for assigning 
breaks. This model has shown to be very practical for the local search to find 
legal break assignments that optimize over/under staffing. 
Quantitative models for optimal rest period scheduling were developed 
with work rate function as basic component. The work rate function defines 
the performance level from the end of one rest period to beginning of the next 
rest period, representing the individual fatigued state. The processes of works 
output decay during work periods and recovery of work rate potential during 
rest breaks are modelled as linear functions of time (Bechtold et al., 1984).  
Therefore, researchers in this field have traditionally concentred on the 
experimental approach to determine optimal work-rest schedules for specific 
tasks and under specified environmental conditions, considering human 
performance in terms of a generic work rate function. They have considered 
constrains as minimum break time, location of breaks, maximal working time 
without breaks in order to optimize the number of workers assigned to every 
shift and their work-rest policy (Aykin, 1996) or to maximize labour 
productivity, as measured by output per unit time (Bechtold, Janaro and 
Sumners, 1984). The work rate performance is often modelled as a linear 
function without a detailed analysis of human reliability trend during the work 
shift and its qualitative effects on system performance (e.g. non- compliant 
items and reworking).  
None of existing methods, in fact, considers human reliability in assessing 
worker performance due to the complexity of HRA approaches, as underlined 
in Chapter I, and given the difficulty of integrating this type of modelling in 
an exact algorithmic or heuristic technique. Moreover, many of the studies in 
the literature have addressed the break scheduling problem only from the point 
of view of productivity. They do not address the problem of break 
management with regard to the quality aspect, namely the impact of human 
errors on the system performance in terms of quality of the performed 
activities (e.g. non-compliant items and reworking). The impact of breaks, in 
fact, was investigated with respect on the loss of productivity, due to the 
decrease of work rate, without considering the effect on the human error 
probability. 
Despite continuing advances in research and applications, work breaks are 
not taken into proper consideration, and there are ongoing efforts to create 
systems that better manage the business in various areas. The literature review, 
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in fact, has pointed out the almost total lack of systems for the management of 
work breaks in an automatic manner. The only exception is the software that 
stimulates workers at video terminals to take frequent breaks and recommend 
performing exercises during breaks. The validity and effectiveness of this type 
of software has been demonstrated by several studies (Mclean et al., 2001; 
van de Heuvel, de Looze and Hildebrandt, 2003). Van Den Heuvel’s (2003) 
study evaluated the effects of work related disorders of the neck and upper 
limbs and the productivity of computer workers stimulated to take regular 
breaks and perform physical exercises with the use of an adapted version of 
WorkPace, Niche Software Ltd., Mclean et al. (2001), instead, examined the 
benefits of micro-breaks to prevent onset or progression of cumulative trauma 
disorders for the computerized environment, mediated using the program 
Ergobreak 2.2.  
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III.1 Introduction 
HRA literature highlights the severity of the human unreliability at work 
and the need to evaluate and to quantify it for reducing the errors and 
improving the productivity. Despite the impact of human errors in industrial 
systems and the development of numerous HRA and break scheduling 
approaches in literature, they have still many limitations, as previously seen. 
The purpose of each HRA method must be to assess human behaviour and to 
quantify HEP, in order to reduce and prevent possible conditions of human 
error in a working context. Existing methods, as previously seen, do not 
always pursue this aim in an efficient way, but every method or simulator has 
its own strength. As well as, work breaks are not taken into proper 
consideration, and there are ongoing efforts to create systems that better 
manage the break scheduling in various areas, especially in manufacturing.  
This chapter presents a new HRA model that exploits the advantages of the 
simulation tools and the traditional HRA methods to predict the likelihood of 
operator error, for a given scenario, in every kind of industrial system or other 
type of working environment. The aspiration for the Simulator for Human 
Error Probability Analysis (SHERPA) model is not that it be a new HRA 
method in the extensive list of existing ones, but that it provides a theoretical 
framework addressing the problem of human reliability in a different way 
from most HRA methods. SHERPA focuses on the quantitative aspect to 
obtain a significant numerical result in terms of HEP and combines the HR 
assessment with the management of work-rest policies. The most important 
objective of the work has been to realize a model for the evaluation of human 
reliability that can obtain useful information about human reliability for every 
kind of work task.  
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SHERPA can be used in the preventive phase, as an analysis of the possible 
situations that may occur and for the evaluation of the percentage of non-
compliant performed tasks due to human error and in post-production to 
understand the nature of the factors that influence human performance in order 
to reduce errors. 
Human reliability is estimated as a function of the performed task, 
influencing factors (PSFs), and time worked, with the purpose of considering 
how reliability depends on the task and working context as well as on the time 
that the workers have already spent at their work. Knowing the HR 
distribution allows intervening from the perspective of reducing errors with 
re-design tasks or other interventions such as the management of the worker’s 
psychophysical recovery through appropriate break configurations.  
The proposed HRA-based model is, in fact, addressed to the break 
scheduling problems through the hypothesis that breaks allow the mental and 
physical recovery and lead to improvements of human reliability. The positive 
break impact on human reliability is a function of break time, location of break 
during the shift, recovery speed and type of performed activities. Rest breaks 
have also a negative aspect due to increased idle time that corresponds, for 
example, to a decrease of productivity in a manufacturing context. For this 
reason, SHERPA is based on an economic model, that allows to assess both 
positive and negative break effects and to compare their impact on the system 
performance, considering for example the cost of lost production due to break 
and the quality costs related to operator errors. The model can be adapted to 
alternative set of constraints (minimum number of breaks and minimum time 
guaranteed by legislation or internal union agreements, maximum hours of 
continuous work and other possible constraints), assigned in the initialization 
phase of the system as inputs. SHERPA can then evaluate the effect of every 
work-rest policy, defined as acceptable for the system under consideration, 
with the aim of identifying the best configuration among those possible. The 
model is able to provide for the following functions: 
1) Estimating human reliability, as function of time, work context conditions, 
physical and mental employee conditions and break scheduling. 
2) Assessing the effects due to different human reliability levels, through 
evaluation of processes, activities or tasks performed more or less 
correctly. 
3) Assessing the impact of environment on human reliability, via performance 
shaping factors. 
4) Simulating a large numbers of break scheduling with several locations and 
duration of breaks, in order to assess their impact of different work-break 
policies on human performance (HEP and recovery after the break) and the 
overall system performance in terms of percentage of compliant performed 
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tasks and economic results (e.g. profits, revenues, quality costs, rework 
costs and break costs).  
5) Determining optimal breaks scheduling, identifying for each case: the 
number, the location in the shift and the optimal break time. 
The proposed model was not created for a particular industry or application 
and therefore can be easily applied to contexts that vary widely. For example, 
the module can equally represent manual maintenance activity, manual 
assembly tasks, medical task in a surgery room etc., by varying the input 
variables such as performed task, level of contextual factors, or physical and 
mental employee condition and by modelling the specific system considering 
all the working context features. Simulators and tools similar to the one 
proposed do not exist today, either from the theoretical point of view or from 
the point of view of the analysis carried out. 
This chapter presents the SHERPA theoretical framework based on the 
integration of traditional and dynamic HRA methods. Its logical foundations, 
the HRA principles and rules, the evaluation and quantification of psycho-
physical recovery and the break scheduling management system are described.  
III.2 Notation  
The following notations will be used in this chapter: 
 
HEPnominal: nominal human error probability. 
HEPcontextual: contextual human error probability. 
HR: human reliability (1 −  HEPcontextual). 
R(t): nominal reliability function. 
k, β, and α: shape and scale of Weibull distribution. 
𝜏: length of the transitional phase of human adaption. 
PSFcomposite: performance shaping factors composite. 
PSfx: assigned multiplier for each PSF. 
Fx: multiplier value of sub-factors. 
Wx: weight of each sub-factor. 
𝑇𝐻𝐼: thermohygrometric index. 
CLO: thermal resistance index of clothing. 
MET: index of metabolic activity. 
𝑇𝑎: environmental temperature. 
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TNOWdeg: current simulation time. 
UR: relative humidity. 
𝑇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑: perceived temperature. 
𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔: operating temperature. 
E: illuminance on the horizontal plane. 
A, B and C: constants for different sky conditions. 
𝛼𝑠: solar height. 
Ee: horizontal surface placed outside, shielded by direct solar irradiation 
and exposed to the light coming from heavenly vault. 
𝜂: daylight factor. 
Fu: utilization factor. 
M: maintenance factor. 
N: number of light sources. 
L: luminous flux. 
A: area to be illuminated.  
LEX, d: individual exposure level to daily noise. 
LEX, w: weekly individual noise exposure level. 
r: recovery factor. 
𝜔: recovery rate. 
R: profit. 
P: price/value added of the processing. 
CFSTD: standard fixed costs. 
CVSTD: standard variable costs. 
Tc: processing time. 
Cr: reworking costs. 
cb: rest break costs. 
Tb: rest break time. 
Tr: reworking time. 
Ttotal: total time of processing that considered the time increment linked to 
possible rework. 
Pr: reworking probability. 
i: working cycle index. 
q: number of units worked in every cycle. 
T1: theoretical time to produce the first unit. 
?̂?1: equivalent time for the first unit of the forgetting curve. 
LR: learning rate. 
b: learning slope. 
f: forgetting slope. 
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III.3 Structure and logic of the SHERPA model 
The SHERPA theoretical model was developed according to the current 
state of the art of HRA methods and break scheduling problem. The operator’s 
recovery and the work - break policies management were based instead on the 
state of the art previously presented.  
Three HRA elements converge into the model:  
 the task classification in one of the generic tasks proposed by HEART 
method (Williams, 1985); 
 the PSFs analysis of the SPAR-H method (Gertman et al., 2005); 
 the dynamic implementation using computer simulation (Boring, 
2007).  
The SHERPA theoretical framework has been described with the technique 
IDEF0 (Integration Definition for Function Modelling), which is a widely-
used technique for the structured analysis and design of systems developed 
through the Air Force's integrated computer aided manufacturing program 
(Presley and Liles, 1995). The four elements (inputs, outputs, controls, 
resources) to the IDEF0 functional model are shown in Figure III.1, where the 
activity box is the SHERPA model. Inputs are represented by the arrows 
flowing into the left-hand side of the activity box, and they are the entities, 
which equally represent the pieces to be processed or the physical/mental 
activities to be performed by the worker. 
The model reproduces the employee’s work during a whole shift, 
quantifying the reliability and error probability that moved on the outputs of 
the system, represented by arrows flowing out the right-hand side of the 
activity box. HEP is estimated here as function of performed task, 
performance shaping factors and worked time, with the purpose of considering 
how reliability depends on the task and on the working context, as well as on 
x: amount of output that would have been accumulated if interruption did not 
occur. 
B: minimum time for total forgetting. 
𝐴(8): equivalent weighted acceleration in frequency referred to eight hours of 
work. 
𝑎𝑣: value of the vector sum acceleration of the components detected on the 
three axes. 
𝑇𝑒: total daily duration of vibration exposure expressed in hours. 
𝑎𝑣𝑖
2 : vector sum of the frequency weighted acceleration relative to the i-th 
operation. 
𝑇𝑖 : the exposure time relative to the i-th operation expressed in hours. 
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the time that the operators have already spent at their work. SHERPA 
determines as outputs the number of compliant, non-compliant, and rework 
entities. These outputs are calculated considering in a first approximation the 
contextual HEP, in this way the human error represents non-compliant 
entities. The concept of quality defects and scraps is not limited to 
manufacturing processes, but extends to a wider range of working 
environments, ranging from services to medical field. Further outputs are the 
HEP distribution and the economic results. The available outputs allow a clear 
and direct assessment of how the system reacts to change in the given break 
scheduling, as well as to change in environmental and psychophysical 
conditions. The arrows flowing into the top portion of the box represent 
constraints or controls on the activities: the HRA and the recovery principles; 
the influencing factors (PSF), namely the contextual factors and the physical 
and mental employee conditions; and the assigned work-rest policy. Finally, 
the resources, represented by arrows flowing into the bottom of the activity 
box, are the mechanisms that carry out the activity. 
The main activity box has been decomposed into more detailed levels of 
analysis, through the four sub-models shown in Figure III.2 and analysed in 
detail in the next sections. The four sub-activities (entities entry, HR 
quantification, process simulation, entities exit) are supported by the operating 
logic shown in Figure III.3. 
The starting analytical basis for the assessment of human errors in 
SHERPA is the determination of HEP, followed by quantification of PSF 
influences on the initial value of HEP. This module receives, as input, the type 
of activity and generic task, each of which is connected to an appropriate 
probability distribution that describes HEP as a function of time. Different 
scheduling of breaks can be assigned and can be simulated in the shift, 
considering that a break determines the worker's recovery and the consequent 
increase in reliability.  
 
Figure III.1: IDEF0 representation of SHERPA simulator. 
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Figure III.2: SHERPA decomposition overview. 
 
Figure III.3: Logical architecture of SHERPA model. 
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As explained in detail later, the proposed model can manage a pool of break 
configurations, which are included into three main groups: no break in the 
shift (continuous working), fixed work-rest policy or automatic management. 
Furthermore, the Learning and Forgetting Curve Model (LFCM) module 
allows evaluating the impacts of the learning and forgetting phenomenon on 
the processing time.  
III.3.1 Entities entry 
The entities in entrance represent many working contexts because they can 
equally simulate a work piece, a document to be drafted, or in general, a task 
to be performed. The model manages in the same manner all the typologies, 
recognizing in the case of product mix the needs of setup. In this phase, the 
model follows the flowchart in Figure III.4. A set of technical data (type of 
performed task, processing time, setup time, time for rework) and economic 
data (product price, fixed and variable costs) is allocated to each entity in the 
first step.  
 
Figure III.4: Input logic of the entities with and without productive mix. 
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III.3.2 Human reliability quantification 
The second phase is addressed to the nominal and contextual HEP 
quantification, which is the first step in any HRA approach, as reported in 
Figure III.5. The preliminary analysis of the model requires advance 
knowledge of the probability with which an operator can make mistakes, and 
therefore assumes probability distributions of HEP as functions of time and 
type of operation to perform, which describe the variations in human 
performance. The flowchart illustrates the process of HR quantification and 
its main phases. Nominal and contextual HEP and the PSF composite are 
quantified for each entity and are representative of each performed task, as 
described hereafter. 
 
Figure III.5: The HRA process in SHERPA model. 
The nominal HEP, independent of the presence of influencing factors, is a 
function of the performed activity and worked time. The Weibull probability 
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distribution is presented by Giuntini (2000) as the best distribution to describe 
the error probability and to characterize the human reliability process. It is 
adapted in the proposed model to take into account the natural process of 
adaptation for a typical human for a given operation that results in a lower 
reliability in the initial part of the shift as follows:  
{
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑘 ∙ 𝑒
−𝛼∙(1−𝑡)𝛽   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0; τ]
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑘 ∙ 𝑒
−𝛼∙(𝑡−1)𝛽   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ ]τ;  ∞[
 (3.1) 
where t is the time worked by an employee; k, β, and α change the scale 
and shape of the curve for the six generic tasks used in the model; and τ is the 
length of the transitional phase of human adaption. The function has also been 
assumed to have a minimum value of error probability in τ (imposed as the 
first hour of processing) and a maximum value at the eighth hour of work 
during an eight-hour shift (Figure III.6).  
 
Figure III.6: Trend in modified human error probability and human 
reliability.  
As noted above, the first generation HRA methods, such as THERP and 
HEART, focused on the quantification of nominal HEP. The second 
generation does not give significant importance to the formal quantification 
of HEP, but often uses standard values, as in the case of SPAR-H, to allow 
greater focus on the influence of PSFs. For SHERPA, the best choice was the 
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HEART method, designed to be a quick and simple method applicable to any 
situation or sector in which human reliability is important. HEART uses eight 
generic categories (GT) to classify operator tasks, but only six have been 
chosen for the proposed model (Kirwan, 1996). The categories shown in Table 
III.1 can represent a wide range of work activities from simple to more 
complex ones, from ones with a very high error rates to those more reliable, 
thanks to the presence of automatic systems of supervision. This range of 
activities allows the module to apply the model to very different working 
environments without any kind of restrictions.  
SHERPA uses six generic categories to classify the type of performed task, 
derived by the HEART, and each of them is connected to an appropriate 
probability distribution that describes nominal HEP as a function of time. For 
each category, Figure III.7 shows the performance of probability of human 
error. 
Table III.1: Coefficient values for the six generic tasks. 
Generic task 
Limitations of 
unreliability 
for operation 
k α β 
1 Totally unfamiliar 35% ÷ 97% 0.65000 0.1660762 1.5 
2 
Complex task requiring 
high level of 
comprehension and skill 
12% ÷ 28% 0.88000 0.0108352 1.5 
3 
Fairly simple task 
performed rapidly or 
given scant attention 
6% ÷ 13% 0.94000 0.0041785 1.5 
4 Routine, highly-practiced 0.7 ÷ 4.5% 0.99300 0.0021068 1.5 
5 
Completely familiar, 
well-designed, highly 
practiced, routine task 
0.008% ÷ 0.9% 0.99920 0.0004838 1.5 
6 
Respond correctly to 
system command even 
when there is an 
augmented or automated 
supervisory system 
0.0001% ÷ 
0.09% 
0.99991 4.813*10^-5 1.5 
Furthermore, according to the SPAR-H method, the tasks are divided into 
action (implementations of actions / processes simple or complex) and 
diagnosis (interpretation of system status and decision-making in case of 
need). The working context and employee state, instead, are taken into account 
through the PSFs of the SPAR-H method. The performance shaping factor is 
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determined by the individual characteristics of the human being, the 
environment, the organization or the activity that enhances or decreases 
human performance and increases or decreases the likelihood of human error. 
PSFs allow all environmental and behavioural factors that affect human 
performance to be taken into account. While many HRA methods have often 
proposed numerous PSFs, even as many as fifty, SPAR-H attempts to provide 
a reasonable coverage of the influence spectra of human performance in a 
reasonable minimum number of PSFs.  
 
 
Figure III.7: HEP trend for every generic task. 
The eight PSFs are the following: available time; stress; complexity; 
experience and training; procedures; cognitive ergonomics; fitness for duty; 
and work process. These eight PSFs are among the most used in second 
generation HRA methods. Several studies have attempted to evaluate the 
discrepancies between the influencing factors used by different approaches. 
Boring (2010) focused its attention on the SPAR-H method, noting that 
despite the variability of the factors used by other first and second-generation 
methods, the eight PSFs can largely cover environmental and individual 
factors, in the wake of the most used methods like CREAM and HEART. A 
study commissioned by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2005 and 
titled “Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis 
(NUREG-1792)” identified 15 essential PSFs for HRA (Kolaczkowski et al., 
2005). Table III.2 shows a comparison between the performance shaping 
factors found in Good Practices, in the SPAR-H, CREAM and HEART 
methods.  
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Table III.2: Performance Shaping Factors comparison (Kolaczkowski et 
al., 2005). 
SPAR-H CREAM Good Practices HEART 
Available time Available Time Time Available 2 
Stress and 
stressors 
Number of 
Simultaneous Goals 
Workload/ Time 
Pressure/ Stress 
29,33 Working 
Conditions Environment 
Time of day 
Complexity 
Number of 
Simultaneous Goals 
Complexity 10 
Experience 
and training 
Adequacy of 
Training and 
Preparation 
Training and 
experience 
1, 6, 9, 15, 
20, 24 
Ergonomics 
Adequacy of HMI 
and Operational 
Support 
Instrumentation 
3, 4, 5, 7, 
13,14, 15, 
23,26, 32 
Human-System 
Interface 
Working 
Conditions 
Accessibility/Opera
bility of Equipment 
Need for Special 
Tools 
Special 
[Equipment] 
Fitness Needs 
Procedures 
Availability of 
Procedures/Plans 
Procedures and 
administrative 
controls 
11,16, 
17,28, 32 
Fitness for 
duty 
- - 30,35 
Work 
processes 
Adequacy of 
Organization 
Available Staffing 
21, 25, 
31,36, 37 Crew collaboration 
quality 
Communications 
Team/Crew 
dynamics 
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Unlike most of the HRA methods, SPAR-H recognizes that a number of 
PSFs can have both positive and negative effects on performance. As shown 
in Figure III.8, the probability of error increases with the growth of the 
negative influence of the PSFs, while, on the contrary, the error probability 
decreases as the positive influence of the PSFs grows. When the influencing 
factor represents a positive effect, it corresponds to a value less than one; 
therefore, the multiplication of a nominal HEP with this value is used to 
decrease the overall HEP. When the PSF, instead, represents a negative effect, 
it corresponds to a value greater than one and the multiplication of a nominal 
HEP with this positive integer serves to increase the HEP. 
 
Figure III.8: Ideal mean HEP as a function of the influence of 
performance shaping factors. 
Nominal HEP is thus modified by these eight PSFs using the following 
adjustment factors: 
𝐻𝐸𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(t) =
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙(t) ∙ 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙(t) ∙ (𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 − 1) + 1
 (3.2) 
where PSFcomposite is calculated as 
𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑆𝐹1 × … × 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑥 × … × 𝑃𝑆𝐹8 (3.3) 
where PSfx is the assigned multiplier for each PSF. The strength of SPAR-
H is in providing a guide for assigning numerical weights for the PSFs; the 
multiplier values for every PSF are reported in Table III.3.  
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Table III.3: PSF multipliers for action and diagnosis. 
SPAR-H 
PSFs 
PSF Levels 
Multipliers 
Action 
Multipliers 
Diagnosis 
Available 
Time 
Inadequate Time P(failure)=1 P(failure)=1 
Time available = time required 10 10 
Nominal time 1 1 
Time available > 5 x time required 0.1 0.1 
Time available > 50 x time required 0.01 0.01 
Insufficient information Nominal  Nominal  
Stress/ 
Stressors 
Extreme 5 5 
High 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
Complexity 
Highly complex 5 5 
Moderately complex 2 2 
Nominal 1 1 
Obvious diagnosis - 0.1 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
Experience/ 
Training 
Low 3 10 
Nominal 1 1 
High 0.5 0.5 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
Procedures 
Not available 50 50 
Incomplete 20 20 
Available, but poor 5 5 
Nominal 1 1 
Diagnostic/symptom oriented - 0.5 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
Cognitive 
Ergonomics 
Missing/Misleading 50 50 
Poor 10 10 
Nominal 1 1 
Good 0.5 0.5 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
Fitness for 
Duty 
 
Unfit P=1 P=1 
Degraded Fitness 5 5 
Nominal 1 1 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
Poor 5 2 
Work 
Processes 
Nominal 1 1 
Good 0.5 0.8 
Insufficient information Nominal Nominal 
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The multiplier values were attributed by analysts of the method, on the 
basis of several studies carried out on nuclear power plants. In order to align 
the evaluation of PSFs in our model, we standardized the multipliers shown 
in Table III.4. This standardization changes the values of the multipliers for 
each generic task compared to the average value of the class, maintaining them 
equal to a nominal level. The multiplier value is attributed to some PSFs as a 
direct input of the level (e.g. experience is directly established as a low, 
nominal or high level). For other PSFs, the final value of the multiplier is 
obtained from the weighted average of the multipliers assigned to the single 
sub-factors, where the weight is assigned by the rating analysts. Thereafter, 
identified levels and influencing factors are considered for each PSF. 
Table III.4: Modified multipliers due to standardization for each 
Generic Task (GT). 
SPAR-H 
Multipliers 
GT 1 GT 2 GT 3 GT 4 GT 5 GT 6 
50 21.00 26.00 28.00 34.00 56.00 82.00 
20 8.40 10.40 11.20 13.60 22.40 32.80 
10 4.20 5.20 5.60 6.80 11.20 16.40 
5 2.10 2.60 2.80 3.40 5.60 8.20 
3 1.26 1.56 1.68 2.04 3.36 4.92 
2 1.01 1.04 1.12 1.36 2.24 3.28 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0,8 0.34 0.42 0.45 0.54 0.90 0.99 
0,5 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.56 0.82 
0,1 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.16 
0,01 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.016 
III.3.2.1 Available time 
Available time, as a PSF term, can be misleading. In the assessment of the 
Available time, SPAR‐H does not look solely at the amount of time that is 
available for a task (Gertman et al., 2005; Boring and Blackman, 2007; 
Blackman, Gertman and Boring, 2008; Whaley et al., 2011). Rather, it looks 
at the amount of time available relative to the time required to complete the 
task. Available time refers to the amount of time that an operator or a crew 
has to diagnose and act upon an abnormal event. The time available can take 
on six levels, both positive and negative: 
 Inadequate time: If the operator cannot diagnose the problem in the 
amount of time available, no matter what s/he does, then failure is 
certain. 
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 Barely adequate time= 2/3 the average time required to diagnose the 
problem is available. 
 Nominal time= on average, there is sufficient time to diagnose the 
problem. 
 Extra time= time available is between one and two times greater than 
the nominal time required and is also greater than 30 minutes.  
 Expansive time= time available is greater than two times the nominal 
time required and is also greater than a minimum time of 30 minutes; 
there is an inordinate amount of time (a day or more) to diagnose the 
problem. 
 Insufficient information. 
Insufficient information is always present as alternative for all eight 
performance shaping factors and represents the situation where information is 
insufficient for assigning a level to a PSF. Insufficient Information is 
quantified with the same value as Nominal.  
III.3.2.2 Stress and stressors 
Stress specifically refers to the level of undesirable conditions and 
circumstances that impede the operator in completing a task (Gertman et al., 
2005; Boring and Blackman, 2007; Blackman, Gertman and Boring, 2008; 
Whaley et al., 2011). Note that the effect of stress on performance is 
curvilinear—that is, some small amount of stress can enhance performance, 
and in the context of SPAR‐H should be considered nominal, while high and 
extreme levels of stress will negatively affect human performance. The 
degradation of performance is the key point when assigning high or extreme 
stress levels. For stress, as well as for the complexity and work processes, the 
value of the multiplier is determined by the presence of more sub-factors. In 
these cases, the overall PSF value is given by the weighted average of the sub-
factor multipliers with respect to the weights that can be reset or assigned from 
time to time during the insertion of the input. Several environmental and 
behavioural sub-factors contribute to identify the multiplier:  
1) Mental stress;  
2) Pressure time;  
3) Workplace; 
4) Circadian rhythm;  
5) Microclimate;  
6) Lighting;  
7) Noise;  
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8) Vibration;  
9) Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation.  
Each of these contributes to the calculation of the total PSF stress through 
the formula 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝐹1 ∙ 𝑊1 + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑥 ∙ 𝑊𝑥 + ⋯ + 𝐹9 ∙ 𝑊9, where F1 is 
the level assigned to one of the nine sub-factors listed above and W1 is the 
weight of each sub-factor between 0 and 1. The weights must respect the 
condition ∑ Wi
9
i=1 = 1.  
The assignment and definition of levels of stress or stressors is identical 
across action and diagnosis and action tasks: 
 Extreme: a level of stress in which the performance of most workers 
deteriorates drastically. This is likely to occur when the onset of the 
stressor is unexpected, and the stressing situation persists for long 
periods. This level is also associated with the feeling of threat to one’s 
physical well-being or to one’s professional status and is considered to 
be qualitatively different from lesser degrees of high stress. 
 High: a level of stress higher than the nominal level (e.g., multiple 
instruments alarm unexpectedly and at the same time; continuous noise 
impacts ability to focus attention on the task; the consequences of the 
task represent a threat to plant safety). 
 Nominal: the level of stress that is strategic to good performance. 
 Insufficient information. 
The values of the multipliers for mental stress, pressure time and 
workplace are assigned directly, as reported in Table III.5. 
Table III.5: Stress levels and multipliers. 
Sub-Factors Stress levels Multipliers SPAR-H Weight 
Mental stress 
Extreme 5 
Variable 
High 2 
Nominal 1 
Insufficient information 1 
Pressure time 
Extreme 5 
Variable High 2 
Nominal 1 
State workplace 
Extreme 5 
Variable 
High 2 
Nominal 1 
Insufficient information 1 
Chapter III 
 
104 
The other factors must be treated individually because the level assignment 
is more complex and depends on a combination of physical, environmental 
and plant-related factors.  
III.3.2.2.1 Circadian Rhythm 
Many studies have been conducted regarding circadian rhythms in human 
performance and the importance of biological and physiological rhythms has 
been demonstrated by the recent Nobel Prize for Medicine 2017 won by 
Jeffrey C. Hall, Michael Rosbash and Michael W. Young. These rhythms 
serve to induce individuals of the need to find somewhere safe to sleep at the 
end of their day, and to become active and productive as they awake from 
sleep in the morning (Monk et al., 1997). 
Several physiological variables (temperature, cortisol and melatonin), 
humoral variables (vigour and well-being) and performance variable (hand 
dexterity, search speed, reasoning speed and accuracy, vigilance speed and 
hits) were found strongly related to circadian rhythm (Monk et al., 1997). Two 
different types of task can be considered (Folkard and Monk, 1980; Folkard 
and Rosen, 1990; Monk et al., 1997; Carrier and Monk, 2000; Folkard, 
Lombardi and Spencer, 2006): 
1) Task 1 (action): require immediate information processing and constant 
attention; they involve little memory (long-term memory) and are 
characterized by a considerable stress due, in many cases, to the speed 
required by the execution of the task. They therefore include manual and 
repetitive operations; 
2) Task 2 (diagnosis): involves both information processing and memory; 
these types of tasks are often referred to as working memory tasks, that is, 
memory work tasks. They therefore include operations of an intellectual 
type, typical of office work. 
The tasks have a different trend of performance during the day and the 
trends have been used to model the value of the multiplier as shown in Figure 
III.9 and Figure III.10. 
III.3.2.2.2 Microclimate 
Microclimate consists of a set of physical and environmental parameters 
that characterize the local environment, not necessarily confined, and that with 
individual parameters, such as metabolic activity and clothing, determine the 
thermal exchange between the environment itself and individuals that operate 
there. Microclimate control in the workplace is one of the fundamental aspects 
that allow people to work in conditions of well-being and comfort, avoiding 
thermal stress. 
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Figure III.9: Automatic trend of circadian rhythm multiplier for Task 1 
(action). 
 
Figure III.10: Automatic trend of circadian rhythm multiplier for Task 1 
(diagnosis). 
One of the basic conditions for comfort is the preservation of thermal 
neutrality, through a physiological response of the thermoregulation system, 
namely the situation in which a person does not feel too cold or too hot. The 
thermoregulation mechanisms, that allow the humans to maintain constant the 
internal temperature, are: 
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 natural or involuntary: 
 vasomotor physiological activity; 
 behavioural activity: sweating or shiver; 
 artificial or voluntary: 
 clothing; 
 modification of environmental conditions. 
The thermohygrometric conditions of the operator in the working 
environment are modelled in SHERPA considering four variables: 
 air temperature (°C); 
 relative humidity (%); 
 physical activity carried out (class of metabolic activity - MET); 
 thermal insulation clothing (CLO). 
These variables allow to assess the level of thermohygrometric comfort 
according to the process shown in Figure III.11. The first step evaluates the 
environmental temperature. 
In the working environments in which thermoregulatory systems are 
present, the temperature remains constant and equal to the value on which the 
thermoregulatory system is regulated, whereas in the absence of the latter the 
seasonal temperature daily trends are taken into account. Table III.6 reports 
the average, maximum and minimum temperatures for the four seasons and 
the times in which the maximum and minimum temperatures are recorded. 
Table III.6: Values of seasonal temperatures. 
Season 
Average 
temperature 
(°C) 
Maximum 
temperature 
(°C) 
Time 
Minimum 
temperature 
(°C) 
Time 
Winter 9,5 13,5 14:30 5,5 2:30 
Spring 16,9 22 16:00 11,8 4:00 
Summer 24,6 29,7 16:30 19,5 4:30 
Autumn 16,4 20,9 15:00 11,9 3:00 
Starting from these values the sinusoidal curves, which represent the 
temperature daily trend, day have been obtained (Figure III.12). The winter 
curve was obtained considering that the maximum temperature is recorded at 
14:30 and the minimum temperature at 2:30 and that the average temperature 
is equal to 9.5 ° C: 
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𝑇𝑎 = 9,5 + 4 sin(𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑔 − 127,5) (3.4) 
The spring curve was obtained considering that the maximum temperature 
is recorded at 16:00 and the minimum temperature at 4:00 and that the average 
temperature is equal to 16,9 ° C: 
𝑇𝑎 = 16,9 + 5,1 sin(𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑔 − 150) (3.5) 
 
Figure III.11: Assessment process for the microclimate factor. 
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The summer curve was obtained considering that the maximum 
temperature is recorded at 16:30 and the minimum at 4:30 and that the average 
temperature is 24,6 ° C: 
𝑇𝑎 = 24,6 + 5,1sin (𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑔 − 157,5) (3.6) 
The autumn curve was obtained considering that the maximum 
temperature is recorded at 15:00 and the minimum at 3:00 and that the average 
temperature is equal to 16,4 ° C: 
𝑇𝑎 = 16,4 + 4,5 sin(𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑔 − 135) (3.7) 
 
Figure III.12: Daily temperature trend. 
Perceived temperature is then determined using the Thermohygrometric 
Index (THI) on the basis of environmental temperature and relative humidity, 
as follows: 
𝑇𝐻𝐼(°𝐶) = 𝑇𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 = 𝑇𝑎 − (0,55 − 0,0055 ∙ 𝑈𝑅) ∙ (𝑇𝑎 − 14,5) (3.8) 
where 𝑇𝑎 is the environmental temperature expressed in °C and UR is the 
relative humidity expressed as a percentage. Thanks to the THI index, the 
temperature perceived by the operator is obtained. This is then modified to 
take into account metabolic activity and clothing through the formula: 
𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑇𝑎 − 3 ∙ (1 + 𝐶𝐿𝑂) ∙ (𝑀𝐸𝑇 − 1,2)               (3.9) 
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where CLO represents the thermal resistance index of clothing and MET 
the index of metabolic activity. Metabolic energy, also called metabolic rate 
or metabolism, depends on muscle activity. Normally, muscle activity is 
transformed into thermal energy; during heavy physical work this 
transformation can be limited to 75%; in fact, if a person climbs a mountain, 
part of the energy used is stored in the body in the form of potential energy. 
Traditionally, the metabolism is measured in met (1 met = 58.55 W/m2 of 
body surface area). An adult has a body surface of 1.7 m2; therefore, under 
conditions of thermal comfort, with a level of activity equal to 1 met, it will 
have a metabolism and therefore a dispersion of energy equal to about 100W. 
Our metabolism reaches the minimum during sleep (0.8 met) and its maximum 
during sports activities, where the value of 10 met is often reached. Table III.7 
shows some metabolic energy values related to typical activities, taken from 
the UNI EN ISO 7730: 2006 standard. 
Table III.7: Classes of metabolic activity and generated power. 
Type of activity 
Metabolic power 
W/m2 met 
Rest 58 1 
Light activity seated (office, diving, laboratory …) 70 1,2 
Light activity up (laboratory, light industry…) 100 1,7 
Moderate activity (work on machine…) 117 2 
High activity (heavy engineering…) 175 3 
Very high activity (intense activity next to limits…) 290 5 
Clothing reduces the dispersion of energy from the human body and it is 
classified according to the level of thermal insulation provided. The unit of 
measurement usually used for the thermal resistance of clothing is CLO 
(1CLO = 0.155m2 ° C / W). Table III.8 shows typical values of the thermal 
resistance of some typical clothing, reported by the UNI EN ISO 7730: 2006 
standard. These values are generally measured by using appropriate heated 
manikins.  
Perceived and operating temperature are compared through the Gap 
quantification. The Gap is identified as the difference in absolute value 
between the perceived and the operating temperature. The assignment and 
definition of levels of the microclimate sub-factor for stress performance 
shaping factor is based on these values: 
1) Extreme level= Gap> 6 ° C; 
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2) High level= 3 ° C <Gap <6 ° C; 
3) Nominal level= Gap <3 ° C. 
Table III.8: Types of thermal clothing and relative thermal resistance. 
Type of clothing Description 
Thermal 
resistance 
CLO M2K/W 
Typical tropical 
clothing 
T-shirt, shorts and sandals 0,1 0,02 
Lightweight 
summer clothing 
Shirt with short sleeves or t-shirt, 
light trousers and shoes 
0,5 0,08 
Lightweight 
clothing or work 
Shirt or shirt in cotton, pants and 
shoes 
Lightweight suit and shoes 
0,7 0,11 
Indoor winter 
clothing 
Short-sleeved underwear, shirt, 
jacket, heavy pants and shoes 
Short-sleeved underwear, sweatshirt, 
heavy pants and shoes 
1 0,16 
Outdoor winter 
clothing 
Short-sleeved underwear, shirt, 
jacket, coat, heavy pants and shoes 
Short-sleeved underwear, overalls, 
overalls with heavy padding, heavy-
duty hat and shoes 
1,5 0,23 
Special clothing Special suits 2 0,31 
III.3.2.2.3 Lighting  
The lighting of a work environment must be such as to satisfy basic human 
needs. A good lighting needs, in addition to the required lighting, other 
qualitative and quantitative requirements: 
 good visibility: to correctly perform a certain activity, the object of the 
vision must be perceived and unequivocally recognized with ease, 
speed and accuracy; 
 visual comfort: the whole visual environment must satisfy 
physiological and psychological needs; it guarantees workers a feeling 
of well-being, which, indirectly, also contributes to creating a high 
level of productivity; 
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 safety: the lighting conditions must always allow safety and ease of 
movement and a prompt and safe discernment of the dangers inherent 
in the work environment. 
 
 
Figure III.13: Evaluation process for the lighting factor. 
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The notion of comfort is subjective and is therefore difficult to define, 
whereas lack of comfort is certainly easier to circumscribe; it is linked to a 
sensation of visual discomfort caused by the presence of a strong contrast of 
luminance in the visual field or by dazzling phenomena. The main 
requirement, required by Legislative Decree. 81/08 for lighting workplaces 
(Annex IV, Article 1.10), is that workplaces must have sufficient natural light. 
In any case, all rooms and workplaces must be equipped with devices that 
allow adequate artificial lighting to safeguard workers' safety, health and well-
being. Based on this requirement SHERPA model considers two possible 
scenarios: 
1) Natural lighting combined with artificial lighting. 
2) Artificial lighting. 
In both cases the evaluation of the lighting factor during the operator's 
activities is based on the comparison between the illumination required by the 
visual task under examination and the illumination provided by the lighting 
system of the workplace. The evaluation process is shown in the following 
flowchart (Figure III.13). 
IESNA model is used to evaluate the amount of natural illumination in 
different periods of the year (Cucumo et al., 1996). This model considers three 
types of sky: clear, partly cloudy and cloudy sky, that are identified with the 
cloudiness ratio (CR), defined as the ratio between diffused radiation and 
global hourly radiation in the horizontal plane. The illuminance is calculated 
as follows: 
𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 ∙ (sin 𝛼𝑠)
𝐶                                                      (3.10) 
where E is the illuminance on the horizontal plane, αs the solar height and 
A, B and C are constants whose values are shown in Table III.9. 
Table III.9: Values of constants A, B and C for different sky conditions. 
Sky A B C 
Clear 0,8 15,5 0,5 
Partly Cloudy 0,3 45,0 1 
Cloudy 0,3 21,0 1 
The solar height trend is modelled through linear regression, referring to 
the values assumed during each season in the industrial area of Salerno, as 
follows: 
1) Winter: 𝛼𝑠 = 0,0039𝑡
4 − 0.205𝑡3 + 3,3097𝑡2 − 16,339𝑡 + 18,985 
2) Autumn: 𝛼𝑠 = 0,004𝑡
4 − 0.208𝑡3 + 3,2847𝑡2 − 15,551𝑡 + 17,235 
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3) Spring: 𝛼𝑠 = 0,0068𝑡
4 − 0.3561𝑡3 + 5,6325𝑡2 − 25,971𝑡 + 28,257 
4) Summer: 𝛼𝑠 = 0,0069𝑡
4 − 0.3592𝑡3 + 5,6843𝑡2 − 26,333𝑡 + 28,735 
A representation more realistic and close to the real lighting conditions in 
the workplace is obtained considering the percentage reported in Table III.10 
and derived from the meteorological historical series. 
Table III.10: Allocation between the different types of seasonal level sky. 
 Clear sky Partly Cloudy Sky Cloudy Sky 
Autumn 22% 33% 45% 
Winter 28% 39% 33% 
Spring 33% 43% 24% 
Summer 48% 32% 20% 
Total 33% 37% 30% 
The internal illumination is then derived applying a mean daylight factor. 
The daylight factor is a parameter suitable to characterize, from the lighting 
point of view, in the case of a source of natural light, the environment under 
study. The ratio or daylight factor η, is defined as: 
𝜂 =
𝐸
𝐸𝑒
 (3.11) 
where E is the illuminance in a point of the environment and Ee is the 
illuminance which, at the same time, would assume a horizontal surface 
placed outside, shielded by direct solar irradiation and exposed to the light 
coming from whole (unobstructed) heavenly vault. The daylight factor η is 
often expressed in percentage units. In the case of the working environment, 
a value of 0.02 is assumed. 
The second step consists in calculating the lighting provided by the 
artificial lighting systems in the workplace, considering: 
1) type of artificial light sources (Table III.11); 
2) number of artificial light sources; 
3) area to be illuminated (A); 
4) maintenance factor (M), equal to 0.6; 
5) utilization factor (Fu), equal to 0.5. 
Knowing the type and number of light sources installed in the work 
environment, it is possible to calculate the illuminance, using the inverse 
formula applied by the total flow design method: 
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𝐸 =
𝐹𝑢 ∙ 𝑀 ∙ 𝑁 ∙ 𝐿
𝐴
 (3.12) 
where E is the illuminance of the plant expressed in lux, Fu and M are 
respectively the utilization and maintenance factors, N is the number of light 
sources, L the luminous flux emitted by each light source and expressed in 
lumens and finally A is the area to be illuminated in square meters. In the case 
of combined natural and artificial lighting the total value of illuminance is 
given by the sum of the natural and the artificial one. 
Table III.11: Types of light sources available for a lighting system. 
Artificial light 
source 
Watt 
Luminous 
flux (lm) 
Colour 
temperature 
Rendering 
index 
Incandescent 
lamp 
100 1380 2700 100 
Tubular 
fluorescent lamp 
T5 
54 4450 4000 85 
Compact 
fluorescent lamp 
18 1200 4000 82 
Sodium vapor 
lamp high 
pressure  
150 15000 2100 25 
Metal halide lamp 400 40000 4140 90 
Mixed light lamp 500 14000 4100 49 
LEDs tubes 30 3300 6500 85 
This is the first value necessary for the evaluation of the illuminance factor. 
It must be compared with the limits imposed by the law for the different visual 
tasks, where the visual task refers to the set of visual elements (dimensions of 
the structure, contrast and duration) that relate to the work carried out. The 
values specified in Table III.12 are the average illuminances maintained 
necessary to ensure visual comfort. 
The quantification of the level of the lighting factor is carried out through 
the following criteria: 
 If the total illuminance level is between the maximum and the 
minimum value required by the visual task, the nominal level is 
assigned; 
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 If the total illuminance level is between the maximum value increased 
by 200 lux and the minimum value decreased by 200 lux the high level 
is assigned; 
 If the total illuminance level is higher than the maximum value 
increased by 200 lux or lower than the minimum level decreased by 
200 lux, the extreme level is assigned. 
Another aspect taken into consideration in the assessment of lighting is the 
dazzling phenomenon. Dazzling is the visual sensation produced by surfaces 
that determine high luminance gradients within the visual field and can be 
perceived as harassing or debilitating glare. In the case of known and present 
dazzling phenomena the extreme level of stress is always assigned. 
Table III.12: Visual tasks and levels of illumination required for each 
one. 
Tasks and visual requirements 
Illumination value 
required for the task 
Tasks with simple visual requirements <300 
Tasks with medium visual requirements 300-600 
Tasks with visual requirements of precision 600-900 
Tasks with difficult visual requirements 900-1200 
Performing visual tasks very precise 1200-1500 
Tasks with special visual requirements  >1500 
III.3.2.2.4 Noise 
Noise in the workplace has become one of the most important problems 
among those included in occupational hygiene. A sound that causes an 
unpleasant, annoying or intolerable sensation can be defined noise. The sound 
is measured in decibels, as regards sound pressure, and in hertz, with regard 
to frequency. There are two quantities to measure the continuous noise 
exposure value and which can be compared to the legal limits: 
 the individual exposure level to daily noise (LEX, d): weighted 
average value of the noise exposure levels for a nominal working day 
of 8 hours. 
 the individual exposure level to weekly noise (LEX, w): weighted 
average value of the daily noise exposure levels for a nominal week of 
5 days of 8-hours. 
Legislative Decree 195/2006 sets the following noise limits: 
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1) Exposure limit value (8 h working day): 87dB (A). 
2) Higher value of action (8 h working day): 85 dB (A). 
3) Lower value of action (8 h working day): 80 dB (A). 
SHERPA considers the noise impact on HEP, as follows: 
1) Extreme level: noise level above 85 dB; 
2) High level: noise level between 60 and 85 dB; 
3) Nominal level: noise level below 60 dB. 
III.3.2.2.5 Vibrations  
The vibrations, according to the physical definition, are mechanical 
oscillations generated by waves of pressure that are transmitted through solid 
bodies. Depending on the physio pathological effects on humans, the 
vibrations are divided into three main frequency bands: 
 0-2 Hz: low frequency oscillations, generated by means of transport 
(land, air, sea). 
 2-20 Hz: medium frequency oscillations, generated by machines and 
industrial plants. 
 > 20-30 Hz: high frequency oscillations; generated by a wide range of 
vibrating tools that are widespread in the industrial field, involving 
many work activities, from the simplest to the most sophisticated. 
The vibrations are characterized by three other parameters closely related 
to each other: 
 amplitude of the displacement (expressed in cm), 
 speed (expressed in cm / sec), 
 acceleration (expressed in m/sec2 or multiples of g, gravity 
acceleration: 1g = 9.8 m/sec2). 
Acceleration is the most important parameter for the assessment of the 
body's response to vibrations. Legislative Decree 81/2008 distinguishes 
between vibrations transmitted to the arm-hand system and those transmitted 
to the whole body. Exposure to vibrations to the hand-arm system is generally 
caused by hand contact with the handgrip of hand tools or hand-driven 
machinery. Mechanical vibrations transmitted to the whole body pose risks to 
the health and safety of workers, in particular back pain and trauma to the 
spine. It is known that various work activities carried out on board transport 
or handling means expose the body to vibrations or impacts, which may be 
harmful to the exposed subjects. The current legislation requires that the 
A Simulator for Human Error Probability Analysis: theoretical framework 
 
117 
exposure to vibrations in both cases is evaluated by calculating the equivalent 
weighted acceleration in frequency referred to eight hours of work, which is 
calculated using the following formula: 
𝐴(8) = 𝑎𝑉√
𝑇𝑒
8
                                               (3.13) 
where Te is the total daily duration of vibration exposure expressed in hours 
and av the value of the acceleration considering the components quantified on 
the three axes: 
𝑎𝑣 (𝑚 𝑠
2)   =   (𝑎𝑤𝑥
2 + 𝑎𝑤𝑦
2 + 𝑎𝑤𝑧
2 )
1/2
 ⁄ )                                     (3.14) 
If the worker is exposed to different vibration values, such as when using 
several mechanical means during the working day, the daily vibration 
exposure A (8), in m/s2, is obtained by expression: 
𝐴(8) = [
1
8
∑ 𝑎𝑣𝑖
2 𝑇𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
] 
1
2
                                           (3.15) 
where 𝑎𝑣𝑖
2  is the vector sum of the acceleration relative to the i-th operation 
and Ti is the exposure time relative to the i-th operation expressed in hours. 
Through the Vibration Database, available online, the exposure values to 
vibrations produced by the machines commonly used in the industrial field 
can be identified. Based on these limits in SHERPA the vibration factor levels 
are assigned according to the following criteria: 
 Hand-arm system: 
1) Extreme level: equivalent vibration level (calculated as per norm) above 5 
m/s2; 
2) High level: equivalent vibration level (calculated as per norm) between 2.5 
and 5 m/s2; 
3) Nominal level: equivalent vibration level (calculated as per norm) lower 
than 2.5 m/s2; 
 Whole body: 
1) Extreme level: equivalent vibration level (calculated as per norm) above 1 
m/s2; 
2) High level: equivalent vibration level (calculated as per standard) between 
0.5 and 1 m/s2; 
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3) Nominal level: equivalent vibration level (calculated as per norm) lower 
than 0.5 m/s2; 
Furthermore, the vibrations are not naturally present in all working 
contexts and for this reason insufficient information level is assigned in lack 
of them. 
III.3.2.2.6 Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation  
The ionizing radiations have enough energy to be able to ionize the atoms 
(or molecules) with which they come into contact. They are divided into two 
main categories: those that produce ions in a direct way (the particles α, β- and 
β +;) and those that produce ions in an indirect way (neutrons, γ rays and X 
rays). Ionizing radiation is generated by nuclear, artificial or natural reactions, 
from very high temperatures such as plasma discharge, through the production 
of high-energy particles in particle accelerators, or due to acceleration of 
charged particles by the fields electromagnetic products produced by natural 
processes, from lightning to supernova explosions. If ionizing radiation affects 
biological tissues, it can cause various types of health-related damage: 
1) deterministic somatic damage: degeneration of organic tissues; 
2) stochastic somatic damage: include leukaemia and solid tumours; 
3) stochastic genetic damage: genetic mutations and chromosomal aberrations. 
Legislative Decree 230/95 imposes different limits for exposure to ionizing 
radiation: 
 Operator not exposed: effective dose absorbed (msV/year) <1; 
 Operator exposed in category B: 1<absorbed effective dose 
(msV/year) <6; 
 Operator exposed in category A: effective dose absorbed (msV /year)> 
6. 
On the basis of these limits, the levels of the ionizing radiation sub-factor 
are assigned as follows: 
 Nominal level= unexposed operator; 
 High-level= category B; 
 Extreme level= category A.  
Non-ionizing radiation refers, instead, to those forms of radiation not able 
to cause the breaking of electronic bonds of matter and which lead to the 
formation of pairs of particles having opposite charge. They refer to any type 
of electromagnetic radiation which, instead of producing charged ions by 
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passing through matter, excites only the movement of an electron to a higher 
energetic state. Several biological effects are observed for different types of 
non-ionizing radiation. The electric, magnetic and electromagnetic fields 
present in the environment have the property of penetrating deeply into 
biological materials. The penetration thickness decreases with the frequency 
of the fields: it is maximum at the low frequencies, of the order of centimetres 
in the radio frequency range, millimetres in the microwave region. 
These fields interact with the charged particles present in the exposed 
system and exert forces on them which can alter the original charge 
distribution. The main effect of the interaction of radio frequencies and 
microwaves with a living system is represented by a transfer of energy, in the 
form of heat, with an increase in the local temperature or in the whole system. 
Furthermore, the possibility of dispersing heat is of importance; for the human 
organism the best heat exchanger is represented by the blood, for this reason 
the less vascularized organs or apparatuses are more susceptible to damages 
from electromagnetic radiations as they are not able to redistribute the heat 
received from an external source. 
The regulation n.36 / 2001 defines the exposure limits for electromagnetic 
fields: 
1) High frequencies: 
 Limit value of the electric field: 20 V/m; 
 Attention value of the electric field: 6 V/m. 
2) Low frequency: 
 Limit value of the electric field: 5 kV/m; 
 Attention value of the electric field: 0.5 kV/m. 
Based on these limits, SHERPA assigns the levels of the non-ionizing 
radiation sub-factor: nominal level to values lower than those of attention of 
the electric field, high level for values between the limit and the attention level 
and, finally, extreme level for values above the limit value. 
In the proposed module the evaluation is done only in case there is 
sufficient information. In the presence of both types of radiation, the total 
assessment of the level is given by the average of the levels assigned to 
ionizing and non-ionizing radiations. 
III.3.2.3 Complexity 
Complexity refers to how difficult the task is to perform in the given 
context; it considers both the task and the environment (Gertman et al., 2005; 
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Boring and Blackman, 2007; Blackman, Gertman and Boring, 2008; Whaley 
et al., 2011). A more difficult task has a greater chance for human error. 
Similarly, a more ambiguous task has a greater chance for human error. The 
complexity is one of those PSFs that Boring (2007) defines as indirect, as it 
cannot be measured directly. For this reason, the value of the complexity 
cannot be assigned directly but relies on input from several elements (Table 
III.13):  
1) General complexity;  
2) Mental efforts required;  
3) Physical effort required from type of activity;  
4) Precision level of the activity; 
5) Parallel tasks. 
Each of these contributes to the calculation of the overall complexity PSF 
through the formula 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐹1 ∙ 𝑊1+. . . +𝐹𝑥 ∙ 𝑊𝑥+. . . +𝐹5 ∙ 𝑊5, 
where F1 is the level assigned to one of the five factors listed above and W1 
is the weight of each factor between 0 and 1. The weights must respect the 
condition ∑ Wi
5
i=1 = 1. 
III.3.2.4 Experience and training 
This PSF refers to the experience and training of the operator involved in 
the task (Gertman et al., 2005; Boring and Blackman, 2007; Blackman, 
Gertman and Boring, 2008; Whaley et al., 2011).  
Years of experience of the individual or crew, and whether the 
operator/crew has been trained on the type of accident, the amount of time 
passed since training, the frequency of training, and the systems involved in 
the task and scenario are included in this PSF. In SHERPA, the data on the 
training and experience of the operator are inserted directly according to 
following levels: 
 Low= less than 6 months of relevant experience and/or training. This 
level of experience / training does not provide the level of proficiency 
and profound understanding necessary to properly perform the 
required tasks; it does not provide adequate practice in these tasks or 
does not expose individuals to various abnormal conditions. 
 Nominal= more than 6 months of relevant experience and/or training.  
 High= extensive experience; a demonstrated master. This level of 
experience / training provides operators with extensive knowledge and 
practice in a wide range of possible scenarios. 
 Insufficient information. 
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Table III.13: Complexity levels and multipliers. 
Factors Complexity levels 
Multipliers 
SPAR-H 
Weight 
General 
complexity 
Highly complex: very difficult to perform 5 
Variable 
Moderately complex: somewhat difficult 
to perform 
2 
Nominal: not difficult to perform 1 
Obvious diagnosis: diagnosis becomes 
greatly simplified  
0,1 
Insufficient information 1 
Precision 
of activity 
High level of precision 5 
Variable 
Moderate level of precision 2 
Nominal level of precision 1 
Insufficient information 1 
Mental 
efforts 
required 
High degree of memory, high 
understanding of technical drawings and 
specifications 
5 
Variable 
Moderate degree of memory, moderate 
understanding of technical drawings and 
specifications 
2 
Minimal mental effort 1 
Insufficient information 1 
Parallel 
tasks 
Multiple run two or more machines 5 
Variable 
Many different tasks on the same machine 
(machining, setup...) 
2 
Processing on the same machine 1 
Insufficient information 1 
Physical 
efforts 
required 
- High activity (heavy engineering...) 
- Very high activity (intense activity next 
to the limits 
5 
Variable 
Moderate activity (work on machines...) 2 
- Light activity seated (office, driving, 
laboratory  
- Light activity up (laboratory, light 
industry...) 
1 
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III.3.2.5 Procedures 
This PSF refers to the existence and use of formal operating procedures for 
the tasks under consideration (Gertman et al., 2005; Boring and Blackman, 
2007; Blackman, Gertman and Boring, 2008; Whaley et al., 2011). Common 
problems seen in event investigations for procedures include situations where 
procedures give wrong or inadequate information regarding a particular 
control sequence. Another common problem is the ambiguity of steps. Levels 
used for this PSF in SPAR‐H: 
 Not available= the procedure needed for a particular task or tasks in 
the event is not available. 
 Incomplete= information is needed that is not contained in the 
procedure or procedure sections; sections or task instructions (or other 
needed information) are absent.  
 Available, but poor= a procedure is available, but it is difficult to use 
because of factors such as formatting problems, ambiguity, or such a 
lack in consistency that it impedes performance.  
 Nominal= procedures are available and enhance performance. 
 Diagnostic/symptom oriented= diagnostic procedures assist the 
operator/crew in correctly diagnosing the event. These procedures 
allow operators to maintain the plant in a safe condition, without the 
need to diagnose exactly what the event is, and what needs to be done 
to mitigate the event.  
 Insufficient information. 
III.3.2.6 Cognitive ergonomics 
Ergonomics refers to the equipment, displays and controls, layout, quality, 
and quantity of information available from instrumentation, and the 
interaction of the operator/crew with the equipment to carry out tasks 
(Gertman et al., 2005; Boring and Blackman, 2007; Blackman, Gertman and 
Boring, 2008; Whaley et al., 2011). Aspects of the human-machine interface 
are included in this category, as well as the adequacy or inadequacy of 
computer software. SPAR-H was born in the nuclear field, so ergonomics is 
mainly oriented to the interaction of a human or group to the instrumentation 
typical of a control room, such as the display and control buttons. In other 
kinds of industries, this PSF focuses instead on the ergonomics of the 
workplace and the equipment used. The multipliers are as follows. 
 Missing, misleading= lack of ergonomic design for the workstation. 
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 Poor= low level of ergonomics limited to single workstation. 
 Nominal= average level of ergonomics limited to single workstation. 
 Good= ergonomic workplace design for both the posture that the tools 
used for. 
 Insufficient information. 
III.3.2.7 Fitness for duty 
Fitness for duty refers to whether or not the individual is physically and 
mentally suited to the task at hand (Gertman et al., 2005; Boring and 
Blackman, 2007; Blackman, Gertman and Boring, 2008; Whaley et al., 2011). 
This PSF includes fatigue, sickness, drug use (legal or illegal), 
overconfidence, personal problems and distractions and also includes factors 
associated with individuals, but not related to training, experience or stress 
(which are covered by other PSFs). Levels used in SHERPA are: 
 Unfit= the individual is unable to carry out the required tasks, due to 
illness or other physical or mental incapacitation (e.g. having an 
incapacitating stroke). 
 Degraded Fitness= the individual is able to carry out the tasks, 
although performance is negatively affected. Mental and physical 
performance can be affected if an individual is ill, such as having a 
fever. Individuals can also exhibit degraded performance if they are 
inappropriately overconfident in their abilities to perform. 
 Nominal= the individual is able to carry out tasks; no known 
performance degradation is observed. Nominal should also be used 
when the analyst judges the PSF as not a performance driver. 
 Insufficient information. 
III.3.2.8 Work processes 
Work processes refer to aspects of doing work, including inter‐
organizational factors, safety culture, work planning, communication and 
management support and policies (Gertman et al., 2005; Boring and 
Blackman, 2007; Blackman, Gertman and Boring, 2008; Whaley et al., 2011). 
How work is planned, communicated and executed can affect individual and 
crew performance. If planning and communication are poor, then individuals 
might not fully understand the work requirements. Work processes also 
include any management, organizational or supervisory factors that may affect 
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performance. In this case, the value of the PSF also may not be assigned 
directly but may be based on multiple elements that are input:  
1) Communication and integration in team work;  
2) Work processes. 
The multipliers are as follows: 
 Poor= insufficient integration into team, bad or conflictual 
relationship, poor communication between different shifts / 
insufficient management of work processes. 
 Nominal= sufficient integration into the team, professional 
relationship, good communication between different shifts / good 
management of work processes. 
 Good= excellent integration into the team, none type of conflict, 
excellent management of work processes. 
 Insufficient information. 
Each of these contributes to the calculation of the total PSF work processes 
through the formula 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝐹1 ∙ 𝑊1 + 𝐹2 ∙ 𝑊2, where F1 is the 
level assigned to one of two factors listed above and W1 is the weight of each 
factor between 0 and 1. The weights must respect the condition ∑ Wi
2
i=1 = 1. 
III.3.3 Process simulation 
The third SHERPA sub model (Figure III.2) represents the process 
modelling and it allows to simulate the execution of human working activities, 
taking into account the features of the process, the HEP, and the assigned 
breaks scheduling. The selection of the input variables such as performed task, 
level of contextual factors, or physical and mental employee condition, allows 
to model the specific system considering all the working context and worker 
features. SHERPA can manage three different rest breaks policies: 
 no break in the shift (continuous working);  
 fixed breaks (several timing and length of rest period); 
 automatic break scheduling management. 
The operating principles are displayed in the flowchart (Figure III.14), 
where the logic of process simulation and breaks policies management are 
represented. The absence of breaks (yellow box) corresponds to the mere 
reproduction of the process. The activities are simulated based on the model 
inputs, technical and economic data (processing and setup times, number of 
entities, workplace conditions and many others) and on the corresponding HR 
distribution, taking into account the hours of continuous work already carried 
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out by the worker. The contextual HEP value, output from this block, consents 
to quantify in the next phase, the non-compliant percentage and to evaluate 
the overall worker performance. In this case, SHERPA represents the 
activities performed by a single operator during the work shift, estimating in 
real time the reliability curves and the impact of the operator's performance 
on the system under examination. 
 
Figure III.14: Logic framework of the break configurations 
management. 
The fixed break (red box) or automatic (blue box) sections involve the 
break scheduling management through the hypothesis that breaks allow the 
mental and physical recovery and lead to improvements of human reliability. 
The worker’s recovery (grey box) is modelled as a function of the break length 
and of the type of activity carried out. Recovery modelling and break 
scheduling management are described in the following sections.   
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III.3.3.1 Recovery modelling 
Despite few studies on the issue, rest breaks literature has shown a great 
influence of breaks, both micros and macros, on the human performance. Rest 
break allows, in fact, the worker’s physical and mental recover (Dababneh, 
Swanson and Shell, 2001; Jett and George, 2003; Demerouti et al., 2012).  
The literature review on breaks impact on human performance allows to 
model the worker’s recovery and the effect in terms of HEP. After a break, in 
fact, the human reliability curve is reported to a previous moment with lower 
level of HEP; this new distribution of nominal HEP is function of length of 
same break (Figure III.15). This means that after a break, more or less 
extended, the HEP nominal value changes, due to the effect of the recovery. 
This value is lower than the HEP when there is no break. Naturally, recovery 
depends on the activity performed, the characteristics of the operator and the 
duration of the break. 
 
Figure III.15: Break impact of human error probability (HEP). 
The recovery factor (rp), that takes the Wright learning curve as a reference, 
is expressed by the exponential function: 
𝑟𝑝 = 𝑒
−𝜔𝑇𝑏                                     (3.16) 
in which Tb is the break length (in hours) and ω is the recovery rate. This 
coefficient represents has been hypothesized for four general categories, 
which describe different working activities, as listed in Table III.14 and Table 
III.15. The recovery index for the four cases has been quantified by imposing, 
as a boundary condition, that the maximum/full recovery is achieved with a 
break of optimal duration and for rp equal to 0.1 by setting this rate at three 
levels (slow, medium and fast). In this way the maximum break time is 
limited: in fact, the rp curve tends asymptotically to a null value with 
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increasing break time; full recovery would be obtained in correspondence to 
a break of infinite time. Below the value of rp of 0.1, it has been assumed that 
the pause not have substantial effects on the recovery of the operator.  
Table III.14: Types of activities and corresponding parameters for the 
optimal allocation of the breaks (recovery rate). 
Activity 
Recovery rate (ω) 
Slow Medium Fast 
Sedentary activities (office, laboratory) 2.76 4.61 13.82 
Activity light, standing (laboratory, light industry) 2.51 3.95 9.21 
Medium activity, standing (work machines) 2.30 3.45 6.91 
Activities heavy (heavy work machines) 1.97 2.76 4.61 
Table III.15: Types of activities and corresponding parameters for the 
optimal allocation of the breaks (optimal time). 
Activity 
Optimal time (min) 
Slow Medium Fast 
Sedentary activities (office, laboratory) 50 30 10 
Activity light, standing (laboratory, light industry) 55 35 15 
Medium activity, standing (work machines) 60 40 20 
Activities heavy (heavy work machines) 70 50 30 
Recovery rate needs an in-depth analysis as it is not possible to attribute a 
break, whose duration is valid for any type of activity carried out (whether 
physical or mental), for any age and/or gender of the worker. Recovery speed 
and type of physical activity (Table III.14) are not the only parameters to be 
considered for the recovery rate. Physiological job demands, age and gender 
are, in fact, factors that strongly determine the individual need of recovery. 
Table III.16 summarizes the main parameters that have been chosen to 
represent all the factors that influence the need for recovery of the operator in 
the workplace.  
The analysis of the scientific literature on need for recovery has allowed 
defining and model the optimal break times according to the previously 
mentioned parameters. Firstly, the percentages of increase and decrease of the 
need for recovery between the different age groups were determined and 
applied with respect to the 36-45 age group which was considered as a 
reference (Mohren, Jansen and Kant, 2010). 
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Table III.16:Parameters of recovery rate. 
Parameters Levels Values 
Recovery speed 3 Slow (S), Medium (M), Fast (F) 
Physical activity 4 
Sedentary activities 
Activity light, standing 
Medium activity, standing 
Activities heavy 
Psychological Job 
Demands 
3 Low, Medium, High 
Age groups 5 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65 
Gender 2 Male, Female 
Likewise, variations were identified with respect to the three different tasks 
that describe the load of cognitive work that the operator perceives, being 
engaged in an activity that requires expenditures of mental energy and psychic 
efforts (Mohren, Jansen and Kant, 2010; Mathiassen et al., 2014). The 
quantification results for male are reported in Appendix A. The results thus 
obtained were then adapted to the female gender in relation to the already 
known recovery needs (Mohren, Jansen and Kant, 2010). The optimal break 
duration for women is obtained starting from that of men, increasing or 
reducing it according to the percentage reported in Table III.17 and derived 
by Mohren, Jansen and Kant (2010). 
Table III.17: Female need for recovery. 
Age Groups 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 
% increased or reduced 
need for recovery 
+ 1.73% -6.4% -8.9% -5.96% +4.75% 
The estimated of recovery times, obtained from the literature and reported 
in Appendix A, aims to be more realistic and relevant to the working reality 
in which the operators exercise a profession that requires physical and mental 
efforts. Recovery times obtained decrease with the increase in the 
psychological burden of work borne by the operator: beyond the expectations 
of an association rather linear between the increase in recovery and the 
increasing difficulty of cognitive work, it is possible to observe a greater 
recovery when the operator detaches from an activity that has committed him 
from the physical point of view to dedicate himself to one that requires 
different efforts, of a psychic nature and of shorter duration, allowing the body 
to recover the muscular energy expenses and accelerate the recovery process. 
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The HR improvement, due to the rest period, is modelled considering that 
the human reliability curves after a break is reported to a previous moment 
with a lower level of HEP and this new distribution of nominal HEP is a 
function of the length of same break, as previous defined. The recovery factor 
impact on the nominal HEP distribution is as follows: 
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑘 ∙ 𝑒
−𝛼∙(𝑇∙𝑟𝑝−1)
𝛽
 (3.17) 
where T is the time in which the operator resumes its activity after the break 
and rp represents the level of recovery, the two parameters α and β change the 
scale and shape of the curve for each generic task.  
 
Figure III.16: The human error probability distribution with two break 
configurations: a) one break of 20 min after 240 worked min; b) four breaks 
of 5 min the first after 132 worked min and the others every 72 min. 
Figure III.16 shows the error probability curves of an eight-h shift in two 
given scenarios, which display action mechanism of the breaks on reliability 
curves. In the first case, a break of 20 min is assigned to half shift and it allows 
the almost full recovery, decreasing the average HEP. In the same way, four 
breaks of 5 min, distributed in the shift, modify the average human reliability. 
The impact of the break length on the worker’s recovery is evident comparing 
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the two HEP curves: a longer break (20 min) leads to higher recovery than 
shorter breaks (5 min).  
III.3.3.2 Break scheduling management  
SHERPA addresses the break scheduling problems through the hypothesis 
that breaks allow the mental and physical recovery and lead to improvements 
of human reliability, as described in the previous section.  
As shown in Figure III.14, for the modelling of the fixed breaks scheduling, 
the model takes into account the exact chosen work-rest configuration and 
then it recalculates the nominal HEP before performing the processing phase. 
In this way, HEP is modified due to the recovery of the operator, which 
naturally leads to a more or less evident performance improvement based on 
the break time, number of break and position of the breaks in the work shift. 
Furthermore, knowing HR and HEP curves, SHERPA applies also an 
economic algorithm to automatically manage break scheduling, that allows to 
assess both positive and negative break effects and to compare their impact on 
the system performance. The algorithm is able to decide: whether to do or not 
the break for the operator before starting the current task and the optimum 
break time. The positive break impact on human reliability is a function of 
break time, recovery speed and type of performed activities. However, the 
break benefit is countered by increased idle time of employees during the rest 
period, that is modelled as a cost of lost production due to break and it 
corresponds, for example, to a decrease of productivity in a manufacturing 
context. The model directly links the contextual HEP to the number of non-
compliant entities, as described in Section III.3.5. The model can be adapted 
to alternative set of constraints (minimum number of breaks and minimum 
time guaranteed by legislation or internal union agreements, maximum hours 
of continuous work and other possible constraints), assigned in the 
initialization phase of the system as inputs.  
SHERPA can then evaluate the effect of every work-rest policy, defined as 
acceptable for the system under consideration, with the aim of identifying the 
best configuration among those possible. The algorithm (Figure III.14) takes 
into account the cost of lost production due to the break and the quality costs 
related to operator errors. In particular, before starting a new processing, the 
algorithm compares: 
 The profit obtained at the end of next processing if the operator 
continues his work activities without break (Rno-break). 
 The profit obtained at the end of next processing if the operator does a 
break of minimum length before (Rbreak). 
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The profit per unit is given by: 
where HR is the operator reliability; P is the item price; HEP is the 
probability of failure (1-HR); CFSTD is the standard fixed cost; CVSTD is the 
standard variable cost; PR is the probability of recovery; CR is the cost of 
recovery; cb is the cost of breaks per minute; and Tb is the break time in 
minutes. The break cost per minute is related to the loss due to the failure 
current work piece. It is therefore expressed as 
where 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total time of processing in minutes that considers the 
time increment linked to possible rework: 
where 𝑇𝑐 is the processing time; 𝑇𝑟 is the time required for the reworking, 
defined as percentage increase of the processing time; and PR is the probability 
of recovery.  
Starting from the minimum break time given as input, the algorithm 
compares the two profits (Rbreak-Rnobreak) and it decides if the break is 
convenient. If the minimum break is convenient SHERPA increases the break 
one minute by one until it remains economically convenient 
(Rbreak+>Rbreak). In this way SHERPA provides the possibility of 
determining the optimal breaks scheduling.  
III.3.4 Learning and forgetting Curves Model (LFCM)  
The Learning and Forgetting Curves Model (LFCM), according to what 
proposed by Jaber and Bonney in 1996, has been implemented as a further 
module in the SHERPA simulator. 
The learning curves are based on the clear improvements that occur when 
the workers learn how to do a job through the production of more and more 
units, decreasing the production time per unit (Azizi, Zolfaghari and Liang, 
2010). This phenomenon is observed by the decrease in production time per 
unit as operators gain experience by producing additional units (Nembhard 
and Osothsilp, 2001). The learning impact on the system performance changes 
when the operator does a break of sufficient length and the forgetting process 
𝑅 = (𝐻𝑅 + 𝐻𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑟) ∙ 𝑃 −  𝐶𝐹𝑆𝑇𝐷 −  𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑇𝐷 −  𝐻𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝐶𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑟 − 𝑐𝑏 ∙ 𝑇𝑏 (3.18) 
𝑐𝑏 =
((𝐻𝑅 + 𝐻𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑟) ∙ 𝑃 − 𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑇𝐷 − 𝐻𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝐶𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝑟)
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 (3.19) 
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = (𝐻𝑅 + 𝐻𝐸𝑃) ∙ 𝑇𝑐 + 𝐻𝐸𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝑟 ∙ 𝑇𝑟 (3.20) 
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starts to take place. In this case the production time of the first unit after the 
break tends to be longer than the production time of the last unit before the 
break (Nembhard and Osothsilp, 2001). 
The impact of these processes on the performance of repetitive tasks has 
been widely studied and applied in various sectors, like manufacturing, 
healthcare, energy, information technologies, education, design and banking 
(Anzanello and Fogliatto, 2011; Jaber and Glock, 2013; Grosse, Glock and 
Müller, 2015). Knowing how humans learn in production systems and how 
learning and forgetting affects the performance of the production processes is 
important for several reasons (Anzanello and Fogliatto, 2011). Considering 
learning in production planning may contribute to a significant reduction in 
total costs or to an improvement in the productivity (Jaber and Glock, 2013). 
Furthermore, it could have a positive effect on the human error rate. The 
experience gained in performing a repetitive task involves, in fact, a decrease 
in the production time which could improve the human reliability, considering 
for example the higher available time for the execution of the task. A learning 
curve is a mathematical description of workers’ performance in repetitive 
tasks; in fact in every repetition the workers tend to demand less time to 
perform tasks due to familiarity with the operation and tools (Anzanello and 
Fogliatto, 2011). The Wright’s learning curve (1936) is the earliest and the 
most popular model observed in an industrial setting that expresses an 
exponential relationship between direct man-hour input and cumulative 
production in the form of:  
𝑇𝑞 = 𝑇1 ∙ 𝑞
−𝑏 (3.21) 
where 𝑇𝑞 is the time to produce the qth unit, q is the production count, 𝑇1 
is the theoretical time required to produce the first unit, and b= -ln(LR)/ln(2) 
is the learning slope, where LR is the learning rate (Jaber and Bonney, 1996). 
Typical LRs according to Givi (Z S Givi, Jaber and Neumann, 2015) are 
shown in Table III.18. Equation (3.21) shows that with growing production 
the unit time decreases by a constant percentage each time the quantity 
doubles. 
At first this phenomenon has been studied individually but it is strongly 
correlated with the forgetting process. In intermittent production runs, there is 
a break of sufficient length that some learning accumulated in producing q 
units in the previous lots is not retained when a new run starts up (Jaber and 
Bonney, 1996). Hence, the production rate at the recommencement would not 
be as high as when the production ceased. The increase in time to produce the 
first unit in the next production run depends on the length of the interruption 
and the time to produce the qth unit which is when the interruption occurred. 
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Table III.18: Learning rates for different tasks (Givi, Jaber and 
Neumann, 2015). 
TYPE OF WORK LR% INDUSTRY LR% 
Assembly 84-85 Aerospace 85 
Prototype assembly 65 Complex machines 75-85 
Clerical ops 75-85 Construction 70-90 
Inspection 86 Electonix mfg 90-95 
Machining 90 Machine shop 90-95 
Welding 85-90 Shipbuilding 80-85 
* Table III.18 was adopted from Crawford (1944). 
To take forgetting effects into consideration, a handful of theoretical, 
experimental and empirical mathematical forgetting models have been 
developed, with no unanimous agreement among researchers and practitioners 
on the form of the forgetting curve (Jaber and Sikström, 2004). Carlson and 
Rowel describe the forgetting by a negative decay function comparable to the 
decay observed in electrical losses in condensers. Their curve is one of the 
most widespread models and it is expressed in the form of (Jaber and Bonney, 
1996): 
?̂?𝑥 = ?̂?1 ∙ 𝑥
𝑓 (3.22) 
where ?̂?𝑥 is the time for the xth unit of lost experience of the forgetting 
curve, x is the amount of output that would have been accumulated if 
interruption did not occur, ?̂?1 is the equivalent time for the first unit of the 
forgetting curve, and f is the forgetting slope (Jaber and Bonney, 1996).  
Starting from equations (3.21) and (3.22), (Jaber and Bonney, 1996) 
developed the learning and forgetting curves model (LFCM). The LFCM 
assumes that there is one learning curve and one forgetting curve, with the 
forgetting curve having its slope and intercept adjusted after each production 
break. The exponent of the power forgetting function depends on the total 
forgetting time, the learning slope and the amount of equivalent units of 
cumulative production accumulated by the point of interruption (Jaber and 
Sikström, 2004): 
𝑓𝑖 =
𝑏(1−𝑏)log(𝑞𝑖)
log(𝐶+1)
          i =1, 2, 3… (3.23) 
where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, which varies in every cycle, is the forgetting slope after 
interruption in cycle i, b is the learning rate, q is the number of units produced 
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in cycle i up to the point of interruption and C=𝐵 𝑇(𝑞)⁄  is the ratio of B, the 
minimum time for total forgetting, to T (q), the amount of time required to 
produce q units. As shown in Figure III.17, at the point of interruption in cycle 
i, the curves have the same value. After every break of length 𝑡𝑏 the numbers 
of units remembered at the beginning of cycle i+1 is determined by the 
equation: 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖
(𝑏+𝑓𝑖) 𝑏⁄ (𝑞𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖)
−𝑓𝑖 𝑏⁄         i =1, 2, 3… (3.24) 
where (qi+si) is the sum of q units produced in the cycle i and s is the total 
number of products that could have been produced in cycle i if production was 
not interrupted: 
(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖) = [
1−𝑏
𝑇1
𝑇𝑏 + 𝑞𝑖
1−𝑏]
1
1−𝑏       i =1, 2, 3… (3.25) 
where 𝑇𝑏 is the length of the interruption that has occurred after cycle i. 
Therefore, the time to produce the first unit in the next production run is: 
𝑇𝑞+1 = 𝑇1(𝛼 + 1)
−𝑏                      i =1, 2, 3… (3.26) 
 
Figure III.17: The curves at the end of cycle i: tpi is the time in 
production to produce qi units in cycle i; tbi is the length of the interruption 
period cycle i; si is the potential additional quantity that would be produced 
if no interruption occurred (Jaber and Bonney, 1996). 
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The LFCM has been proven to conform with most requirements of learning 
and forgetting models and it benefits from easy calculations (Jaber and 
Bonney, 1997; Jaber and Sikström, 2004). The LFCM could be easily used in 
simulation models of work activities that involve repetitive tasks in order to 
assess the impact of these processes on the system performance and on the 
processing time, as reported in literature.  
LFCM module in SHERPA allows evaluating how the human reliability 
and the learning and forgetting processes impact on the system performance. 
The human reliability assessment identifies the human error probability (HEP) 
and the rate of non-compliant performed task, while the LFCM algorithm 
allows the quantification of the decrease in the processing times, taking into 
account both the single shift and more consecutive working days. During a 
single shift the forgetting effect is caused by the rest breaks and it is less 
evident due to their short time, while between two consecutive working days 
the interruption is longer, and it has a greater impact.  
Figure III.18 shows the logic of the LFCM algorithm. The input data are: 
the type of the performed task; the production time of the first unit T1; the time 
of total forgetting B; the length of the break Tb and the chosen time horizon 
Tend. The first algorithm step provides the selection of the learning slope b as 
function of: 
 learning rate LR of the working sector (bmoderate); 
 performed task with more or less learning complexity (bslow=bmoderate+5%; 
bfast=bmoderate-5%). 
The following phases allow to model the curves for all the possible cycles 
i separated by breaks of variable lengths. The production times, under the 
learning phenomenon for each cycle i, are quantified according to the equation 
(1): 
𝑇𝑞+1 = 𝑇1(𝑞 + 1)
−𝑏 (3.27) 
where the learning slope b is determined as previously described; T1 is an 
input data and q is the units counter. The q counter is initially set equal to zero 
and it represents the number of experience units, i.e. the units remembered 
before each new activity. In addition to the units counter, the counter of work 
cycles i and the counter of Tcycle, which identifies the time worked without 
breaks in the cycle i, are initialized. If breaks do not occur in the working 
activity, the algorithm calculates the improved production times until it 
reaches the constrain Tend.  
The forgetting phenomenon takes place when a break of length Tb occurs, 
involving the decrease of the gained experience. It determines the decrease of 
the remembered units, when the operator starts to work in the cycle i+1, and 
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the increase in the production time compared to the time achieved in the last 
processing of the previous cycle i. In this case the processing time is quantified 
through the equation (3.26) where 𝛼 is determined as previously shown by the 
equation (3.24). The 𝛼-value is attributed to the q counter changing the q value 
assigned in the previous cycle. 
 
Figure III.18: The LFCM algorithm. 
The LFCM algorithm is modelled into the theoretical framework of 
SHERPA. The LFCM module assumes, on the basis of the findings previously 
discussed, that the performance improves with the increase in cumulative 
production (or alternatively, number of repetitions of a specific task). The 
performance deteriorates, instead, when learning sessions are separated by 
breaks that result in knowledge depreciation or forgetting (Jaber & Sikstrom, 
2004).  
LFCM is adopted taking into account both the single shift and more 
consecutive working days. During a single shift the forgetting effect is caused 
by the rest breaks and it is less evident due to their short lengths, while 
between two consecutive working days the interruption is longer and has a 
greater impact (Figure III.19). The learning rate is fixed according to the 
working area for which the simulation is performed and, thanks to this value, 
the levels of learning slope (slow, moderate and fast) are quantified as reported 
in Table III.19. 
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Figure III.19: Learning and forgetting effects in a work shift. 
Table III.19: Generic task and learning slope b. 
Generic task used in SHERPA Learning 
slope b 
1 Totally unfamiliar bslow 
2 Complex task requiring high level of skill bslow 
3 Fairly simple task performed rapidly  bmoderate 
4 Routine, highly-practiced bmoderate 
5 Completely familiar, well-designed, highly 
practiced, routine task 
bfast 
6 Respond correctly to system command even 
when there is an automated supervisory system 
bfast 
III.3.5 Entities exit 
The main SHERPA outputs are compliant, non-compliant, and rework 
entities. These categories are derived from the forecast of HEP on the basis of 
the performed activity of the period when the process is carried and of the 
contextual and individual conditions. This concept of quality defects and non-
compliant entities is not limited to manufacturing processes, but extends to a 
wider range of working environments, ranging from services to medical field. 
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As shown in the flowchart (Figure III.20), each entity in the output from the 
system receives the compliant percentage and function of the error probability 
to overturn the human performances on the system ones. The reworking 
entails an increase of the processing time, as in Figure III.20. Finally, 
economic results in terms on profit (eq. 3.18) are quantified after each 
simulation.  
 
Figure III.20: Entities exit. 
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IV Chapter IV: Simulation tools 
 
 
 
 
IV.1 Introduction 
The theoretical framework has been implemented as simulation template 
in Arena 14.0© and Anylogic. It allows a lot of different scenarios to be 
simulated easily without consuming a lot of time by changing the type of 
activity, the influencing factors, and especially the break configurations. The 
simulator can be used to assess the impact of different rest breaks scheduling 
in every working context and conditions, moreover it can dynamically analyse 
a whole shift identifying the moments of the highest operator unreliability and 
automatically managing the breaks in order to reduce errors and to increase 
productivity and efficiencies. 
IV.2 Simulator features and structure 
The logical model of the simulator has been designed independently of the 
current implementation in the Arena and Anylogic environments. The 
simulator is designed to represent the activities performed by a single operator 
during the work shift, estimating in real time the reliability curves, the effect 
of recovery due to the work breaks and the impact of the operator's 
performance on the system under examination. 
The main feature of the simulation template is the possibility to be 
specialized and configurable for different working contexts by modifying the 
inputs through suitably implemented dialog boxes. Another important feature 
is to make possible its integration in any simulation model from the simplest 
(one operator and repetitive processing) to the most complex (more operators 
interacting on complex activities).  
The SHERPA structure is presented again in Figure IV.1. The simulator 
can be considered divided into two parts. A first "physical" part, in which the 
working process (Process Simulation) is performed taking the incoming 
entities and returning in output compliant, non-compliant and rework entities. 
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The distinction between success or failure of the performed activity is, instead, 
based on the logical part of the model (Human reliability quantification), 
which allows the HEP quantification, as described in Chapter III, and is also 
a function of the assigned break scheduling. The four modules in Figure IV.1 
correspond to the four main sections implemented in the simulator. 
 
Figure IV.1: SHERPA decomposition overview. 
Entities entry, that includes the implementation of the user interfaces to the 
definition of the inputs (worker data, performed activity data, PSF, break 
scheduling). The user interfaces are built to allow the rapid and guided 
insertion of all the variables. Particular importance is assumed by the levels of 
the PSF that follow those defined theoretically. Choosing one level over 
another allows you to easily modify the simulated scenario. Human reliability 
quantification allows, instead, to assign the nominal distribution parameters 
for HEP and the value of PSF multipliers and to quantify HEP contextual. 
Process simulation, instead, involves the implementation of the three 
alternatives break scheduling, of the LFCM module and finally of the entities 
exit to quantify the HEP impact on system performance.  
The designed simulation template has been implemented both in Arena and 
in Anylogic. The simulation tools were implemented through several steps: 
1) Design and implementation of the user interfaces; 
2) Implementation of the logic model: entities entry, human reliability 
quantification, process simulation with break scheduling module, LFCM 
module and entities exit. 
3) Check errors and debug form. 
The two simulation environments, Arena and Anylogic, allowed to 
implement the theoretical model of SHERPA respectively in a template and 
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in an agent resource. These simulation tools offer numerous advantages to 
simulate a large number of scenarios without being resource intensive or time 
consuming. In particular, Anylogic makes it possible to check the trend of all 
real-time model variables, and it is indicated for more complex models to 
evaluate their settings and to allow their validation. While the Arena template 
provides a tool easy to use and effective as a decision support system. 
IV.3 Arena SHERPA Template 
The model for the evaluation of human reliability and the management of 
breaks in the workplace, described in the previous chapter, was firstly 
implemented through the Arena 14.0® software, a widely used application for 
the simulation of manufacturing-oriented systems. Arena Simulation, a 
product of the US company Rockwell Automation, is an advanced simulation 
software that provides an interactive environment for the construction, 
animation, verification and analysis of simulation models. The basics of the 
Arena language are (Kelton, Sadowsky and Sadowsy, 2006): 
 Entities: objects that flow through the system, such as customers, parts, 
vehicles, information, or logical elements, etc. Through the system, 
entities can change state, be influenced by other entities in the system 
and in turn affect system performance. They are dynamic objects 
within the simulation (they are usually created, they move within the 
system and then are released). 
 Code: waiting areas where the movement of entities is temporarily 
suspended. 
 Resources: system components that must be allocated to entities, such 
as machines, operators, switchboards, etc. An entity commits 
resources when it is available and releases it when it has finished 
processing. 
 Attributes: are a common characteristic of all entities, but with a 
specific value that can change from one entity to another. Attributes 
make it possible to individualize entities, such as the type of 
processing, arrival time, etc. 
 Variables: represent values that describe the status of the system or 
process, such as the number of available machines, the number of 
setups, etc. A system can have several variables, but each is unique, all 
entities can access a variable but cannot change. 
The Arena template appears as a block flowchart that can be used in 
various types of simulation models and allows the assessment of human error 
probability without excessive time consumption Figure IV.3. The template is 
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shown in Figure IV.2. It can be inserted in the processing flow and it simulates 
the task performed by operator during a whole shift, considering the time 
required to complete the task as well as calculating the operator’s human 
reliability (HR) and human error probability (HEP).  
 
Figure IV.2: SHERPA template user interface. 
 
Figure IV.3: SHERPA template used in a simulation model. 
IV.3.1 Design and implementation of the dialog boxes 
In this first phase all the dialog boxes were designed and implemented 
through the Dialog Design Window. These windows and the related operands 
are described below. The main SHERPA dialog box, shown in Figure IV.4, 
allows access allows to initialize the template by entering all the information 
related to the scenario to be simulated; thus, every input can be defined. The 
SHERPA dialog box provides access to several other windows for data entry. 
Figure IV.5 shows the sub-dialog boxes that are linked to the main dialog of 
the HRA module. The initial dialog box allows access to all the forms for 
entering the data necessary for the simulation. Scrap recovery operation, as 
well as LFCM, are not mandatory and can be selected through the specific 
check box. 
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Figure IV.4:Main dialog SHERPA template. 
 
Figure IV.5: Connections between sub-dialog boxes and dialog man. 
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Each dialog box is defined by several operands. The operands are particular 
objects that allow the definition of a variable, of its default value, of the type 
of variable and of the representation in the data entry form (Kelton, Sadowsky 
and Sadowsy, 2006). In each window you can enter different types of operand, 
the most important are shown in Table IV.1. 
Table IV.1: Operand typologies. 
Toolbox Controls 
Type 
Description 
Text Used to show a line of text on the dialog box 
TextBox Used to insert a user input or to display text 
ComboBox Used to view and edit data 
RadioButtonGroup Used to display a set of two or more mutually 
exclusive choices. The choices are presented in 
an array of buttons 
CheckBox Used to indicate if a particular condition is 
enabled or not. The possible choice is Yes / No or 
True / False 
DialogButton Used to insert a button that opens another 
window 
HiddenOperand Used to define a hidden object 
These objects can be enabled or hidden using switches. A switch is a 
construct that allows you to define variations of (Kelton, Sadowsky and 
Sadowsy, 2006): 
1) Fields displayed in a dialog box; 
2) Logic of the model and the elements that are created during the simulation; 
3) Animation objects displayed in the user view of a module. 
The operands of the main SHERPA dialog box, shown in Figure IV.4, are 
defined in Table IV.2 with the following information: 
 Name of the operand. 
 Type of operand. 
 Switch presence: indicates the presence of a switch assigned to the 
operand. The switch allows you to hide or disable the operand when 
required. 
 Brief description of the operand function. 
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 Notes: insert further information on the considered operand. 
Table IV.2: Operand properties of the HRA dialog box. 
Name Type Switch Description 
HRA Main dialog No Definition initial dialog box 
Department Combo box No Input of the production department 
Technician Textbox No 
Input of technician's name who 
performs work 
Gender Radiobuttongroup No Choice gender of the operator 
Operation Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
operation 
Shift Dialog button No Entry to secondary dialog box shift 
Scrap 
recovery 
Check box No 
Choice of the possible scraps 
recovery operation 
Scrap 
recovery 
operation 
Dialog button 
swscrap 
recovery01 
Entry to secondary dialog box scrap 
recovery opertion 
Learning and 
forgetting 
curves 
Check box No 
Choice of the possible learning and 
forgetting curves 
LFCM Dialog button swlfcm01 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
LFCM 
Available 
time 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
available time 
Stress and 
stressors 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box stress 
and stressors 
Experience 
training 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
experience and training 
Fitness Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
fitness for duty 
Complexity Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
complexity 
Procedures Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
procedures 
Cognitive 
Ergonomics 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
ergonomics and HMI 
Work 
processes 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary dialog box work 
processes 
Entry item Hidden operand No 
Defines the input connection to the 
template 
Good items Hidden operand No Module output (good items) 
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Name Type Switch Description 
Recovered 
items 
Hidden operand No Module output (recovered items) 
Scrap Hidden operand No Module output (scraps) 
The information about the task to be performed can be inserted into the 
dialog box Operation (Figure IV.6). The window allows the selection of the 
type of activity and the generic task performed by the operator. Such 
information is necessary to identify the nominal human reliability curve in 
order to quantify the total HR in the simulation. The operand contents are 
summarized in Table IV.3. 
 
Figure IV.6: Dialog box for operation data entry. 
 
Table IV.3: Operand properties of the dialog box operation. 
Name Type Switch Description 
Work task Text box No 
Definition work task to be 
performed 
Task types Radiobuttongroup No 
Choice between action and 
diagnosis 
Generic task Radiobuttongroup No Choice of generic task from the list 
Workload Radiobuttongroup No Choice of generic task from the list 
In the proposed simulation module, the length shift in hours and the start 
time of the same can be inserted, in order to be able to carry out the simulation 
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in all possible working conditions. Figure IV.7 shows the window in the three 
possible configurations that it can assume, based on the choice of the type of 
break scheduling. The configurations identify the three possible alternatives 
break scheduling (Figure IV.7): 
1) No break, continuous shift: in this case neither "scheduled breaks" nor 
"automatic management of breaks" are chosen; 
2) Scheduled breaks: by choosing "scheduled breaks" the main dialog Breaks 
is shown, in which the information on the breaks is inserted (described 
below); 
3) Automatic management of the breaks: the module is thus automatically 
selected by specifying only the length (expressed in minutes) of the 
minimum break. 
The operand contents are summarized in Table IV.4. 
 
 
Figure IV.7: Dialog box shift data entry. 
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Table IV.4: Operand properties of the dialog box shift. 
Name Type Description Notes 
Hours Text box Input work schedule (Hours) 
Min 0 
Max 23 
Minutes Text box Input work schedule (Minutes) 
Min 0 
Max 59 
Length shift in 
hours 
Text box Input length shift (Hours) 
Min 4 
Max 12 
Scheduled breaks Check box Choice of scheduled breaks Required 
Breaks Dialog button 
Entry to secondary dialog box 
breaks 
Required 
Automatic 
management of 
breaks 
Check box 
Choice of automatic 
management of breaks 
Required 
Minimum break Text box 
Input minimum duration for 
break 
Min 0 
Max 59 
The secondary dialog box break (Figure IV.8) allows entering the 
scheduled work-rest configuration in two different ways: 
 Fixed length: breaks have the same duration, and they are assigned at 
regular intervals; 
 Variable length: up to six breaks can be assigned with different lengths 
and at variable intervals. 
Table IV.5 shows all the operand of the box and its properties.  
The other operands of fundamental importance for the evaluation of human 
reliability are those related to the eight PSFs of the SPAR-H method, analysed 
in parallel with the logic developed in the following section.  
It should be noted that the attributes necessary for the HRA module are not 
only those entered via the dialog boxes, but some of them must be defined 
outside the module and assigned as attributes to the entities entering the 
system. These, required in various sections of the module, such as setup and 
break scheduling management, are: setup time; job; processing time; 
price/value added of the processing; standard fixed costs and standard variable 
costs. 
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Figure IV.8: Dialog box breaks data entry. 
Table IV.5: Operand properties of the dialog box breaks. 
Name Type Description Notes 
Fixed length Check box 
Choice type of break (with 
fixed length) 
- 
N of fixed breaks Combo box Choice number of breaks 
Min 1 
Max 7 
Breaks length in 
minutes 
Text box Input duration time 
Min 0 
Max 59 
Time interval 
between breaks 
Text box 
Input time between two 
successive breaks 
Min 0 
Max 480 
Cost break per 
minute  
Text box Input cost break per minute Min 0 
Variable length Check box 
Choice of type of break (with 
variable length) 
 
N of variable 
breaks 
Combo box Choice number of breaks 
Min 1 
Max 7 
Time 1 Text box Input duration time 
Min 0  
Max 59 
After 1 Text box 
Input time between two 
successive breaks 
Min 0  
Max 480 
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IV.3.1.1 Performance shaping factors dialog boxes 
A specific dialog box for each PSF has been designed that makes it possible 
to choose and select the PSF level or to enter the information necessary to 
calculate the multiplier. 
The available time, for example, has six levels, both positive and negative, 
that differ between action or diagnosis, as shown in Figure IV.9. In the 
available time dialog box, there is a dialog button that allows to modify the 
values of the multipliers (Figure IV.10). This type of window is present for 
every PSF, it allows to use the default values of the multipliers, but also to 
modify them to suit different operational situations. Table IV.6 shows all the 
operands of the two windows. 
 
 
Figure IV.9: Dialog box available time data entry. 
 
 
Figure IV.10: Dialog box multipliers available time. 
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Table IV.6: Operand properties of the dialog box available time. 
Name Type Switch Description 
Time for diagnosis 
Radiobutton 
group 
swDiagnosis 
Choice of level from the 
list 
Time for action 
Radiobutton 
group 
swAction 
Choice of level from the 
list 
Multipliers available 
time 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary 
dialog box multipliers 
Value inadequate 
time 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Value barely 
adeguate time 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Value nominal Text box No Input multipliers 
Value extra time Text box No Input multipliers 
Value expansive time Text box No Input multipliers 
Insufficient 
information 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Unlike the available time, as explained in Chapter III, stress factor includes 
several sub-factors: mental stress; pressure time; workplace; circadian 
rhythm; microclimate; lighting; noise; vibration and ionizing and non-ionizing 
radiation. The presence of different factors makes the stress window richer 
and more complex as shown in Figure IV.11.  
The levels of circadian rhythm, mental stress and pressure time can be 
selected directly from the dialog box (Figure IV.11). The remaining factors 
have been designed separately because the quantification of the level depends 
on multiple values and different situations. Appendix B reports the dialog 
boxes of all the sub-factors of stress. Table IV.7 shows all the operands in the 
dialog box stress and stressors. 
Table IV.7: Operand properties of the dialog box stress and stressors.  
Name Type Switch Description Notes 
Circadian rhythm 
Radiobutton 
group 
No 
Choice of level from 
the list 
 
Weight circadian 
rhythm 
Combo box No Choice of weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Mental stress Check box No 
Selection of mental 
stress factor 
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Name Type Switch Description Notes 
Level mental 
stress 
Radiobutton 
group 
Swmental 
stress01 
Choice of level from 
the list 
 
Weight mental 
stress 
Combo box 
Swmental 
stress01 
Choice of weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Pressure time Check box No 
Selection of pressure 
time factor 
 
Level pressure 
time 
Radiobutton 
group 
Swpressure 
time01 
Choice of level from 
the list 
 
Weight pressure 
time 
Combo box 
Swpressure 
time01 
Choice of weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Other stressors Group box No 
Entry to secondary 
dialog box multipliers 
 
 
Figure IV.11: Dialog box stress data entry. 
Figure IV.12 shows the user interface for the PSF complexity. The level of 
physical effort required is obtained directly from the operand Type of activity 
present in the Operation window. For each sub-factor the user can choose 
between different levels, explained in the clearest possible form, to ensure a 
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good modelling of contextual factors. Table IV.8 summarizes all the operands 
and their properties. 
Table IV.8: Operand properties of the dialog box complexity. 
Name Type Switch Description Notes 
General complexity 
Radiobutton 
group 
swDiagno
sis 
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
General complexity 
for action 
Radiobutton 
group 
swAction  
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
Weight general 
complexity 
Combo box No Input Weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Precision level of 
activity 
Radiobutton 
group 
No 
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
Weight precision of 
activity 
Combo box No Input Weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Mental efforts 
required 
Radiobutton 
group 
No 
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
Weight mental effort Combo box No Input Weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Parallel tasks 
Radiobutton 
group 
No 
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
Weight parallel tasks Combo box No Input Weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Weight physical 
efforts 
Combo box No Input Weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Multipliers 
complexity 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary 
dialog box  
 
Value highly 
complex 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value moderately 
complex 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value nominal 4 Text box No Input multipliers 
Require
d 
Obvious diagnosis Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Insufficient 
information 1 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Require
d 
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Figure IV.12: Dialog box complexity data entry. 
 
The operator's experience and training can be quantified with greater 
simplicity, as they are defined directly by the operator's number of months of 
experience (Figure IV.13). All operands are summarized in Table IV.9. 
 
Figure IV.13: Dialog box experience data entry. 
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Table IV.9: Operand properties of the dialog box experience. 
Name Type Description Notes 
Experience and training 
Radiobutton 
group 
Choice of level from the 
list 
 
Multipliers experience Dialog button 
Entry to secondary 
dialog box  
 
Value short for action Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value short for diagnosis Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value nominal 2 Text box Input multipliers Required 
Value long Text box Input multipliers 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Insufficient information 2 Text box Input multipliers Required 
 
Procedures PSF refers to the existence and use of formal operational 
procedures for the activities under consideration. The evaluation of the PSF is 
not always easy and immediate. In the dialog box two different alternatives 
are given in the case of action and diagnosis, as shown in Figure IV.14. Table 
IV.10 shows all the operands of the two windows. 
 
 
Figure IV.14: Dialog box procedures data entry. 
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Table IV.10: Operand properties of the dialog box procedures. 
Name Type Switch Description Notes 
Procedures for 
action 
Radiobutton 
group 
swAction 
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
Procedures for 
diagnosis 
Radiobutton 
group 
Sw 
Diagnosis 
Choice of level 
from the list 
 
Multipliers for 
procedures 
Dialog button No 
Entry to secondary 
dialog box  
 
Not available Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Incomplete Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Available but 
poor 
Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value nominal 5 Text box No Input multipliers Required 
Diagnostic Text box No Input multipliers 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Insufficient 
information 5 
Text box No Input multipliers Required 
Fitness for duty considers if worker is physically and mentally fit or not to 
perform the task at the required time (Figure IV.15). Another important PSF 
is the cognitive ergonomics. Figure IV.16 shows the dialog box designed for 
the SHERPA module. The alternatives proposed for the ergonomic level are 
those defined in the SPAR-H method. Table IV.11 and Table IV.12 
summarize the operands with their properties. 
 
Figure IV.15: Dialog box fitness for duty data entry. 
Chapter IV 
 
158 
Table IV.11: Operand properties of the dialog box fitness for duty. 
Name Type Description Notes 
Fitness for duty 
Radiobutton 
group 
Choice of level from 
the list 
 
Multipliers for fitness for 
duty 
Dialog 
button 
Entry to secondary 
dialog box  
 
Value degraded fitness Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value nominal 3 Text box Input multipliers Required 
Insufficient information 3 Text box Input multipliers Required 
 
Figure IV.16: Dialog box cognitive ergonomics data entry. 
Table IV.12. Operand properties of the dialog box ergonomics. 
Name Type Description Notes 
Ergonomics for 
workplace 
Radiobutton 
group 
Choice of level from the list  
Multipliers for 
ergonomics 
Dialog 
button 
Entry to secondary dialog 
box  
 
Value missing Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value poor Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value nominal 6 Text box Input multipliers Required 
Value good Text box Input multipliers 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Insufficient information 6 Text box Input multipliers Required 
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The last PSF is work processes, which is divided in two sub-factors: 
Communication and integration; Work processes (Figure IV.17). All operands 
are summarized in Table IV.13. 
 
Figure IV.17: Dialog box work process data entry. 
Table IV.13: Operand properties of the dialog box work process. 
Name Type Description Notes 
Communication and 
integration  
Radiobutton 
group 
Choice of level from the 
list 
 
Weight communication Combo box Input weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Work process 
Radiobutton 
group 
Choice of level from the 
list 
 
Weight work processes Combo box Input weight 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Multipliers work process 
Dialog 
button 
Entry to secondary dialog 
box  
 
Value poor for action Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value poor for diagnosis Text box Input multipliers 
Min 2 
Max 100 
Value nominal 7 Text box Input multipliers Required 
Value good for action Text box Input multipliers 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Value good for diagnosis Text box Input multipliers 
Min 0 
Max 1 
Insufficient information 7 Text box Input multipliers Required 
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IV.3.2 Logical implementation 
The logic of the template, which represents the heart of the SHERPA 
module, was implemented in the Logic Window and it is not visible to the user 
during the simulation runs. The simulation module is structured in seven 
sections: 
1) Input module. 
2) Setup module. 
3) Human reliability quantification. 
4) Simulation without breaks. 
5) Simulation with scheduled breaks. 
6) Simulation with automatic break scheduling management. 
7) Recovery items. 
Figure IV.19 shows the logical SHERPA model used to implement the 
theoretical model in Arena simulation environment. The first section manages 
the entry of entities into the system, which must respect as constraint the work 
shift assigned as input. SHERPA has been designed to be used with any type 
of work shift.  
The information related to the beginning of the shift and its length are, in 
fact, required in the Shift dialog box. Based on this information, Tstart and 
Tend variables are calculated, which represent respectively the start and end 
of the daily shift. Tstart and Tend are used to manage entry of entities both 
during working hours and during non-working hours. These variables are 
defined in the section input module, shown in Figure IV.18. 
 
Figure IV.18: Input Module. 
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Figure IV.19: Logical SHERPA model implemented in Arena. 
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Once entered through the "Count: InputAll" block, the entities are kept in 
the Items.Queue queue, managed via FIFO logic, until the condition is true: 
TNOW> Tstart TNOW && <Tend 
where TNOW represents the current simulation time. 
At the beginning of the simulated work shift, the first entity into the system 
using the Seize technician module (Figure IV.18) to engage the operator for 
the execution of the activity. Once the operator is busy, the entities enter the 
setup module (Figure IV.20). This SHERPA section allows to manage the 
setup between machining of different entities, if required. 
 
Figure IV.20: Setup Module. 
IV.3.2.1  Human reliability quantification  
The first phase for the evaluation of human reliability is the assignment of 
the parameters of the Weibull distribution. In the sub-model Assign 
distribution parameters (Figure IV.21), alpha, beta and kappa values are 
assigned to calculate the nominal HEP distribution, based on the generic task 
selected by user in dialog box for operation data entry (Figure IV.6). 
In this sub-model, the three variables of time, used in the model, are 
initialized: 
 Technician_Relative time = time elapsed since the start of the shift, 
calculated as the difference between the current time and the start of 
the work shift. 
 Technician_Time = time for calculating operator reliability. It is 
calculated using the formula: 
TechnicianTime = TechnicianTime + TechnicianRelativeTime − TechnicianLast Time  
 Technician_Last time = variable used to calculate the 
Technician_Time.  
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Figure IV.21: Assign distribution parameters. 
The next phase consists in the evaluation and quantification of the PSF 
impacts on HEP in the sub-model Performance shaping factors (Figure 
IV.22). Each of the influencing factors is implemented in a sub-model, in 
which the respective value of the PSF multiplier is assigned, according to the 
data entered the module through the dialog boxes previously described. The 
logic, implemented to assign the multiplier of the PSF, is the same for all PSFs 
whose level is defined and assigned directly by the user through dialogs, such 
as available time, experience, procedures, ergonomics and fitness for duty.  
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Figure IV.22: Sub-model performance shaping factors. 
By way of example, the case of available time is shown. The level chosen 
by the user in the dialog box (Figure IV.9) is used by the specific sub model 
and it is transferred to the module through the logical part ( 
Figure IV.23). Figure IV.24 shows as PSF_time attribute is assigned. 
 
Figure IV.23: Logic assignment of PSF available time. 
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Figure IV.24: Assignment of the PSF_time attribute. 
The different switches direct the entity to the appropriate Assign block in 
which the PSF_time attribute is assigned with the respective value of the 
multiplier (Table IV.14). Once the value of the PSF_time has been assigned, 
the Tally block allows to memorize this value and bring it back to the end of 
the simulation. 
Stress, complexity and work processes, instead, were modelled to take into 
account their sub-factors. The PSF stress, for example, is divided into nine 
different sub-factors. For some of them, circadian rhythm, mental stress, 
pressure time and workplace, the multiplier is assigned, as for the available 
time, according to the level selected in the user interface (Figure IV.25 and 
Figure IV.26). 
Table IV.14: Switches used in PSF sub-model. 
Name Condition 
swavailabletime01 `Time for action`=="Inadequate Time"||`Time for 
diagnosis`=="Inadequate Time" 
swavailabletime02 `Time for diagnosis`=="Barely Adequate Time"||`Time for 
action`=="Time available is equal to time required" 
swavailabletime03 `Time for diagnosis`=="Nominal time"||`Time for 
action`=="Nominal time" 
swavailabletime04 `Time for diagnosis`=="Extra time"||`Time for action`=="Time 
available is greater than 5 x time required" 
swavailabletime05 `Time for diagnosis`=="Expansive time"||`Time for 
action`=="Time available is greater than 50 x time required" 
swavailabletime06 `Time for diagnosis`=="Insufficient information"||`Time for 
action`=="Insufficient information" 
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The remaining factors were implemented separately because the 
quantification of the level depends on multiple values and different situations, 
as reported in Chapter III. For each of them a sub-model has been created, as 
shown in Figure IV.27, in order to assign each multiplier through a specific 
attribute. Each attribute assigned is then multiplied by the relative weight and 
the Tally blocks allow keeping track of the values assumed. The same logic 
was implemented for complexity and work processes. 
 
Figure IV.25: Sub-model of the stress factor (part 1). 
 
Figure IV.26: Sub-model of the stress factor (part 2). 
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Figure IV.27: Sub-model of the stress factor (part 3). 
IV.3.2.2 Process simulation for break scheduling 
management 
SHERPA aims to quantify the worker reliability and to use this knowledge 
for managing the work-rest configurations. Human reliability, or rather the 
complementary HEP, strongly affects the performance of the operator. The 
first part of the template, analysed previously, allows obtaining information 
on the HEP curves, with a careful analysis of PSFS, which represent the most 
elaborate part of the module. In the second part of the template, instead, a 
generic work process was implemented, on the basis of which it is possible to 
simulate an assigned or automatic break scheduling. There are three sections: 
1) Work process simulation without breaks: operator works continuously 
without stopping for a break. 
2) Work process simulation with scheduled breaks: the operator stops for a 
break only when it is scheduled, based on the information inserted in the 
shift dialog box, previously described. 
3) Work process simulation with automatic break scheduling management: the 
algorithm developed for the model assigns the optimal break scheduling 
on the basis of the economic and reliability assessment. 
The first section is shown in Figure IV.28 and Figure IV.29. The entities 
are processed according to the FIFO logic and Count: No Breaks block allows 
you to consider the number of entities processed.  
Although it is defined as a No Breaks section, all entities cross this section 
even in the case of scheduled breaks or in automatic management. In these 
cases, the entities are first sent to the respective section where the break 
scheduling is managed and then returned to the No break section. This part of 
the model, in fact, aims to simulate any type of work process and to assess the 
reliability linked to this activity in terms of: 
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 worked time; 
 performed activity; 
 performance shaping factors. 
 
Figure IV.28: Logic of work process without break (part 1).  
 
 
Figure IV.29: Logic of work process without break (part 2).  
The processing time is variable and is assigned as input, as an attribute of 
the entities. After processing (Process 2), the worker reliability is calculated 
in the two phases described in Chapter III. First, the probability of nominal 
error is calculated in the HEP 1 and HEP 2 modules. The two modules 
calculate the HEP, defined by the `Technician`_HEP attribute in the two 
different conditions managed by Decide 7, which divides the entities 
processed within the first hour of work from those processed subsequently. 
Alpha, beta and kappa values assigned in Assign distribution parameters are 
used and once the nominal HEP has been determined, PSFcomposite is 
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quantified: 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑆𝐹1 × … × 𝑃𝑆𝐹𝑥 × … × 𝑃𝑆𝐹8; where PSFx is the 
value assumed by the attributes defined in the previous phase, one for each 
PSF. If the value of the HEPcontext is higher than one, Decide 8 directs the 
entities to the Assign Error where the attribute `Technician`_HR, ie the 
reliability of the operator, is set equal to one. On the other hand, if HEPcontext 
is not greater than one, the reliability is calculated as the complement to one 
of the HEPcontext. Once the process simulation is finished and the reliability 
calculated, the operator resource is released and then made available for other 
working activities.  
For the management of scheduled breaks, the entities flow through the 
section shown in Figure IV.30 and Figure IV.31, to coordinate the intervals 
between the work and the fixed breaks. Entities enter this section thanks to the 
switch swscheduledbreaks01: `Scheduled breaks` ==" Yes "assigned to the 
Count: Scheduled Breaks. The logic of this section provides to transfer the 
incoming entities to NoBreaks section to carry out the processing if entities 
come when it is not scheduled a break. If the entity arrives in the period in 
which the pause has to be performed, it is retained to simulate the operator's 
stop and modify the time variables to identify the new reliability of the 
operator after the pause. 
 
Figure IV.30: Logic of work process with scheduled break (part 1). 
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Figure IV.31: Logic of work process with scheduled break (part 2). 
After the break has been simulated, the Technician_Last time variable 
is modified to insert the break time and the Technician_time variable to take 
into account the recovery due to the pause as follows: 
This new time allows to calculate the new reliability of the operator in the 
No Breaks section. 
The last type of break scheduling management is the automatic, based on 
the economic algorithm defined in Chapter III. Entities are referred to this 
section by the switch swautomaticbreaks: 'Automatic management of breaks` 
== "Yes" && Scheduled breaks` == " No." (Figure IV.32). 
A basic assumption of the model is that the lowest probability of error is 
reached after the first hour of work, considering this hypothesis no breaks are 
necessary within the first hour. For this reason, the entities in input are sorted 
according to the Technician_time variable in Decide 9, if it is less than one 
processing is carried out directly, otherwise it continues to determine whether 
to pause. The logic in automatic management is to compare for each incoming 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
= 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + (𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/60 
(4.1) 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∙ 𝑟𝑝                        (4.2) 
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entity the profit obtained by directly executing the task or by performing the 
processing downstream of a break. In the event that it is appropriate to pause, 
starting from the minimum duration the break is increased until the optimal 
time is identified, beyond which a break would not be more convenient 
(Figure IV.33). 
 
Figure IV.32: Logic of automatic break scheduling management (part 1). 
 
Figure IV.33: Logic of automatic break scheduling management (part 2). 
To calculate the profit, it is naturally necessary to know the reliability of 
the operator in these two cases. HEP is calculated in the two alternative 
conditions for each entitie: 
1) Immediate processing without breaks: in this case the reliability is 
calculated considering the working time reached by the operator at the end 
of the processing of the entity. 
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2) Break of minimum length and subsequent processing: it is assumed to make 
a minimum break (considering the minimum time selected as input) and 
then the processing. In this case the reliability is evaluated downstream 
processing, however considering the recovery of the operator for the break 
performed. 
In the second case, the nominal HEP quantification is expressed as follows: 
where T is the time in which the operator starts the break, rp the recovery 
factor and Tp the duration of the subsequent processing. Once the values of 
the nominal HEP have been obtained with and without the break, the 
contextual factors are evaluated through the PSF composite. In the Assign 
Profit the Profit_after and Profit_before attributes are defined and calculated: 
 
where HR and HEP are calculated in the previous steps and cb_after is the 
cost of the pause due to the lack of production. 
The previous calculation of profit makes it possible to decide whether to 
pause; in fact, when Profit_after is greater than Profit_before with the Decide 
10 the entities are addressed towards the calculation of the optimal break, 
otherwise, since a break is not convenient, the entities enter the No Breaks 
section for process simulation. If a minimum break time is convenient, the 
model evaluates the possibility of increasing the break until reaching the 
optimal duration. In the Assign HEP before and after processing 1 the variable 
IncBreak is defined, which allows to increase the length of the break one 
minute from time to time. This variable is added to the Minimum Break 
variable and the recovery factor, the Profit_before, recalculated equal to the 
previous Profit_after, and finally the new value of the probability of nominal 
and contextual error after the pause. In the Assign 2 the Profit_after is then 
recalculated. On the basis of the new values the profit values are again 
compared to the minimum pause and increased pause conditions, until all the 
conditions in Decide 11 are false, the break is increased by another minute, 
when at least one is true, the duration has been reached optimal pause. The 
status of Break is then assigned to the resource and the break is made through 
the Delay Break. To perform the downstream processing of the break taking 
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 1 − 𝑘 ∙ 𝑒
−𝛼∙(𝑇∙𝑟𝑝+𝑇𝑝−1)
𝛽
                             (4.3) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 = (𝐻𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑤 ∙ 𝑃𝑟) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑣 −
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∙ 𝐶𝑟  
(4.4) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = (𝐻𝑅𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑤 ∙ 𝑃𝑟) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐶𝑓 − 𝐶𝑣 −
𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 ∙ 𝐶𝑟 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 ∙ 𝑐𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  
(4.5) 
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into account the recovery of the operator, the variables Technician_time and 
Technician_last time are redefined. These variables will be used to calculate 
the reliability of the No Breaks section operator. 
IV.3.2.3 Learning and forgetting module in SHERPA 
The LFCM module can be easily selected in the main dialog box, as shown 
in Figure IV.34, and through the LFCM dialog box the algorithm input data, 
such as the total forgetting time B, the learning rate LR and the time T1 can be 
inserted. The learning rate is fixed according to the working area for which 
the simulation is performed and, thanks to this value, the levels of learning 
slope (slow, moderate and fast) are quantified as reported in Table III.19. 
 
Figure IV.34: Dialog box learning and forgetting data entry. 
The LFCM logic has been implemented in an Arena sub model that 
modifies the production time as a result of learning and forgetting processes. 
When a rest break, whether programmed or automatic, occurs the 𝛼-value is 
quantified, and it is used to decrease the internal q counter taking into account 
the phenomenon of forgetting during the work shift. At the same way the 
forgetting is quantified between two successive shifts. Downstream each 
simulation, the template provides as outputs the learning and forgetting curves 
and the average production time, in addition to the outputs already given. 
The LFCM module may be used to assess how the learning and forgetting 
impact on productive performances in terms of pieces produced and of human 
error rates.  
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IV.3.3 Entities exit 
Finally, entities were managed as function of HEP and divided into 
compliant and non-compliant performed tasks, and, in the case in which the 
scrap recovery operation is activated, recovered tasks. Figure IV.35 shows the 
logical flow. Based on the worker reliability in the Decide Quality Items the 
entities are sorted considering the `Technician`HR attribute, given in the No 
Breaks section, as a true percentage. The entities recognized as good are 
transferred to the Count: Conform Items while for the non-compliant entities 
the possibility of performing a rework or not is evaluated. The recovered 
entities, instead, undergo further processing by the operator and then exit from 
the template through the Count: Retrieved items. 
 
Figure IV.35: Logic of entities exit. 
 
IV.4 Anylogic HRA agent 
SHERPA has been also implemented in AnyLogic, allows you to build 
models through a language of nature and extend them with Java code. The 
agent designed and implemented in Anylogic is shown in Figure IV.36. The 
basic logic of the model is the same used in the Arena template, with variations 
due to the different simulation environment. By clicking on this icon, you can 
access the user interface that allows you to enter the values of the main 
parameters necessary for operation of SHERPA (Figure IV.37). The user 
interface is divided into different sections. 
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Figure IV.36: Anylogic SHERPA Agent. 
 
 
Figure IV.37: Main SHERPA user interfaces. 
IV.4.1 User interfaces 
The first menu allows the identification of data on the operator (Figure 
IV.38): it is possible specify the name of the operator, gender and age, as well 
as other data regarding the work context (work shift, end of shift priority, 
pause).  
The Breaks section (Figure IV.38), instead, allows the choice of the 
psycho-physical recovery speed and the type of break scheduling 
management. In particular, the choice of automatic management activates the 
automatic break identification algorithm (it is also necessary to provide the 
minimum break time); alternatively, it is possible to option to a real break 
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scheduling or to break on a call, when necessary, during the execution of the 
simulation. In the case of a scheduled break, a Resource Task block must be 
inserted within the main simulation model and selected in the menu. The break 
is, in fact, seen as a fictitious task that the operator must perform when 
requested and based on the priority stability. Figure IV.39 shows the data entry 
screen regarding the activity performed. It is possible to select the type of task, 
the sector to which it belongs, the priority of the task, the type and the category 
of activities, as well as the cognitive load required.  
 
Figure IV.38: User interface for entering operator data. 
To activate the re-workings, the check on the appropriate entry has to be 
active: two possible configurations are present in Figure IV.39, depending on 
whether you choose a fixed rework time (obtained as a percentage of the run 
time of the main operation) or a variable rework time (in this case the 
percentage is obtained from a triangular distribution whose parameters are 
set). The menu also allows the choice of the probability of recovery of the gap 
and of the unit cost of the recovery itself.  
Each PSF, as in the Arena template, has its own menu for the choice of 
level and the insertion of the information required as input. 
Available time. The user interface allows the selection of the PSF level (the 
menu with the descriptions of the levels depends on the type of activity) and 
to change the value of the multipliers if the appropriate check box is checked 
(Figure IV.40). 
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Figure IV.39: User interface for entering operation data. 
 
Figure IV.40: User interface for entering available time data. 
Stress and stressors. The definition of this PSF occurs by specifying the 
levels (or data, from which the level is derived) of some sub factors: 
 Mental Stress: if the activity expects the presence of mental stress, the 
appropriate section must be activated that allows the selection through 
a drop-down menu of the level related to this sub factor. 
 Pressure Time: the situation is similar to the previous one, by 
activating the switch it is possible to select the level related to the sub 
factor. 
 Workplace: in this case the level relative to the sub factor must always 
be selected from the appropriate drop-down menu. 
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 Microclimate: the choice of level is not immediate, but some data must 
be provided and then processed within SHERPA. In Figure IV.41 there 
is a section of the user interface that differs according to whether or 
not the presence of the temperature control system is selected: if 
present, the temperature at which it is set is indicated, as well as the 
relative humidity percentage and the type of clothing used by the 
operator. 
 Lighting: also for this PSF the level is not directly selected, but 
provided the data necessary to obtain it (Figure IV.41): type of light, 
visual requirements, type of light source, luminous flux of the 
illuminated area source, number of light sources, presence of dazzling. 
 Noise: the menu connected to this PSF allows first of all the choice on 
the presence of the factor in the activity performed: only in this case it 
is possible to enter the noise value expressed in dB from which the 
level is obtained. 
 Vibrations: in this case it is possible to choose if the factor is present 
or not. In the presence of the factor, the check boxes appear that allow 
to establish the type of vibrations (vibrations for the hand-arm system 
only, vibrations for the sole body, vibrations for both): if the 
corresponding buttons are checked, the boxes appear in which to enter 
the acceleration values from which the PSF level is then calculated. 
 Radiation: the interface and the choices for this PSF are very similar 
to the previous one. First the presence of the factor is established, 
therefore the choice of the type of radiation (ionizing, non-ionizing, or 
both) is allowed. After checking the appropriate boxes, you can enter 
the values necessary to identify the PSF level. At this point the 
interface allows to define the weights to be associated with each sub 
factor (whose corresponding box appears only if the presence of the 
sub factor has been established, where possible) and, if necessary, to 
change the values related to each level (by ticking the appropriate 
check box). 
Complexity. This PSF results from the weighted average of several sub 
factors. The choice of the levels of each sub-factor takes place directly through 
the user interface, through which it is possible to specify the weights and 
possibly change the values associated with each level, after the selection of 
the appropriate box (Figure IV.42). 
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Figure IV.41: User interface for entering available time data. 
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Figure IV.42: User interface for entering complexity data. 
Experience and training. The user interface allows the assignment 
directly of the level for the considered PSF and the eventual modification 
of the values associated to each level through the affixing of the check in 
the prepared box (Figure IV.43). 
 
Figure IV.43: User interface for entering experience and training 
data. 
Procedures. Through the user interface you can directly choose the PSF 
level as well as change the values associated with each level after checking 
the appropriate box. The levels differ from the type of activity. 
Fitness for duty. In this case, the user interface allows the direct attribution 
of the level and the choice of the values associated to each of them. 
Ergonomics. The choice of level is direct, just as there is the possibility to 
change the values associated with the levels after selecting the appropriate 
box. 
Work Process. The user interface returns to be more articulated. For this 
PSF it is possible to directly select the levels of the sub factors, define the 
weights to be associated with each sub factor and, after activating the 
appropriate section after checking the box provided, choose the values 
linked to each of the levels (Figure IV.44). 
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Figure IV.44: User interface for entering work process data. 
IV.4.2 Logic model  
The SHERPA theoretical framework was implemented similar to the 
previous one seen for the Arena in an agent resource. However, the logic 
model is visible to the user during the simulation runs. Figure IV.45 shows the 
implemented SHERPA model. At the beginning of the simulation, the 
eventStartSimulation block is activated, and it allows the system initialization. 
In particular, based on the choices made through the user interface, the 
parameters of the Weibull distribution for HEP calculation, the recovery 
coefficient and, after standardization, the values of the PSF were identified.  
Several dedicated functions were designed for applying the theoretical 
model. In particular, the PSF quantification is immediately available if directly 
indicated via the user interface, otherwise it is calculated on the basis of the 
data established through the user interface. The level of the PSF is provided, 
together with the vector of the standardized values associated with each of the 
levels of the PSF, as input to the AssignPSFValue function, which extracts the 
desired value. This value is eventually subjected to further reprocessing 
(weighted average) if the PSF is a combination of several sub-factors.  
The second Hold block prevent multiple entities in the system, whereas 
Seize block manages the only resource defined within the 
ResourceAvailability block and representative of the operator performing the 
task. This block is essential for the management of work shifts, breaks (the 
resource is actually available or there is a break based on what is established 
through the user interface in the section on operator data) and priorities (it is 
always carried out the operation with the highest priority).  
The temporal attributes indicate the time of the beginning of the shift, the 
time elapsed since the beginning of the shift (real and correct, where 
necessary, through the recovery factor rp) and the time of the last update. These 
updates take place every time the probability of error is calculated, at the 
beginning of each shift (eventShift block) and at the end of each break 
(eventBreak). 
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Figure IV.45: SHERPA Logic.  
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The temporal attributes are quantified as follows: 
 Start time of the shift is established (eventShift block). 
 Time of the last update is written and coincides precisely with the 
moment in which the time management routine is launched. 
 Real time, spent since the beginning of the shift, is a simple difference 
between the current time and the start time of the shift; 
 Correct time elapsed since the beginning of the shift (the one actually 
used to calculate the probability of error) is, instead, given by its 
previous value to which must be added the difference between the 
current time and the time of the last update. 
The eventual setup is then managed through a Select Output which, reading 
the parameter of the Job agent, allows establishing whether a setup must be 
carried out. The setup is simulated by stopping the entity within a Delay block 
for the time established by the value given to the attribute of the same agent 
Tsetup. 
IV.4.2.1 Human reliability quantification 
Human reliability quantification starts with the update of the time variables 
and the quantification of the nominal HEP. The latter is performed through 
the HEPnomCalculation function, that takes in input the vector containing the 
parameters of the Weibull distribution and the value of the correct time 
elapsed since the beginning of the shift. The value of the composite PSF is 
then calculated and used as input for the HEPcontCalculation function, that 
quantify the contextual HEP. The HEP values are saved within the appropriate 
attributes of the Operator resource. At the output of the operations block a 
Delay block is used as a computational block in which human reliability is 
actually calculated as a complement to the contextual HEP and the statistical 
variables are updated. The reliability value adjusts the operation of the next 
Select Output that directs the entities towards the exit of the good pieces or 
towards the output of the rejects / reworks.  
IV.4.2.2 Break scheduling management 
The first step for the break scheduling management is the identification of 
the recovery coefficient. Optimal break duration and, therefore, recovery 
factor, based on the parameters indicated in Table III.16, are determined at the 
beginning of the simulation. The application of the rp factor takes place at the 
end of each break both for scheduled and automatic breaks.  
The scheduled breaks are managed through the eventBreak block. At the 
beginning of the break, the recovery factor rp is calculated following the 
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identification of its time as defined through the user interface previously seen. 
At the same time, the break counting variable is increased and the time 
variables are updated. At the end of the break, the recovery factor rp is applied, 
starting the update routine of the temporal attributes of the Operator resource 
and modifying the time elapsed since the beginning of the shift through the rp 
factor.  
The economic algorithm, described in Section III.3.3.2, is implemented in 
the model section reported in Figure IV.46. Economic variables that regulate 
the algorithm are read by the entity attributes spanning the SHERPA block, 
and they allow the quantification of profit with and without break and the 
choice of the optimal break scheduling. 
 
Figure IV.46: Break scheduling logic. 
IV.5 Methodology for HEP estimation in 
manufacturing systems 
Several studies underline that the use of taxonomies to classify data is a 
potential solution to produce meaningful information from different types of 
source using the same framework: i) historical incident data (Moura et al., 
2016), ii) incident investigation (Saurin et al., 2008) and iii) prospective 
analysis (Hollnagel, 1998). Focusing on manufacturing systems, however, this 
method may not be very suitable and not being able to model the human factor 
issue. 
The estimation of human error probability is a highly complicated task 
since it involves a huge number of internal and external variables. As 
previously seen, numerous HRA methods have been proposed over the years, 
but to date these have several limitations due to validation lacks. Chapter I 
analysed the consequences of human error in manufacturing systems, 
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proposing a beginning classification for human error data collection. This is 
the first step of the proposed methodology for HEP estimation in 
manufacturing systems, starting from experimental data. The methodology, 
implemented in an Excel tool, allows to use experimental HEP distributions 
for validation of nominal HEP into SHERPA method, as described below. It 
is a useful tool for assessing and estimating human error and provides 
advantageous information about frequency of different human error 
consequences, length of the transitional phase of human adaption and range 
of unreliability for every context. In particular, the HEP distributions derived 
from the realistic and simulated scenarios are compared through two statistical 
methods in order to verify the goodness of the SHERPA estimation. Figure 
IV.47 shows the main steps of the proposed methodology. 
 
Figure IV.47: General framework of the proposed methodology. 
IV.5.1 Realistic scenario: data collection and experimental 
HEP 
Data collection is certainly the most complex step. The proposed tool uses 
historical data on non-compliance (rejected items and reworks offline), 
accidents and injuries, directly attributable to man, and machine’s failures, 
slowdown and latent errors, when caused by worker, to build experimental 
HEP curves. Available data are collected in one-hour time slots, covering the 
entire shift (Table IV.15). They are the number of human errors made during 
the work. 
Considering the formal definition of HEP, the tool calculates the error 
probability for each hour with respect to all the events, taking into account the 
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average number of errors on the total of activities performed by worker that 
can be subject to error in every time slot. This allows to build the experimental 
contextual HEP for the work shift. This distribution is adjusted taking into 
account the PSFs impact. Table IV.16 reports the obtained experimental HEP 
points. 
IV.5.2 Simulated scenario: theoretical HEP and generic 
task identification 
The theoretical human error distribution on the shift follows a Weibull 
distribution for six alternative generic tasks, as previously seen. In the 
proposed methodology, SHERPA simulator is firstly initialized taking into 
account the impact of contextual and individual factors (Table IV.16), in order 
to achieve the nominal HEP for the following comparison.  
Table IV.15: Data collection form for experimental HEP 
Non-compliants Hours 
# Shift 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 6 1 4 1 14 13 18 7 
2 13 3 4 0 20 12 21 23 
…. 9 2 4 2 15 24 27 4 
250 7 0 6 1 22 7 18 15 
Average number of 
scraps 
8 2 4 5 9 11 16 14 
Total activities 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
HEPcontext 8,0% 2,0% 4,0% 5,0% 9,0% 11,0% 16,0% 14,0% 
Table IV.16: Experimental HEP distribution. 
 Hours 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total 
HEPcontext 
18,0% 11,0% 14,0% 17,0% 24,0% 31,0% 35,0% 30,0% 
PSFcomposite 5,17 5,17 5,17 5,17 5,17 5,17 5,17 5,17 
Experimental 
HEPnominal 
4,07% 2,33% 3,05% 3,81% 5,76% 8,00% 9,43% 7,66% 
The second step, instead, is the identification of generic task that is closer 
to experimental data, knowing the standard deviations among six theoretical 
curves and experimental distribution. The method of least squares has been 
used, identifying the category with the minimum sum of squared residuals, 
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where a residual is the difference between the realistic and simulated HEP 
value. The selected theoretical curve is then adapted respect to the 
experimental points, minimizing the sum of squared residuals as function of 
k, β, α and τ, in order to create an adapted curve that approximates in an 
optimal way the realistic scenario (Figure IV.48). 
 
Figure IV.48: Graphical comparison of the experimental with the 
theoretical SHERPA curves, standard and adapted. 
IV.5.3 Assessment HEP estimation  
In the final stage the experimental and theoretical curves, considering both 
standard and adapted, are evaluated through two different statistical tests for 
assessing the goodness of fit between the distributions. The chi-square and 
Kolmogorov-Smirvon tests establish whether or not an observed frequency 
distribution differs from a theoretical distribution and in particular whether the 
hypothesized Weibull distribution is appropriate to describe the phenomenon 
of human error. Test results provide a lot of information on estimation of error 
probability into SHERPA model, on statistical significance between 
theoretical and experimental distribution, on behaviour of human error 
likelihood in a work shift, on nominal unreliability range for different 
activities.  
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V Chapter V: Experimental 
campaigns and case study 
 
 
 
 
V.1 Introduction 
The SHERPA model allows to simulate numerous scenarios, considering 
a plurality of conditions and working activities. The simulator produces in 
brief time results in terms of compliant and non-compliant performed 
activities and human error probability that allow to evaluate the impact of 
context (influencing factors) and break scheduling on system performance.  
In this Chapter it has been used to conduct several experimental campaigns 
to evaluate: the impact of human reliability on system performance; the 
influence on HR of every PSF level, considered both in singular way and 
combining with the other factors; the impact of learning and forgetting curves 
on productivity; and the impact of different work-rest policies on human 
reliability and system performance. The experimental campaigns simulated a 
manual assembly processing with the Arena template.  
Finally, a case study was conducted in an operating room of Department 
of Orthopaedics and Traumatology of the University Hospital San Giovanni 
di Dio-Ruggi d'Aragona of Salerno. The case study aims to study of the human 
reliability inside an existing operating room, where the consequence of an 
error is of crucial importance and the spectrum varies from no consequence to 
serious and fatal.  
V.2 Experimental campaigns: simulations of manual 
assembly processing 
The SHERPA template developed in Arena was used to conduct several 
simulations to evaluate the effect of human reliability as part of manufacturing 
activity in the prevailing manual content. A manual assembly processing, in 
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which human reliability is critical due to the high contribution of manual tasks, 
has been simulated as case study in four alternative scenarios: 
 Experiment 1: Human Reliability assessment. 
 Experiment 2: Simulative analysis of impact of PSFs on human 
reliability. 
 Experiment 3: Simulation of a manual assembly process with LFCM 
module. 
 Experiment 4: Break scheduling management. 
The simulated scenarios, even if fictitious, are representative of actual 
working environments. 
V.2.1 Experiment 1: HRA assessment 
V.2.1.1 Problem definition 
The first experiment was conducted using a simulation model, which 
reproduces the operator work station involved in manual assembly on an 
eight-hour shift. The simulation was carried out on an annual basis, 
considering 235 working days, always with the same work shift. Assembly 
operation was simulated for three different items with random arrival 
sequences based on a default mix. For each item, processing times, 
characterized by a triangular distribution, fixed and variable costs and selling 
prices, as well as overall production mix, were defined. The data described are 
shown in Table V.1. 
Table V.1: Features simulated items. 
Features Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Processing time (min.) 25 36 45 
Setup time (min.) 5 5 5 
Price (€) 115 155 200 
Fixed cost (€) 52 65 78 
Variable cost (€) 18 24 32 
SCENARIO 1 20% 5% 75% 
SCENARIO 2 15% 65% 20% 
SCENARIO 3 50% 30% 20% 
The SHERPA template was integrated in a specific Arena model to allow 
simulation of established scenarios. Figure V.1 shows the Arena model that 
provides for the entity creation, the assignment of the attributes required for 
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simulation and implementation of the different production mix chosen. 
Features of items, production mix and SHERPA inputs can easily be modified 
for subsequent simulations through the following model. Once the required 
attributes are assigned, entities entered template that allow simulation of the 
working process and generate the following output: compliant, non-compliant 
and retrieved items. Of course, the template must be completed with all 
information concerning the activity and the environmental and behavioural 
operator conditions, through the dialog boxes discussed in the previous 
section. 
 
Figure V.1: Assembly model with SHERPA template. 
V.2.1.2 Results analysis and discussions 
The first aspect of SHERPA taken into consideration in this experiment is 
the impact of several types of modelled generic tasks. Three scenarios were 
simulated for each of the six categories, keeping the contextual factors at 
nominal level, with the composite PSF equal to one. Results for every scenario 
are shown in Table V.2, where the total value of compliant and non-compliant 
items, their respective percentages and the mean values of HEP nominal and 
HEP context are reported. 
Unlike many HRA methods, SHERPA has been implemented for covering 
a wide range of working task, for this reason the six modelled categories may 
represent activities that are more or less reliable. As evident from Figure V.2, 
the percentage of non-compliant items decreases going from generic task one 
to task six, due to the increase in the reliability level of each category and the 
complementary decrease in the human error probability. The generic task one 
represents the worst activity in terms of reliability; in fact, the average human 
reliability is approximately equal to 30% in every scenario without taking into 
account the influence of PSFs. The other categories are higher nominal values 
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of human reliability, reflecting the HEART limitations of unreliability for 
operation. 
Table V.2: Results of the first step of the simulation. 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 
GT 1 GT 2 GT 3 GT 4 GT 5 GT 6 
Compliant Items 838 2162 2400 2589 2645 2652 
Non-Compliant Items 1814 490 252 63 7 0 
Total Items 2652 2652 2652 2652 2652 2652 
% Compliant 31.60% 81.52% 90.50% 97.62% 99.74% 100% 
% Non-Compliant 68.40% 18.48% 9.50% 2.38% 0.26% 0% 
Average HEP Nominal 68.79% 17.90% 8.50% 2.06% 0.39% 0.012% 
Average HEP Context 68.79% 17.90% 8.50% 2.06% 0.39% 0.012% 
 
 
SCENARIO 2 
GT 1 GT 2 GT 3 GT 4 GT 5 GT 6 
Compliant Items 917 2380 2643 2845 2896 2911 
Non-Compliant Items 1995 532 269 67 16 1 
Total Items 2912 2912 2912 2912 2912 2912 
% Compliant 31.49% 81.73% 90.76% 97.70% 99.45% 99.96% 
% Non-Compliant 68.51% 18.27% 9.24% 2.30% 0.55% 0.04% 
Average HEP Nominal 68.73% 17.89% 8.50% 2.06% 0.39% 0.012% 
Average HEP Context 68.73% 17.89% 8.50% 2.06% 0.39% 0.012% 
 
 
SCENARIO 3 
GT 1 GT 2 GT 3 GT 4 GT 5 GT 6 
Compliant Items 959 2621 2931 3124 3180 3196 
Non-Compliant Items 2238 576 266 73 17 1 
Total Items 3197 3197 3197 3197 3197 3197 
% Compliant 30% 81.98% 91.68% 97.72% 99.47% 99.97% 
% Non-Compliant 70% 18.02% 8.32% 2.28% 0.53% 0.03% 
Average HEP Nominal 68.57% 17.84% 8.50% 2.06% 0.39% 0.012% 
Average HEP Context 68.57% 17.84% 8.50% 2.06% 0.39% 0.012% 
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Figure V.2: Percentage of compliants and non-compliant items for 
generic categories of activities (Scenario 1). 
The most interesting aspect of the SHERPA model, however, is its ability 
to simulate several environmental conditions for the same performed activity. 
The second step of simulation is focused on positive or negative influences of 
PSFs, keeping constant the type of activity sets equal to generic task three. 
Table V.3 shows the results of simulations carried out by changing, from time 
to time, only the complexity and procedures level and keeping all other values 
at the nominal level. 
 The performance shaping factors do not always have a negative impact on 
the reliability, but factors such as experience, ergonomics, time available and 
work processes may lead to the improvement of the reliability and the 
consequent decrease in the probability of human error. In the case study, two 
different conditions were tested where the positive effect of experience was 
tested and then the positive effect of ergonomics was added. Table V.4 shows 
a high human reliability improvement due to the decrease in the value of the 
composite PSF for scenarios two and three. 
The simulated scenarios have been used to assess the behaviour of the 
template when the PSFs levels vary, i.e. with different contextual conditions, 
for the same performed activity. In the Scenario 1 the simulations highlight 
the relationship between the composite PSF and the contextual human error 
probability; in fact, the value of contextual HEP grows with increases in the 
composite PSF. Starting from the same nominal HEP value, always kept 
constant, the performance shaping factors increase variably the HEP 
contextual according to their multiplier (Figure V.3). 
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Figure V.3: HEP as function of increasing composite PSF. 
 
Table V.3: Results of simulation for scenario one, while changing 
complexity and procedures levels. 
SCENARIO 1 
COMPLEXITY PROCEDURES 
Nominal  Moderate Extreme 
Available 
but Poor 
Incomplete 
Not 
available 
PSF 
Composite 
1.024 1.12 2.464 2.867 11.4688 28.672 
Compliant 
Items 
2396 2372 2150 2106 1311 761 
Non-
Compliant 
Items 
256 280 500 546 1341 1891 
Total Items 2652 2652 2652 2652 2652 2652 
% Compliant 90.35% 89.44% 81.15% 79.41% 49.43% 28.70% 
% Non-
Compliant 
9.65% 10.56% 18.85% 20.59% 50.57% 71.30% 
Average HEP 
Nominal 
8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 
Average HEP 
Context 
8.70% 9.44% 18.55% 20.92% 50.85% 71.80% 
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Table V.4: Results of simulation for scenarios two and three, changing 
experience and ergonomics levels. 
 
SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 
Nominal Experience 
Experience/
Ergonomics 
Nominal 
Experien
ce 
Experience/ 
Ergonomics 
PSF - 0.28 0.28-0.28 - 0.28 0.28-0.28 
PSF 
Composite 
1 0.28 0.078 1 0.28 0,078 
Compliant 
Items 
2643 2828 2886 2931 3107 3171 
Non-
Compliant 
Items 
269 84 26 266 90 26 
Total Items 2912 2912 2912 3197 3197 3197 
% 
Compliant 
90.76% 97.12% 99.11% 91.68% 97.18% 99.19% 
% Non-
Compliant 
9.24% 2.88% 0.89% 8.32% 2.82% 0.81% 
Average 
HEP 
Nominal 
8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 8.52% 
Average 
HEP 
Context 
8.52% 2.61% 0.75% 8.52% 2.61% 0.74% 
In some cases, the variation is limited; for example, when considering a 
moderate level of complexity there is the increase of approximately 10% 
compared to the nominal level. The increase grows up to 95%, with an 18.85% 
of non-compliant items, when the complexity level is extreme. In other cases, 
the particular environmental or personal conditions can lead to high increases 
in the probability of error, as in the case of not available procedures where the 
variations in HEP are larger due to the multiplier theoretically assigned from 
the SPAR-H method. 
A further assessment done in the experiment is relative to the positive 
performance shaping factors. Positive factors lead to a decrease in the final 
value of the composite PSF and an improvement in the operator reliability 
compared to the nominal HEP. As evident in Figure V.4, a multiplier of high 
experience, amounting to 0.28, improves the human error probability, 
lowering it to the 2.61%. Where two or more positive PSFs are merged, the 
improvement is even more evident; for example, in the simulation, high 
Experimental campaigns and case study 
 
195 
experience level and good ergonomics level allow the values of human error 
to approach nearly zero, equal to 0.75% in both scenarios. 
 
Figure V.4: HEP as function of decreasing composite PSF. 
In most real cases, positive and negative factors coexist and affect the 
activity carried out by the operator. This condition was simulated considering 
factors with positive impact such as high experience, and other negative 
factors, such as moderate stress, poor procedures and poor working processes. 
In this last simulation, the same conditions are used for every scenario and the 
results are shown in Table V.5. Finally, the same kind of task and the same 
contextual conditions have been used in the three scenarios. The results, in 
terms of reliability, are very similar to each other, because the difference in 
production mix translates especially in terms of total units produced, given the 
different processing times. The error probability, in these cases, is determined 
more by the type of activity than by performance shaping factors. 
Table V.5: Results of last step of simulation. 
 SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 
Composite PSF 1.7208 1.7208 1.7208 
Compliant Items 2269 2489 2754 
Non-Compliant Items 383 423 443 
Total Items 2652 2912 3197 
% Compliant 85.56% 85.47% 86.14% 
% Non-Compliant 14.44% 14.53% 13.85% 
Average HEP Nominal 8.52% 8.52% 8.50% 
Average HEP Context 13.77% 13.77% 13.73% 
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This first experiment underlines the major SHERPA features, described in 
the theoretical model. In particular, its versatility is useful in revealing the 
environmental and psycho-physical factors which mainly influence the human 
reliability and may therefore be subject to improvement in order to reduce 
errors. 
V.2.2 Experiment 2: Simulative analysis of impact of 
PSFs on human reliability 
The influencing factors play a key role in the modelling of human error 
and many theoretical studies have been carried out to define, to classify and 
to model these factors as above.  
The aim of this experiment is the study of parameters that affect the human 
performance in workplace, considering how they increase or decrease the 
human error probability in SHERPA. Influence of every PSF level considered 
both in singular way and combining with the other factors, was quantified 
through numerous simulations with the SHERPA template. The following 
briefly describes the basic steps used in the simulation process: 
1) Problem definition: description of the case study. 
2) Experiment planning and system definition: identification of the system 
components to be modelled and the performance measures to be analysed. 
3) Results analysis: list of results and discussion of study implications. 
V.2.2.1 Problem definition 
A manufacturing activity was simulated in an Arena model for the research 
purpose of this experimental campaign. The construction of the simulation 
model takes hint from the description of different assembly stations proposed 
in literature (Falcone et al., 2010, 2011). A 30-minute break after four hours 
for the shift start is scheduled. The simulations were performed considering 
the assembly activities belonging to the action category: Routine, highly-
practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill (Table III.1).  
The assembly operation was simulated for three different items with 
random arrival sequences based on a production mix and with processing 
times characterized by a triangular distribution, with vertices corresponding 
to the mean ±10%. For each item, processing times, fixed and variable costs 
and selling prices, as well as overall production mix, were defined and are 
shown in Table V.6. 
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Table V.6: Features of simulated items in the case study. 
Features Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Mean processing time (min.) 25 36 45 
Setup time (min.) 5 5 5 
Price (€) 115 155 200 
Fixed cost (€) 52 65 78 
Variable cost (€) 18 24 32 
Productive mix 25% 35% 40% 
V.2.2.2 Experiment planning and system definition 
The SHERPA template allows modelling the context and the psycho-
physical condition of the operator through twenty-one PSFs, both main and 
secondary.  
Every PSF impacts in a different way on nominal HEP. SPAR-H method, 
in fact, uses a nonlinear levels classification and the levels classes are different 
for every PSF. In the case of available time, for example, there are four levels 
in addition to the nominal case, while stress or work processes have only two 
levels. Consider all these factors with a full factorial analysis, would be to 
make 221 = 2097152 simulations, taking into account just two levels per factor. 
For this reason, in the experiment planning a selection of the potentially most 
significant PSFs was necessary. 
Firstly, all factors were classified (Table V.7) compared to the experiment 
context in: 
 Controllable: you can manage and define values in advance, as the input 
of the experiment itself. 
 Uncontrollable: are out of hand when they appear; may change during 
operation of the product or process. 
 Measurable: able to be measured; not subjective, perceptible or 
significant. 
 Unmeasurable: not able to be measured objectively. 
The proposed classification was useful in the subsequent selection of the 
most relevant factors for the goal of simulative analysis. The choices of the 
factors took into account this classification, considering at least a factor by 
category. In the second step a common method of investigating the effects of 
parameters on a process was applied. The one-factor-at-a-time (OFAT) 
method allows changing only one factor at a time, to assess the impact of 
factors considered one at a time instead of all simultaneously and to notice its 
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influence on a given response. Although this method has the advantage of 
being simple, it requires many trials and does not point out the possible 
interactions between several factors.  
Table V.7: Factors classification in terms of measurability and 
controllability. 
 Measurable Unmeasurable 
Controllable 
Available time 
Parallel tasks 
Microclimate 
Lighting 
Workplace 
Procedures 
Precision level 
Physical effort 
Mental effort 
Cognitive ergonomics 
Uncontrollable 
Circadian rhythm 
Experience 
Noise 
Vibrations 
Radiations 
General complexity 
Work processes 
Mental stress 
Fitness for duty 
Pressure time 
Communication 
The PSF levels were modified one at a time keeping the others at nominal 
level. The contextual HEP value and the PSF composite were calculated for 
every simulation. Some factors were set to scenario: microclimate, lighting, 
circadian rhythm and physical effort, the latter is related to the performed task. 
Downstream the simulations, the results were analysed and for each factor the 
ratio between the percentage variation of contextual HEP and PSF composite 
was considered (Table V.8). It can be clearly seen that the increase of the PSF 
level determines an increase of the PSF composite and a consequent increase 
in the probability of error. 
The negative changes, such as extra and expansive available time or good 
cognitive ergonomics, represent the positive effect of the factors on the 
performance, as seen above. A special factor is the experience. This factor, in 
fact, determines a very high increase of HEP (∆HEPc=97.85%) with a modest 
increase in PSF composite (∆PSFc=20.63%). Factors with similar changes in 
their PSF composite, for example the general complexity (∆PSFc=15.25%) or 
mental stress (∆PSFc=26.47%), respectively determine increments of HEP 
equal to 1.89% and 3.57%. This exception will be thorough better later.  
Previous evaluations were used to select the factors for the next step 
considering the factors with more impact on HEP and mainly representative 
of a manufacturing context. With the aim of reducing the number of runs the 
parameters available time, state of workplace, vibrations, radiations, pressure 
time, precision level, mental efforts and communication and integration in 
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team work were excluded. All these factors were set to the nominal level in 
the experimental stage, and they have not had their influence on HEP.  
Table V.8: PSF effect on contextual HEP. 
SPAR-H PSFs PSF Levels ∆HEPc% ∆PSFc% 
∆HEPc%/ 
∆PSFc% 
Available Time 
Inadequate 98.73 not 
available 
not 
available 
Barely 
adequate 
84.09 85.29 0.9859 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Extra -1355.27 -1370.59 0.9888 
Expansive -14409.55 -
14605.88 
0.9865 
Mental stress, Pressure 
time and Noise 
Extreme 18.96 70.59 0.2687 
High 3.57 26.47 0.1348 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Radiations and 
Vibrations 
Extreme 10.39 54.54 0.1904 
High 1.89 15.25 0.1236 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Workplace 
Extreme 10.39 70.59 0.1472 
High 1.89 26.47 0.0713 
Nominal 0 0 - 
General complexity, 
Precision level, Mental 
efforts, Parallel tasks 
Highly 
complex 
30.67 70.59 0.4346 
Moderately 
complex 
6.24 26.47 0.2356 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Experience/ Training 
Low 97.85 20.63 4.7421 
Nominal 0 0 - 
High -191.72 -1.94 0.9877 
Procedures 
Not 
available 
95.72 97.06 0.9862 
Incomplete 91.37 92.64 0.9863 
Available, 
but poor 
69.67 70.59 98.69 
Nominal 0 0 - 
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SPAR-H PSFs PSF Levels ∆HEPc% ∆PSFc% 
∆HEPc%/ 
∆PSFc% 
Cognitive Ergonomics 
Missing 95.72 97.06 0.9862 
Poor 84.09 85.29 0.9859 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Good -191.72 -194.12 0.9877 
Fitness for Duty 
Unfit 98.73 not 
available 
not 
available 
Degraded 
Fitness 
69.66 70.58 0.9869 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Work Processes and 
Communication 
Poor 53.95 77.27 0.6981 
Nominal 0 0 - 
Good -48.71 25.37 -1.92 
Then the most significant factors were chosen based on this assessment 
and taking into account the classification of the factors in terms of 
measurability and controllability: noise; mental stress; general complexity; 
parallel tasks; experience; procedures; work processes; fitness for duty; and 
cognitive ergonomics.  
For the chosen factors were considered only two levels from those 
available for the analysis: 
 Noise: Extreme and Nominal levels; 
 Mental stress: Extreme and Nominal levels; 
 General complexity: High and Nominal levels; 
 Parallel tasks: High and Nominal levels; 
 Experience: Low and Nominal levels; 
 Procedures: Incomplete and Nominal levels; 
 Work processes: Poor and Good levels; 
 Fitness for Duty: Degraded and Nominal levels; 
 Ergonomics:  Poor and Good levels; 
In the system definition, nine factors were selected with two levels for each 
one. In this condition we can define the number of simulations to be performed 
to analyse the scenarios provided by all possible combinations of PSFs and to 
evaluate their effect on the likelihood of operator error; they are 29= 512 
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simulations. The experiment was conducted simultaneously changing the 
levels of selected factors until you cover the entire experimental plan.  
V.2.2.3 Results analysis and discussions 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine the effect of 
significant PSFs on the HEP (Scheffe, 1999; Gelman, 2005). This method, 
developed by Fisher, is at the basis of many designs of experiments and is 
used to compare differences of means among more than two groups. It does 
this by looking at variation in the data and where that variation is found. 
Specifically, ANOVA compares the amount of variation between groups with 
the amount of variation within groups. It can be used for both observational 
and experimental studies.  
In performing ANOVA, the experimental factors and the dependent 
variable or response are identified. The experimental factors are the source of 
variability whose effect is to be determined based on the results of a dependent 
variable or response. In the case of study, experimental factors are therefore 
the PSFs, while the dependent variable is the contextual HEP. The simplest 
experiment suitable for ANOVA analysis is the experiment with a single 
factor, used in a first time to assess the impact of each factor on HEP. Table 
V.9 lists the one-way ANOVA results. The SS stands for Sum of Squares; F-
ratio is test statistic used for ANOVA, the p-value is the probability of being 
greater than the F-ratio. The F is a ratio of the variability between groups 
compared to the variability within the groups. F-ratio will always be at least 
0, meaning that it is always non-negative. The p-values in the last column are 
the most important information contained in this table. Statistical significance 
of the effect depends on the p-value, as follows: 
 If the p-value is larger than the significance level you selected, the 
effect is not statistically significant. 
  If the p-value is less than or equal to the significance level you 
selected, then the effect for the term is statistically significant. 
Usually, a significance level (denoted as α or alpha) of 0.05 works well. A 
significance level of 0.05 indicates a 5% risk of concluding that an effect exists 
when there is no actual effect. 
Figure V.5 shows the results for all the chosen factors and it underlines 
graphically the different impacts on error likelihood. Each graph represents 
the average value of HEP when the factor is set to level one or two. The 
vertical bars indicate the level of confidence at 95%, that is the probability 
that the calculated values fall in this range. It is to be noted that when the bars 
are large the possible values are very different from each other and fluctuate 
around a mean value.  
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Table V.9: One-way ANOVA results. 
FACTORS SS F-ratio p-value 
Mental stress 0,046 0,362 0,548 
Noise 0,046 0,362 0,548 
General complexity 0,128 1,013 0,315 
Parallel tasks 0,128 1,013 0,315 
Experience 25,196 327,178 0,00 
Procedures 11,565 111,289 0,00 
Work processes 2,073 16,942 0,000045 
Fitness for duty 1,746 14,199 0,000184 
Cognitive ergonomics 18,061 198,465 0,00 
 
The most influential factors (experience, procedures and cognitive 
ergonomics) have a very tight confidence interval, a sign of their strong impact 
in the calculation of the error probability. 
Through this first analysis the greatest difference of average HEP is easily 
observed for those factors that have the two multipliers more distant from each 
other, like procedures and ergonomics. The experience is an exception, 
because it has a strong impact on the probability of error despite its multipliers 
are comparable to those of stress and complexity. Such behaviour is also clear 
in the two-way ANOVA.  
The two-way analysis of variance is an extension of the previous one-way, 
which examines the influence of two different factors and it aims at assessing 
if there is any interaction between factors and how the contemporary presence 
of two factors affects the variable result. Through this second step of analysis, 
the interrelationships between multiple PSFs were examined. In this case the 
p-value is used as an indicator to determine if the two factors have a significant 
interaction when considered simultaneously. If one factor depends strongly on 
the other, the F-ratio for the interaction term will have a low p-value. The two-
way ANOVA table is structured just like the one-way.  
Table V.10, in fact, shows the SS, the F-ratio and the p-value for all factors 
combinations.  
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Figure V.5: Single factor Analysis of Variance. 
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Table V.10: Two-way ANOVA results. 
FACTORS SS F ratio p-value 
Mental stress x Noise 0,0001 0,001 0,976 
Mental stress x General complexity 0,0006 0,004 0,946 
Mental stress x Parallel tasks 0,0006 0,004 0,946 
Mental stress x Experience 0,0107 0,138 0,710 
Mental stress x Procedures 0,0007 0,007 0,934 
Mental stress x Work processes 0,0000 0,000 1,000 
Mental stress x Fitness for duty 0,0003 0,002 0,963 
Mental stress x Ergonomics 0,0021 0,022 0,881 
Noise x General complexity 0,0006 0,004 0,946 
Noise x Parallel tasks 0,0006 0,004 0,946 
Noise x Experience 0,0107 0,138 0,710 
Noise x Procedures 0,0007 0,007 0,934 
Noise x Work processes 0,0000 0,000 1,000 
Noise x Fitness for duty 0,0003 0,002 0,963 
Noise x Ergonomics 0,0021 0,022 0,881 
General complexity x Parallel tasks 0,0008 0,006 0,937 
General complexity x Experience 0,0162 0,211 0,646 
General complexity x Procedures 0,0013 0,012 0,912 
General complexity x Work processes 0,0001 0,001 0,976 
General complexity x Fitness for duty 0,0002 0,002 0,965 
General complexity x Ergonomics 0,0028 0,031 0,860 
Parallel tasks x Experience 0,0162 0,211 0,646 
Parallel tasks x Procedures 0,0013 0,012 0,912 
Parallel tasks x Work processes 0,0001 0,001 0,976 
Parallel tasks x Fitness for duty 0,0002 0,002 0,965 
Parallel tasks x Ergonomics 0,0028 0,031 0,860 
Experience x Procedures 0,2884 5,348 0,021 
Experience x Work processes 0,0534 0,731 0,393 
Experience x Fitness for duty 0,1571 2,135 0,145 
Experience x Ergonomics 0,0926 2,237 0,135 
Procedures x Work processes 0,0000 0,000 0,992 
Procedures x Fitness for duty 0,0012 0,012 0,913 
Procedures x Ergonomics 0,0075 0,109 0,742 
Work processes x Fitness for duty 0,0001 0,001 0,973 
Work processes x Ergonomics 0,0021 0,024 0,876 
Fitness for duty x Ergonomics 0,0002 0,003 0,960 
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There is a statistically significant interaction between the effects of 
experience and procedures on HEP (p-value= 0,021<0.05), so the effect on 
the mean outcome of a change in one factor depends on the level of the other 
factor (Figure V.6). The significant relationship between these factors depends 
also on the high impact on HEP of single factors. For all the other 
combinations there is not statistical dependence. Their p-values, in fact, are 
included between 0,135 (experience x cognitive ergonomics) and 1,000 
(mental stress x work processes). For example, in Figure V.7 the interaction 
between mental stress and noise (p-value=0,976) shows clearly the statistical 
independence: the effects of a change in one factor on the outcome do not 
depend on the value or level of the other factors. 
 
Figure V.6: Procedures x Experience ANOVA results. 
The experience is the most interesting factors. As already highlighted by 
the OFAT and one-way ANOVA analysis, the experience has one of the major 
impact on the error probability. This effect is further confirmed by the 
interactions between factors (Figure V.8). The level two of experience 
determines a considerable decrease of human reliability and consequent 
increase in error probability when it is combined with every factor (i.e. mental 
stress, general complexity, cognitive ergonomics and procedures). The strong 
impact does not depend on exclusively from the multiplier, but it derives also 
by the logic experience evaluation used by the model. Lack of knowledge of 
the processes, of the machines and of the procedures modifies the nominal 
HEP, because it impacts on the category of performed task, which can no 
longer be regarded as routine and highly-practiced. 
The performance shaping factors are an integral part of modelling and 
characterization of errors, and they affect the productivity and the efficiency 
at work. Their modelling is a problem for each HRA method. Many HRA 
approaches introduce widespread PSF taxonomies and complex modelling of 
their mutual influence. Despite the efforts of HRA experts, the PSFs have not 
explicit role both in error identification and in probability estimation yet. The 
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goal of this experiment was to analyse the PSFs, used in the SHERPA model, 
and to assess their impact on HEP in order to improve the model and to make 
it more responsive to working reality.  
 
Figure V.7: Mental stress x Noise ANOVA results. 
 
 
Figure V.8. Two-way ANOVA results. 
Thanks to the simulative analysis and to the results obtained from one and 
two-way ANOVA, the influence of every PSF level, considered both in 
singular way and combining with the other factors, was quantified and 
Experimental campaigns and case study 
 
207 
evaluated, allowing to realize if there is more or less dependence between 
them. Several useful considerations can be made downstream of the study. 
First of all, through the preparatory OFAT analysis the different PSF impacts 
on HEP in relation to the value of its multiplier is evident. It is certainly useful 
as a starting point for the improvement of PSF modelling, that is currently 
under investigation. The one-way ANOVA underlined the higher or lower 
impact on HEP of individual factors, whereas the results of two-way ANOVA 
highlight few interactions between factors. There is significance of impact 
only when the experience is combined with the procedures. As regards the 
experience, its special behaviour requires further investigations and studies. 
V.2.3 Experiment 3: Simulation of a manual assembly 
process with LFCM module 
The LFCM module, validated and tested, was used to simulate a manual 
assembly process without fixed production rate. The case study reproduces 
the operator work station involved in manual assembly, considering 235 
working days with 5 days of training. PSFs for this scenario were chosen to 
represent approximately the actual conditions in the assembly plant. Available 
time, procedures, fitness for duty and work processes were imposed at the 
nominal level; complexity, stress and ergonomics at the moderate/high level 
and experience at high level. 
The work-break schedule of a Toyota assembly line was used, and it 
involves two breaks of 10 minutes and one break of 45 minutes as presented 
in Table V.11 (Givi, et al., 2015). The other parameters of the problem are set 
according to Table V.11. 
Table V.11: Features of produced item in the case study. 
Cycle time Break time Parameters 
125 min 10 min Price (€) 115 
120 min 45 min Fixed cost (€) 52 
120 min 10 min Variable cost (€) 18 
90 min - T1 (min) 30 
Total 
Total forgetting time 
B (days) 
365 
455 min 65 min Learning rate % 85 
 Case study was simulated for two scenarios with and without the learning 
and forgetting effects. In the second scenario, the average processing time was 
fixed to 5 minutes. The learning curve for the first scenario over the entire 
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horizon time (240 days) is presented in Figure V.9. In the graph, the first unit 
takes 30 minutes to be produced and the processing time per unit decreases as 
operator gain experience by producing additional units. 
During the training phase the production time decreases very fast because 
the operator is learning a new task. The forgetting phenomenon, instead, is 
present during the shift and between two consecutive days and it determines 
an increase in time to produce the first unit in the next production run. The 
simulation results for both the scenarios are reported in Table V.12.  
Table V.12: Simulation results. 
 Case study with 
LFCM 
Case study without 
LFCM 
Number of compliant 
items 
22,433 20,678 
Number of non-
compliant items 
753 716 
Average HEP 3.3% 3.3% 
The impact of the learning and forgetting processes on the system 
performance is evident from the comparison between the two scenarios. The 
number of produced items grows from 20,678 to 22,433; when the learning 
and forgetting curves are considered in the simulation. It is due to the 
reduction of the average production time that varies from 5 minutes of the 
scenario without LFCM to 4.62 minutes of the other scenario.  
 
Figure V.9: The learning and forgetting effect on the processing time. 
The LFCM module allows simulating a large number of scenarios without 
being resource intensive or time consuming in order to evaluate the human 
performance under the learning and forgetting phenomenon.  
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V.2.4 Experiment 4: Break scheduling management  
Two different numerical examples were presented for the break scheduling 
management in this section.  
V.2.4.1  Scenario 1: Problem definition 
A manual assembly process was simulated as a case study, involving a 
single 8-h shift for 230 days per year. The simulated assembly task is mixed-
model with two different items (P1 and P2) with similar assembly processes 
and with random arrival sequences based on the fixed production mix (65% 
P1 and 35% P2). The assembly operation was performed with processing 
times reported in Table V.13 and characterized by a triangular distribution, 
with vertices corresponding to the mean ±10%. The economic parameters are 
set according to what is shown in Table V.13. 
Table V.13: Features of simulated items. 
Features P1 P2 
Productive mix 65% 35% 
Mean Processing time (min) 5 7.5 
Setup time (min) 0.5 0.5 
Price/added value (€) 20 25 
Fixed standard cost (€) 3.76 5.64 
Variable standard cost (€) 9.84 13.7 
SHERPA template, integrated in a specific Arena model, was set to 
reproduce an operator with high experience (PSF experience = high level) and 
in good physical fitness (PSF fitness for duty = nominal level) involved in 
moderately complex tasks. The PSFs for the context were chosen to represent 
approximately the actual conditions in the assembly plant: available time and 
work processes were imposed at the nominal level while stress, procedures 
and ergonomics at the moderate/high level. 
The template, as implemented, investigates the performance of different 
work break configurations and it was applied in different scenarios changing 
the simulation parameters in Table V.14. Every break configuration was 
simulated for the three different recovery rates (slow, medium, and fast), for 
two different reworking probabilities (30% and 60% of the non-compliant 
items) and for two reworking times, which involve an increase of processing 
time equal to 15% and 30%. Without considering the four reworking classes, 
Table V.15 shows the list of the simulated scenarios in order to have a clearer 
and more immediate understanding of them. 
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Table V.14: Simulation parameters. 
Parameters Levels Values 
Recovery rate 3 Slow, Medium, Fast 
Break Length (min) 3 20, 25, 30 
Number of breaks 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 
Reworking time (Tr) 2 +15%, +30% 
Reworking probability (Pr) 2 30%, 60% 
Table V.15: Simulated scenarios. 
Tr= x% 
Pr= x% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# breaks 
1 S-20-1 S-25-1 S-30-1 M-20-1 M-25-1 M-30-1 F-20-1 F-25-1 F-30-1 
2 S-20-2 S-25-2 S-30-2 M-20-2 M-25-2 M-30-2 F-20-2 F-25-2 F-30-2 
3 S-20-3 S-25-3 S-30-3 M-20-3 M-25-3 M-30-3 F-20-3 F-25-3 F-30-3 
4 S-20-4 S-25-4 S-30-4 M-20-4 M-25-4 M-30-4 F-20-4 F-25-4 F-30-4 
No breaks (S-M-F) 0-0 
Two types of work-rest schedule were introduced: a single break in half 
shift or more breaks distributed at different times on the entire work shift. For 
each break configuration, the overall rest period length was considered 
respectively equal to 20/25/30 min. In the case of distributed breaks, the 
following distributions were hypothesized: 
 Scenarios with 20 min of break: 
Number of breaks Length (min.) Interval (min.) 
2 10-10 180-120-120 
3 6-8-6 150-90-90-90 
4 5-5-5-5 132-72-72-72-72 
 Scenarios with 25 min of break: 
Number of breaks Length (min.) Interval (min.) 
2 12.5-12.5 180-120-120 
3 8-9-8 150-90-90-90 
4 6-6-7-6 132-72-72-72-72 
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 Scenarios with 30 min of break: 
Number of breaks Length (min.) Interval (min.) 
2 15-15 180-120-120 
3 10-10-10 150-90-90-90 
4 7-8-7-8 132-72-72-72-72 
In summary, the experiment was applied in 148 different scenarios in order 
to show how effective solutions for the break scheduling problem can be found 
with the proposed simulator.  
V.2.4.2 Scenario 1: Simulation results 
Results for every scenario consist of total value of compliant and non-
compliant items, their respective percentages, mean values of the HEP 
context, as well as the economic results in terms of profit, revenue, scraps 
costs, rework costs, and breaks costs. 
Table V.16 shows the average HEP for every scenario. These values reflect 
the chosen experiment, and they are a function of the performed assembly task 
as well as of the supposed individual and contextual factors. In addition to the 
scenarios defined, additional scenarios were simulated in the absence of 
breaks for every reworking class. The human error probabilities, reported in  
Table V.16, were significantly lower than those to the reference case in the 
absence of breaks because of the presence of operator’s psychophysical 
recovery. 
As described in Chapter III, the profits, related to the correct execution of 
each task, depend on the revenues of the compliant items, the scraps costs 
(fixed and variable unit costs), the costs of the reworking items (rework costs), 
and finally the breaks costs that stand for lack of production. 
Table V.16: Average HEPs for the simulated scenarios. 
Tr = +15% 
Pr = 30% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# 
breaks 
1 12.88% 12.20% 11.65% 11.83% 11.28% 11.19% 11.35% 11.28% 11.19% 
2 12.85% 12.06% 11.40% 11.57% 10.78% 10.18% 9.66% 9.61% 9.55% 
3 12.88% 12.09% 11.40% 11.55% 10.72% 10.09% 9.36% 8.88% 8.82% 
4 12.97% 12.13% 11.45% 11.61% 10.74% 10.08% 9.28% 8.67% 8.43% 
No breaks 17.86% 
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Tr = +15% 
Pr = 60% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# 
breaks 
1 12.89% 12.19% 11.64% 11.82% 11.28% 11.19% 11.35% 11.28% 11.19% 
2 12.85% 12.06% 11.39% 11.56% 10.78% 10.18% 9.67% 9.61% 9.55% 
3 12.88% 12.10% 11.40% 11.54% 10.72% 10.08% 9.36% 8.87% 8.83% 
4 12.96% 12.13% 11.45% 11.60% 10.74% 10.07% 9.29% 8.68% 8.43% 
No breaks 17.84% 
 
Tr = +30% 
Pr = 30% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# 
breaks 
1 12.90% 12.19% 11.64% 11.82% 11.27% 11.20% 11.36% 11.27% 11.20% 
2 12.85% 12.05% 11.39% 11.56% 10.79% 10.18% 9.67% 9.61% 9.55% 
3 12.88% 12.08% 11.40% 11.53% 10.72% 10.07% 9.35% 8.86% 8.83% 
4 12.97% 12.12% 11.44% 11.59% 10.74% 10.08% 9.28% 8.68% 8.43% 
No breaks 17.88% 
 
Tr = 
+30% 
Pr = 60% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
# 
breaks 
1 12.86% 12.19% 11.62% 11.80% 11.26% 11.19% 11.35% 11.26% 11.19% 
2 12.84% 12.04% 11.38% 11.54% 10.78% 10.16% 9.66% 9.60% 9.54% 
3 12.87% 12.07% 11.39% 11.52% 10.71% 10.08% 9.36% 8.88% 8.82% 
4 12.93% 12.11% 11.44% 11.58% 10.73% 10.07% 9.23% 8.67% 8.44% 
No breaks 17.80% 
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Table V.17 reports the profits for the all the configurations which will be 
analysed in detail hereinafter.  
Table V.17:Profit in euros for the simulated scenarios. 
Tr = +15% 
Pr = 30% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
#  
breaks 
1 64.497 64.367 63.794 67.674 66.825 64.971 68.763 66.825 64.971 
2 65.210 64.494 62.992 68.212 67.794 67.229 73.051 71.293 67.946 
3 65.399 64.163 64.060 67.620 67.908 66.888 72.730 72.719 70.521 
4 63.846 64.103 63.378 67.621 67.457 67.929 74.235 72.942 70.857 
No breaks 61.339 
 
 
Tr = +15% 
Pr = 60% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# 
breaks 
1 76.861 75.207 73.646 79.005 76.699 74.131 79.754 76.699 74.131 
2 77.272 75.181 74.399 79.378 77.650 76.257 81.344 79.439 77.052 
3 77.249 75.163 74.159 79.415 77.363 76.055 82.513 80.214 78.101 
4 76.597 75.755 74.047 79.228 77.680 76.459 82.447 81.186 78.943 
No breaks 79.615 
 
 
Tr = +30% 
Pr = 30% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# 
breaks 
1 64.191 63.365 63.221 67.420 66.371 63.871 68.158 66.371 63.871 
2 63.489 63.358 63.648 67.234 66.677 66.009 72.251 70.499 68.158 
3 64.041 64.226 63.253 67.713 67.638 66.444 73.294 72.664 69.257 
4 64.197 63.872 64.087 67.375 67.571 67.598 73.904 74.328 70.941 
No breaks 59.703 
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Tr = +30% 
Pr = 60% 
RECOVERY RATE 
Slow Medium Fast 
Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length Total Breaks Length 
20 25 30 20 25 30 20 25 30 
# 
breaks 
1 75.569 74.906 72.800 77.602 75.861 74.707 78.366 75.861 74.707 
2 75.964 75.010 73.690 78.072 77.110 75.005 81.562 79.010 76.054 
3 76.105 75.666 72.772 78.363 77.026 75.168 82.347 80.257 77.552 
4 75.984 75.977 73.265 78.595 76.784 75.077 82.328 80.867 77.606 
No breaks 78.347 
V.2.4.3 Scenario 1: Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment is the evaluation of impact of different 
work-rest policies on human reliability and system performance for an 
assembly process. Reliability evaluation involves three significant aspects 
associated with the impact of recovery rate, breaks time, and configurations.  
The decrease of worker error probability in the simulated scenarios, in fact, 
derives from the break time and the recovery rate and it is underlined 
graphically in Figure V.10. There is a statistically significant interaction 
between the effects of recovery rate and break time on the HEP; therefore, the 
effect on the mean outcome of a change in one factor depends on the level of 
the other factor. The vertical bars in the graphs indicate the level of confidence 
at 95%. 
 
Figure V.10: Human error probability value as a function of recovery 
rate and break total time without distinction of rework class. 
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The human unreliability is a function of the operator’s recovery rate 
through equation (3.16) and (3.17), as previously explained in Chapter III. 
With equal break lengths, in fact, a slower recovery rate leads to higher values 
of HEP. The recovery rate is an inherent feature of the worker that depends on 
several elements, such as the age (Mohren, Jansen and Kant, 2010), and even 
if in a limited manner, it can be influenced by the regenerating activities during 
the same break, e.g., specific physical exercises (van de Heuvel, de Looze and 
Hildebrandt, 2003; Balci and Aghazadeh, 2004). The increase of total break 
time in the shift, instead, improves human reliability because the worker has 
more time to rest and receive a greater psychophysical recovery. This increase 
is naturally stronger in the case of slow recovery rate than that fast, because 
in this last case, a shorter time for an adequate recovery is enough. The last 
assessment is linked to the effect of several work-break configuration in the 
shift (Figure V.11).  
 
Figure V.11: The impact of work–rest configurations in terms of HR. 
It is evident that the four work-rest policies impact differently on the 
worker reliability according to the rate of recovery. The HR improvement is 
much more stringent for the fast recovery rate, where the single break in half 
shift is less effective and significantly worse compared to the other three 
configurations, which exploit the distribution of shorter breaks over 8-h to 
their advantage. The work-rest policies with three or four breaks in the shift 
allow the worker more rest moments, increasing its average reliability. These 
benefits are less marked in the case of medium recovery rate and almost 
insignificant when the recovery rate becomes slow. This can easily be justified 
with a propensity to longer pauses that allow a greater recovery for the 
operator.  
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The previous evaluations were carried out without discrimination on the 
reworking class (reworking time and reworking probability) since this has no 
impact on the HEP. In the economic evaluations, however, the reworking class 
must be taken into account due to its significant effect on the profits. 
Comparing Table V.16 and Table V.17, it is evident that when reworking class 
changes, the HEP value remains unchanged while the profits vary greatly. 
This effect can be easily justified, considering that the rework has no impact 
on the human reliability distribution, but it influences the number of compliant 
items of the system that generate higher profits. For this reason, the scenarios 
were evaluated separately considering the different reworking classes and 
recovery rates in order to assess the economic impact of different break 
configurations. 
Figure V.12 reports the profits for the scenarios with rework probability 
equal to 30% recovery and rework time equal to 30% for the three recovery 
rates. It is evident that the one-break configuration is always less advantageous 
compared to three or four distributed breaks in terms of economic 
performance. Unlike the HEP trend, the increase of the total length does not 
always have an improving effect on profit and the economic results only 
partially reflect the previous HR assessments. 
 z
 
Figure V.12: Economic performance (profits in euros) to changing 
work–rests policies with fixed rework class (30% reworking probability and 
30% reworking time). 
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Table V.18 lists the economic results in the case of reworking time and 
probability equal to 30% in average conditions of recovery. The best results 
for each performance parameter are underlined. It is evident that the best 
economic performances do not correspond in the same order with the best 
reliabilities. This result derives from the combination of the economic impact 
of break times and break configurations.  
The positive HR variations related to the increase of the number and the 
length of breaks involves an improvement in the rate of quality of the 
processing and consequently a lower cost of scraps, while the increase of the 
break time determines a clear rise of the breaks costs. As previously described, 
the break costs represent the costs of lost production time; naturally, the 
transition from 20 to 30 min increases the number of products not 
manufactured and the break costs, and this is reflected in a reduction of global 
revenues, which do not result from a deterioration in the quality of work, but 
only by the reduction of the total worked hours. 
Table V.18: Details of the economic performance. 
SCENARIO PERFORMANCES 
Break 
time 
# 
breaks 
Profits  
(€) 
Revenues 
(€) 
Scraps 
costs (€) 
Rework 
costs (€) 
Breaks 
costs (€) 
HEP % 
20 1 67,420 96,936 22,121 633 6,762 11.82% 
20 2 67,234 96,749 22,086 634 6,795 11.56% 
20 3 67,713 96,997 21,855 630 6,799 11.53% 
20 4 67,375 96,850 22,060 624 6,791 11.59% 
25 1 66,371 96,131 20,597 624 8,540 11.27% 
25 2 66,677 96,194 20,317 584 8,615 10.79% 
25 3 67,638 96,458 19,604 589 8,626 10.72% 
25 4 67,571 96,520 19,742 583 8,623 10.74% 
30 1 63,871 95,306 20,560 615 10,261 11.20% 
30 2 66,009 95,705 18,670 571 10,454 10.18% 
30 3 66,444 95,849 18,352 578 10,475 10.07% 
30 4 67,598 96,336 17,731 533 10,473 10.08% 
Being the obtained profits strongly dependent on the economic parameters, 
a further analysis was carried out with the following changes on the reference 
case: 
 Price/added value: ±20%; 
 Fixed standard cost: ±50%; 
 Variable standard cost: ±20%. 
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Figure V.13 shows the profits for the new six scenarios obtained modifying 
such parameters according to the OFAT (One Factor At a Time) analysis 
technique.  
 
Figure V.13: Economic performances with changes in the economic 
baseline. 
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The effects of these changes belong to two distinct classes of result: growth 
and the reduction of the profit per unit. On one side, the reduction of the costs, 
both fixed and variable, and the increase of the price increase the profit per 
unit and this leads to an overall increase in profits. In this condition, shorter 
breaks are preferable in all possible configurations since they reduce the non-
working time and increase the total production; in fact, the pauses of 20 min 
are always the best ones. Furthermore, the advantages associated to a greater 
number of breaks are more evident in the case of breaks by 30 min, which is 
noted in the net increase of profits in the passage from one to four break 
pauses. Otherwise, when the costs rise or the price drops, the reduction of the 
profit per unit greatly lowers the economic performance of the system and it 
entails the convenience of longer breaks than the previous case. In this 
situation, the scenarios with four breaks amounting 30 min always represent 
the best choice, and in general 25 and 30 min of breaks are economically 
preferable especially with distributions of 3 and 4 breaks. Such variations are 
caused to the different impact of scrap costs, break costs, and revenues when 
the economic parameters of the examined case study change. 
V.2.4.4 Scenario 2: Problem definition 
The SHERPA simulator was also used to conduct several simulations in 
order to evaluate the effect of rest break management in a manufacturing 
industry. The simulation model reproduces the operator work station involved 
in manual assembly, on an 8-hour shift, considering 235 working days. The 
assembly operation was simulated for three different items with random 
arrival sequences based on a production mix and with processing times 
characterized by a triangular distribution, with vertices corresponding to the 
mean ±10%. The item input data are shown in Table V.19. 
PSFs for this scenario were chosen to represent approximately the actual 
conditions in the assembly plant. Available time, procedures, fitness for duty 
and work processes were imposed at the nominal level; complexity, stress and 
ergonomics at the moderate/high level and experience at high level. Of course, 
the choices made do not reflect accurately the reality, because this is highly 
variable from context to context. For this scenario the following breaks 
scheduling were simulated: 
 absence of breaks during the work shift; 
 a long pause (30 min.) in mid-turn (fixed 1); 
 two breaks of 15 minutes, the first after 2.5 hours and the second after 
other 3 hours (fixed 2); 
 three short breaks (10 min.) every two hours (fixed 3); 
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 seven breaks of 5 minutes each hour (fixed 4); 
 automatic determination of breaks for each operator (minimum break 
time 1,2,3,5 minutes). 
Table V.19: Features of produced items in the experiment. 
Features Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Mean processing time (min.) 25 36 45 
Setup time (min.) 5 5 5 
Price (€) 115 155 200 
Fixed cost (€) 52 65 78 
Variable cost (€) 18 24 32 
Productive mix 20% 30% 50% 
Production target (units/year) 2300 
V.2.4.5 Scenario 2: Simulation results and conclusions 
In Table V.20 the simulation results are shown; for the automatic 
management, the number and the break length assigned by the evaluation of 
the economic convenience are reported. In first analysis, the percentage of 
errors, when breaks are absent in the shift, is higher than in the case of 
automatic management and programmed break (from 23% to 12-14% of non-
compliance). 
Table V.20: Results of the case study. 
Breaks 
scheduling 
Time 
breaks 
(min) 
N. 
Breaks 
%Comple-
tion 
% Err 
Annual 
breaks 
cost (€) 
Annual 
Profit (€) 
No breaks 0 0 91% 23% 0 96 802 
Automatic 1 20.8 6.64 98% 14% 9 694 123 703 
Automatic 2 20.85 5.9 97% 14% 9 767 119 553 
Automatic 3 20.5 4.8 97% 15% 9 650 117 129 
Automatic 5 20.3 3.35 97% 14% 9 715 120 522 
Fixed 1 30 1 94% 15% 14 805 108 449 
Fixed 2 30 2 100% 13% 14 921 120 000 
Fixed 3 30 3 97% 12% 14 878 119 497 
Fixed 4 35 7 96% 13% 16 418 115 514 
The decrease of scrap has to be attributed to the physical and mental 
recovery operator following a break, is also clear that as the length of the 
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pause, decreases the total number of units produced, because the break is a 
period of non-production. 
 
Figure V.14: Annual profit vs % Error for the simulated scenarios. 
Automatic management in all scenarios determines many breaks but with 
short time, such as to ensure the recovery of the operator at times of high 
probability of error. It is clear the advantage of distributing the breaks 
throughout the work shift and not concentrate them in few interruptions of 
long duration. From the economic point of view the automatic management 
appears to be the best not only in terms of percentage of errors but especially 
considering the total profit, depending on the number of good products but 
also on the break time and on when the break is carried out (Figure V.14). 
V.3 Case study: Orthopaedics Surgery 
The SHERPA method was applied through the AnyLogic simulation 
template for the study of the human reliability inside an existing operating 
room. The objective was to conduct a scenario analysis for the evaluation of 
the HR effects on the result of an orthopaedic surgery, both in terms of errors 
committed and in terms of the time taken to perform it. 
V.3.1 Problem definition 
The case study was conducted in an operating room of Department of 
Orthopaedics and Traumatology of the University Hospital San Giovanni di 
Dio-Ruggi d'Aragona of Salerno. The Department of Orthopaedics and 
Traumatology deals with both elective and urgent interventions, occupying 
the operating room on Monday, Wednesday and Friday from 8 am to 2pm. 
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For the study carried out it was chosen to refer to a particular surgery: the 
reconstruction of the Achilles tendon following rupture. This intervention is 
carried out using a particular innovative technique described below (Maffulli 
et al., 2008). Task analysis was performed to determine the chronological 
steps involved in the Table V.21. 
Table V.21: Operating activities. 
TASK DESCRIPTION RESOURCES 
Anaesthesia 
room 
In this phase the identity of the 
patient and of the site to be operated 
is verified. The anaesthesiologist 
administers the anaesthesia and it 
waits until the patient is sedated. 
Nurse 
Anaesthesiologist 
Pre-
intervention in 
the operating 
room 
A nurse and a theatre nurse proceed 
with the preparation of the material 
and equipment used during the 
operation. 
Nurse 
Theatre nurse 
Patient 
positioning 
The patient is moved to the 
operating bed. The patient is 
positioned prone with a thigh 
tourniquet. 
Nurse 
Operative field 
preparation 
Skin preparation is performed, and 
sterile drapes are applied. 
Surgeon  
Nurse 
Anaesthesiologist 
Operating 
activity 1 
Pre-operative anatomical markings 
include the palpable tendon defect 
and both malleoli.  
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 2 
The first incision is a 5 cm 
longitudinal incision, made 2 cm 
proximal and just medial to the 
palpable end of the residual tendon. 
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 3 
The second incision is 3 cm long and 
is also longitudinal but is 2 cm distal 
and in the midline over the distal end 
of the tendon rupture. 
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 4 
The tendon of the semitendinosus is 
harvested through a vertical, 2.5–3 
cm longitudinal incision over the 
pes anserinus 
Surgeon 
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TASK DESCRIPTION RESOURCES 
Operating 
activity 5 
An osteotomy of the postero-
superior angle of the calcaneus is 
performed. 
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 6 
The calcaneus is pierced and reamed 
in order to obtain a bone tunnel to 
pass the semitendinosus to be 
transplanted. 
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 7 
The semitendinosus muscle tendon 
is passed through an incision of the 
proximal abutment and secured to 
the entry and exit points of the 
incision. 
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 8 
The tendin of the semitendinosus 
muscle is lodged through the bone 
tunnel first made in the calcaneus, 
stretched with the foot in the 
position of complete plantar flexion, 
fixed with a heel screw and tied to 
the distal stump of the Achilles 
tendon. 
Surgeon 
Operating 
activity 9 
The incisions are sutured, and the 
limb plastering is performed. 
Surgeon 
V.3.2 Problem modelling 
As a basic assumption, it was decided to study the process that includes the 
activities performed in the operating room starting from the patient entry time 
to the anaesthesia room to the ends of operation. Moreover, it was 
hypothesized (even considering the intervention that was chosen to simulate) 
that the operating team is composed of two nurses, a theatre nurse, an 
anaesthesiologist and two surgeons, with individual features reported in Table 
V.22. 
Table V.22: Resources features.  
Resource Gender Age 
Nurse 
Anaesthesiologist 
Theatre nurse 
Surgeon 
F 
M 
M 
M 
40 
40 
40 
50 
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Possible errors and hazards related to the procedure were identified 
(Maffulli et al., 2008): 
 Inadequate exposure and traction of the proximal stump of the Achilles 
tendon (operating activity 3). 
 Solution - Complete the exposure. 
 Incorrect positioning, breaking, loss or loosening of the screw 
(operating activity 8). 
 Solution - Remove the screw. 
 Inadequate tendon tension (operating activity 8). 
 Solution - Repetition of the intervention. 
 Calcaneus fracture (operating activities 5 and 6). 
 Solution - Fracture reduction and internal fixation. 
 Damage to the sural nerve. 
 Infection. 
 Solution - Antibiotics. 
 Reduced hip mobility. 
 Solution - Physiotherapy. 
 New rupture. 
 Solution - Repetition of the intervention. 
The possible errors on the operative activities that lead to possible post-
intervention complications are to be mainly found in the operating activity 8: 
the others can be easily recovered, leading to a lengthening of the times of the 
operation itself. 
Figure V.15 shows graphically how the model is organized on a conceptual 
level. The arrival of the patient determines the beginning of the whole process: 
the operating team, composed of the various resources, marks the succession 
of tasks to be performed and it determines the progress of the operation within 
the model. The SHERPA blocks, one for each resource involved, allow the 
collection of indications on the reliability of resources and the relative 
intervention performance, in terms of errors committed and times taken to 
complete the activities. Each resource (nurse, anaesthesiologist, theatre nurse 
and surgeon) corresponds to an agent within which a SHERPA block is 
placed. In this case, the SHERPA block simulates the completion of an 
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elementary operation: each processed entity represents an activity that can end 
with a success, a rework or an error, being the object of an estimate of the 
reliability of the individual who performs it. In particular, the rework entails 
an increase of the operating activity time. 
 
Figure V.15: Operating room model. 
The activities performed in the pre-operative anaesthesia room, and 
operating theatre by each resource was modelled in detail. For example, the 
activities performed by Nurse, Anaesthesiologist and Surgeon were modelled 
as shown in Figure V.16, Figure V.17 and Figure V.18. The respective State 
charts allow managing and process all the activities performed by the 
individual operator in the sequence reported in Table V.21, and to calculate in 
real time the operator's performance and the possible errors committed with 
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the relative consequences. At the end of the operation, the patient operated 
leaves the model, which is ready to receive another one. 
 
Figure V.16: Nurse Agent. 
 
Figure V.17: Anaesthesiologist Agent. 
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Figure V.18: Surgeon Agent. 
Table V.23 shows the times of the activities planned for the intervention. 
These times were obtained through a direct comparison with the personnel 
taking part in the intervention and were re-elaborated to be implemented in 
the simulator. 
Table V.23: Time of operating activities. 
Activity 
Minimum 
time 
Modal time 
Maximum 
time 
Anesthesia room 15 min  
20 
min 
30 
min 
Pre-intervention in the 
operating room 
5 min 10 min  15 min 
Patient positioning  — —  2 min  
Operative field preparation 5 min 7-8 min  10 min  
Operating activity 1  — — 1 min  
Operating activity 2 1 min 2 min 3 min  
Operating activity 3  —  — 1 min  
Operating activity 4 —  — 1 min 
Operating activity 5 —  —  2 min  
Operating activity 6 — — 2 min  
Operating activity 7 3 min  4 min 5 min  
Operating activity 8 — — 1 min  
Operating activity 9 5 min  7-8 min  10 min  
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For each entity entering SHERPA the attribute corresponding to the 
duration of the activity must be assigned. The starting point for the choice of 
the distributions from which to derive this duration is Table V.23. In cases 
where all the values were known, a triangular distribution was defined. In 
other cases, not having enough information available, it was decided to use a 
uniform distribution. Some activities were divided because they are composed 
of more sub-activities that require the use of different tools (for example the 
operating activity 2, 3 and 4) or the collaboration among more resources (in 
cases where there is a request for an instrument or a request for assistance). In 
Table V.24, there is a collection of all the distributions used to the resource 
involved and to the state in which the duration is assigned. 
Each resource was modelled from relevant field data and the PSF levels 
were defined as shown in Figure V.19 and Figure V.20. 
 
Figure V.19: PSFs data (part 1). 
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Figure V.20: PSFs data (part 2). 
 
Table V.24: Distribution used in the model. 
Activity State Agent Resource Distrbution (min) 
Anesthesia room PreparaPaziente NurseA uniform(0.5, 2) 
Anesthesia room Anestesia Anesthesiologist triangular(15,30,20) 
Pre-intervention in 
the operating room 
TrovaStrumento NurseB 
triangular(0.15, 
1.50, 0.25) 
Pre-intervention in 
the operating room 
PosizionaStrume
nto 
Theatre nurse uniform(0, 0.15) 
Patient positioning 
PosizionaPazien
te 
NurseB uniform(0.25, 2) 
Operative field 
preparation 
PreparazioneCut
e 
Theatre nurse triangular(3, 6, 4.5) 
Operative field 
preparation 
PreparazioneTel
eria 
SurgeonB triangular(2, 4, 3) 
Operating activity PrendiStrumento Theatre nurse uniform(0.05, 0.15) 
Operating activity 1 Attività01 SurgeonA uniform(0.25, 1) 
Operating activity 2 Attività02A SurgeonA uniform(0.15, 0.25) 
Operating activity 2 Attività02B SurgeonA triangular(1, 3, 2) 
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Activity State Agent Resource Distrbution (min) 
Operating activity 2 Attività02B SurgeonB uniform(0.25, 0.5) 
Operating activity 3 Attività03A SurgeonA uniform(0.15, 0.25) 
Operating activity 3 Attività03B SurgeonA uniform(0.50, 1) 
Operating activity 4 Attività04A SurgeonA uniform(0.15, 0.25) 
Operating activity 4 Attività04B SurgeonA uniform(0.50, 1) 
Operating activity 4 Attività04B SurgeonB uniform(0.25, 0.5) 
Operating activity 5 Attività05 SurgeonA triangular(1, 2, 1.5) 
Operating activity 6 Attività06 SurgeonA triangular(1, 2, 1.5) 
Operating activity 6 Attività06 SurgeonB uniform(0.25, 0.5) 
Operating activity 7 Attività07 SurgeonA triangular(3, 5, 4) 
Operating activity 8 Attività08 SurgeonA uniform(0.50, 1) 
Operating activity 9 Attività09 SurgeonA 
triangular(5, 10, 
7.5) 
V.3.3 Model validation 
Verification and validation of simulation model is usually part of the model 
development process. In order to enhance the assurance of the results and 
evaluate the accuracy of models, it is necessary to verify and validate the 
simulation model. The model validation is defined as proving that the 
conceptual model is an accurate representation of real system which deals with 
forming the correct model. 
The model presented was validated and verified by statistical test 
considering the total time of the intervention (from the beginning of the 
administration of the anaesthesia to the end of the operating activities) and the 
time of the operating activity with data collected within the operating registry 
from November 2015 to October 2016 and shown in Table V.25.  
Real durations were subjected to a boxplot analysis that led to the exclusion 
of the real patient number three. Table V.26 contains the durations obtained 
by running a model run on the simulator. The tests necessary for the validation 
of the model (Table V.27) were applied both for the total duration of the 
intervention and for the individual operating activities. 
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Table V.25: Historical data from operating registry. 
Patient Date 
Room 
Entry 
Start of 
anaes-
thesia 
Start of 
Surgery 
End of 
Surgery 
End 
anaes-
thesia 
Room 
Exit 
01 26/01/2016 14:30 14:30 14:50 15:10 — 15.20 
02 15/03/2016 8:50 9:00 9:10 9:25 9:30 10:00 
03 17/03/2016 8:00 8:00 8:30 9:40 — 9:45 
04 29/03/2016 13:00 13:00 13:20 14:00 — 14:10 
05 05/04/2016 10:50 11:00 11:30 12:10 12:20 12:30 
06 28/04/2016 12:00 12:00 12:15 12:40 — 12:45 
07 16/06/2016 8:15 8:30 9:00 9:40 — 9:50 
08 23/06/2016 8:00 8:00 8:45 9:15 — 9:20 
09 14/07/2016 8:00 8:30 9:00 9:15 — 9:30 
10 26/07/2016 8:00 8:10 9:00 9:50 — 10:00 
11 06/09/2016 8:00  8:25  9:00  9:30  —  9:40  
Table V.26: Data derived from real system and simulator. 
Real system Model to the simulator 
Patient 
Total activity 
duration (min) 
Duration of 
surgery (min) 
Patient 
Total activity 
duration (min) 
Duration of 
surgery (min) 
1 40 20 1 59.131 23.076 
2 25 15 2 70.701 24.547 
3 100 70 3 70.879 21.539 
4 60 40 4 53.956 22.036 
5 70 40 5 51.302 22.165 
6 40 25 6 51.991 21.867 
7 70 40 7 57.687 21.323 
8 75 30 8 60.466 26.046 
9 45 15 9 53.025 23.362 
10 100 50 10 71.152 24.565 
11 65 30 11 54.003 22.692 
   12 60.909 23.279 
   13 59.987 28.120 
   14 51.008 22.323 
   15 60.146 26.596 
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Table V.27: Validation results with indication of the p-values obtained. 
V.3.4 Design of experiment 
The validated model was used as a decision support system in the operating 
room to evaluate HR impacts on performance. A scenario analysis was 
performed, by changing one or more parameters that regulate the functioning 
of the simulation model, and choosing, after appropriate considerations on a 
statistical basis, the best solution. The Key Performance Indicators (KPI), 
taken as a reference, are the overall reliability of the system, the time the 
patient has passed from entering the anaesthesia room to leaving the operating 
room and the effective duration of operating activities. In particular, the 
overall reliability is calculated at the end of each intervention through the 
following formula: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑
 (5.1) 
Errors were considered both if the error is recovered during the 
interventions and if the error is not recovered and it is, therefore, a source of 
possible future complications. The total number of activities for the operation 
under examination (from anaesthesia to actual intervention) was fifty-three, 
divided as follows: the anaesthesiologist performs only one activity, the 
nurseA performs only one activity, the nurseB performs eleven activities, the 
theatre nurse performs twenty-four activities, the surgeonA performs twelve 
activities and the surgeonB performs four activities. 
Two experimental campaigns have been chosen: the first one focuses on 
factors (PSF) that directly influence reliability calculations using the SHERPA 
 
Shapiro-
Wilk’s test 
Fisher ‘s test 
Wilcoxon’s 
test 
Smi.-Sat.’s test Res. Val. 
Total real 
time  
 
Total model 
time. 
0.8090  
 
0.0297 
— 1 — OK 
Real 
Operating 
activity time 
 
Model 
Operating 
activity time 
0.4652  
 
 
0.0698 
10
−8
 — 0.0999 OK 
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method, and it is used as a tool for verifying the correct modelling of the 
process. The second focuses mainly on organizational factors such as the 
break scheduling management, and it is used to determine if changes in this 
direction lead to improvements compared to the As-Is model. 
V.3.4.1 Experimental campaign 1: PSF impacts  
Factors chosen among the available PSFs are those that most influence a 
medical activity (Dollarhide et al., 2014): Mental Stress, Fitness for duty, 
Communication. In particular, the first two are related to the psycho-physical 
well-being of the surgery staff involved in the intervention, the last one 
regards the harmony of the medical team. The changes of the PSF concern all 
the resources involved. The full list of alternatives is reported in Table V.28, 
where the alternative As-Is, that is the model of the real system, corresponds 
to the number five. This experimental campaign allows to verify the 
hypothesis of decrease of reliability and increase of the operating times with 
negative value assumed by the PSFs. 
Table V.28: List of alternatives of the first experimental campaign. 
Alternatives 
Levels 
Mental Stress Fitness for duty Communication 
1 Nominal Nominal Good 
2 Nominal Nominal Poor 
3 Nominal Degraded Good 
4 Nominal Degraded Poor 
5 (As-Is) High Nominal Good 
6 High Nominal Poor 
7 High Degraded Good 
8 High Degraded Poor 
9 Extreme Nominal Good 
10 Extreme Nominal Poor 
11 Extreme Degraded Good 
12 Extreme Degraded Poor 
V.3.4.2 Experimental campaign 2: Break scheduling 
management  
Organizational factors chosen for this experimental campaign are: 
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 the scheduling of break before each intervention, if this occurs after 
the first hour with respect to the beginning of the shift;  
 the reduction of operating times, as if a limit of duration to be respected 
was imposed, in order to reduce its variability. This effect is obtained 
by decreasing the maximum time associated with the distributions 
previously seen. This condition activates the PSF Pressure Time. The 
effect of this activation is a decrease in reliability with a greater 
possibility of error and, therefore, an increase in times (in a situation 
opposite to that desired).  
The nine alternatives are shown in Table V.29, where the As-Is alternative 
is the number one. The goal is to find the alternative that ensures the best 
balance between the reliability achieved and the durations of the interventions. 
Table V.29: List of alternatives of the second experimental campaign. 
Alternatives 
Levels 
Break time Maximum time reduction Pressure Time 
1 (As-Is) 0 min 0% Absent 
2 0 min 5%  High  
3 0 min 15%  Extreme  
4 10 min 0%  Absent 
5 10 min 5%  High  
6 10 min 15%  Extreme  
7 15 min 0%  Absent 
8 15 min 5%  High  
9 15 min 15%  Extreme  
V.3.5 Analysis of results and discussions 
The analysis of the results is divided into four phases: identification of the 
number of replicas; execution of the simulation runs; statistical analysis of the 
simulation runs and choice of the best solution. 
V.3.5.1  Analysis of the results for the first experimental 
campaign 
Table V.30, Table V.31, and Table V.32 show the results obtained in terms 
of average KPI of interest in the first experimental campaign. All the relative 
standard errors are lower than the pre-established threshold of 0.1, and for this 
reason the 10 replicas made for each alternative are sufficient to proceed with 
the subsequent analyses. 
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Table V.30: KPI total flow time. 
 
Average total flow time (min) 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
60.52 
58.98 
56.92 
54.64 
58.38 
57.26 
59.16 
59.22 
56.95 
57.19 
73.12 
62.70 
62.78 
67.09 
66.22 
62.63 
63.62 
71.05 
64.71 
68.30 
68.62 
65.15 
61.90 
66.75 
62.41 
66.68 
62.50 
66.61 
59.24 
60.66 
74.80 
79.54 
72.97 
73.75 
71.84 
78.92 
74.91 
70.89 
71.75 
70.65 
59.51 
63.24 
61.06 
57.70 
61.25 
62.41 
59.75 
62.10 
58.68 
59.88 
64.67 
64.59 
65.19 
66.74 
61.01 
68.05 
67.14 
68.46 
67.22 
65.12 
62.48 
69.37 
63.80 
61.53 
64.48 
67.35 
66.17 
66.11 
70.08 
67.02 
75.87 
76.23 
73.82 
79.36 
78.08 
72.15 
74.67 
71.93 
74.51 
67.06 
58.75 
65.19 
59.61 
59.93 
64.39 
61.37 
62.61 
56.33 
64.25 
62.17 
66.88 
68.71 
71.74 
69.49 
72.54 
68.20 
63.89 
71.99 
68.31 
66.93 
66.18 
67.61 
70.55 
64.06 
67.45 
65.21 
66.89 
65.63 
63.97 
68.75 
75.81 
76.78 
81.06 
72.09 
79.53 
71.69 
80.44 
74.05 
78.55 
81.29 
µ 57.92 66.22 64.05 74.00 60.56 65.82 65.84 74.37 61.46 68.87 66.63 77.13 
ϭ 1.66 3.68 3.11 3.13 1.75 2.20 2.79 3.48 2.82 2.69 2.07 3.62 
e 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 
Table V.31: KPI duration of the operating activities. 
 
Average duration of the operating activities (min) 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
23.45 
23.12 
22.92 
22.15 
23.33 
23.13 
25.25 
23.85 
23.30 
24.40 
26.85 
25.16 
25.91 
25.93 
26.23 
24.65 
25.20 
24.96 
25.25 
26.60 
25.17 
24.81 
25.89 
26.13 
26.84 
27.96 
25.70 
25.73 
24.66 
25.59 
27.56 
28.78 
27.37 
28.08 
28.66 
28.22 
28.79 
26.42 
26.83 
30.11 
24.10 
23.24 
23.84 
23.68 
23.20 
23.56 
23.84 
23.82 
25.30 
23.03 
24.76 
23.94 
25.84 
26.75 
28.84 
26.70 
25.54 
26.05 
27.03 
24.61 
24.72 
26.40 
24.94 
24.74 
26.83 
25.59 
26.80 
26.06 
27.67 
26.31 
30.68 
27.96 
29.35 
32.08 
28.85 
31.36 
28.64 
30.60 
29.55 
27.72 
23.58 
24.25 
24.25 
23.31 
25.55 
24.89 
24.21 
23.19 
23.75 
24.58 
26.54 
26.95 
27.16 
25.95 
26.31 
25.85 
25.85 
26.87 
25.64 
26.16 
25.15 
26.57 
26.81 
26.04 
25.18 
25.36 
27.34 
24.33 
26.71 
26.63 
28.84 
29.77 
30.73 
31.13 
30.87 
27.08 
29.42 
29.33 
30.95 
31.06 
µ 23.49 25.68 25.85 28.08 23.76 26.01 26.01 29.68 24.16 26.33 26.01 29.92 
ϭ 0.85 0.74 0.98 1.08 0.64 1.42 1.00 1.46 0.73 0.53 0.96 1.30 
e 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
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Table V.32: KPI Human reliability. 
 
Average human reliability 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0.903 
0.929 
0.931 
0.899 
0.927 
0.934 
0.896 
0.935 
0.919 
0.914 
0.764 
0.792 
0.810 
0.765 
0.780 
0.788 
0.799 
0.796 
0.787 
0.769 
0.786 
0.814 
0.827 
0.822 
0.818 
0.808 
0.804 
0.805 
0.840 
0.798 
0.582 
0.577 
0.615 
0.615 
0.557 
0.620 
0.580 
0.644 
0.633 
0.600 
0.913 
0.921 
0.904 
0.911 
0.925 
0.906 
0.898 
0.877 
0.921 
0.916 
0.765 
0.775 
0.728 
0.761 
0.744 
0.760 
0.808 
0.740 
0.696 
0.791 
0.801 
0.802 
0.823 
0.774 
0.783 
0.770 
0.761 
0.758 
0.750 
0.791 
0.553 
0.601 
0.570 
0.537 
0.547 
0.543 
0.580 
0.593 
0.554 
0.613 
0.893 
0.882 
0.884 
0.877 
0.896 
0.907 
0.855 
0.898 
0.907 
0.866 
0.739 
0.744 
0.743 
0.763 
0.726 
0.742 
0.766 
0.745 
0.755 
0.768 
0.795 
0.765 
0.736 
0.761 
0.756 
0.781 
0.756 
0.779 
0.767 
0.755 
0.512 
0.567 
0.572 
0.514 
0.526 
0.585 
0.520 
0.578 
0.533 
0.537 
µ 0.919 0.785 0.812 0.602 0.909 0.757 0.781 0.569 0.887 0.749 0.765 0.544 
ϭ 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.028 0.014 0.032 0.023 0.027 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.028 
e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 
The statistical analysis of the runs is performed using the software R. The 
ANOVA results are collected in Figure V.21, Figure V.22 and Figure V.23. 
 
 
Figure V.21: ANOVA Results (KPI flow time). 
 
Figure V.22: ANOVA Results (KPI operating time). 
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Figure V.23: ANOVA Results (KPI human reliability). 
The asterisks indicate the factors that strongly influence the three KPIs. 
Furthermore, important interferences between the factors are detected (the 
effects often combine, overlap and amplify), especially between the levels of 
the PSF Fitness for duty and Communication. The Duncan test (Table V.33) 
allows verifying with greater precision what are the effects of PSF on KPIs. 
Table V.33: Results of the Duncan test for the first campaign. 
KPI total flow time (min). 
Groups 
Alternatives in increasing order of performance 
A01 A05 A09 A03 A06 A07 A02 A11 A10 A04 A08 A12 
µ 57.92 60.56 61.46 64.05 65.82 65.84 66.22 66.63 68.87 74 74.37 77.13 
G1             
G2             
G3             
G4             
G5             
G6             
KPI operating time (min). 
Groups 
Alternatives in increasing order of performance 
A01 A05 A09 A02 A03 A06 A07 A11 A10 A04 A08 A12 
µ 23.49 23.76 24.16 25.68 25.85 26.01 26.01 26.01 26.33 28.08 29.68 29.92 
G1             
G2             
G3             
G4             
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KPI Reliability. 
Groups 
Alternatives in increasing order of performance 
A01 A05 A09 A03 A02 A07 A11 A06 A10 A04 A08 A12 
µ 0.919 0.909 0.887 0.812 0.785 0.781 0.765 0.757 0.749 0.602 0.569 0.544 
G1             
G2             
G3             
G4             
G5             
G6             
G7             
G8             
G9             
The alternative A01 is always the most performing with respect to each of 
the KPIs, while the alternative A12 is always the worst. The hypothesis for 
which the experimental campaign was carried out is verified. In fact, the 
alternative A01 is the one that owns all PSFs with the best level from the 
reliability point of view, on the contrary for the alternative A12 these factors 
assume the worst level.  
The first case allows to obtain the highest reliability value and, 
consequently, the lower times (both of total flow time and duration of the 
operating activities) given the lower number of errors committed; vice versa 
in the second case, the high number of errors committed (low reliability) is 
reflected in an increase in the times of each activity. The results of the Duncan 
test are also confirmed by other data collected, in particular on the average 
percentage of errors that could generate complications on the total 
interventions for each single run. This information was obtained by recording 
for each run of each of the alternatives the ratio between the number of 
interventions with possible future complications and the number of total 
interventions and averaging them (Table V.34). 
Table V.34: Average incidence of interventions with possible 
complications. 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 
35.7% 56.3% 60.0% 76.5% 33.6% 61.7% 52.3% 83.8% 27.1% 63.0% 56.2% 77.7% 
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V.3.5.2  Analysis of the results for the second experimental 
campaign 
Table V.35, Table V.36 and Table V.37 show the results obtained in terms 
of average KPI of interest in the second experimental campaign. All the 
relative standard errors are lower than the pre-established threshold of 0.1, and 
for this reason the 10 replicas made for each alternative are sufficient to 
proceed with the subsequent analyses.  
The ANOVA results (Table V.35, Table V.36, Table V.37) shows that the 
factors interfere individually with a certain significance on the chosen KPIs, 
while the combined effect is negligible. The Duncan test (Table V.38) allows 
us to understand, although there is a strong overlap between the groups, that 
there is a significant difference from the reliability point of view between the 
As-Is system (A01) and the set of alternatives A04, A05, A07, A08. The 
reliability values for the latter models are higher than the alternative A01: this 
is also evident by observing the duration of the only operating activities for 
which the alternative A01 has the worst performance, given the highest 
number of errors that generate waste of time for their recovery. Within the 
group of more reliable alternatives than the As-Is, the discriminant cannot be 
the duration of the operating activities, so there are no significant differences 
according to the Duncan test (the four alternatives all belong to the G4 group). 
Table V.35: KPI total flow time. 
 
Average total flow time (min) 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
60.88 
57.99 
58.14 
63.21 
57.18 
60.48 
62.12 
58.02 
58.92 
60.15 
56.12 
59.45 
56.56 
61.60 
58.47 
57.34 
56.32 
62.55 
56.04 
63.64 
55.96 
57.04 
56.23 
54.63 
54.31 
59.14 
60.33 
55.46 
59.11 
51.02 
64.04 
65.28 
68.11 
65.61 
64.45 
62.51 
66.97 
63.70 
64.59 
67.23 
68.47 
66.48 
64.26 
68.50 
65.73 
68.58 
67.70 
64.86 
64.92 
71.34 
64.08 
61.59 
59.06 
66.61 
61.67 
65.96 
62.86 
65.87 
63.27 
58.59 
70.96 
74.26 
71.07 
71.33 
70.60 
75.05 
73.26 
72.16 
71.06 
72.95 
69.08 
74.67 
68.46 
68.91 
66.17 
68.50 
72.91 
72.07 
63.44 
71.31 
68.74 
69.00 
67.01 
68.14 
65.13 
61.11 
64.65 
59.73 
68.64 
70.86 
µ 59.71 58.81 56.32 65.25 67.08 62.69 72.72 69.55 66.30 
ϭ 1.99 2.87 2.75 1.75 2.22 2.79 1.55 3.31 3.61 
e 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 
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Table V.36: KPI duration of the operating activities. 
 
Average duration of the operating activities (min) 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
24.51  
23.57  
22.69  
23.77  
24.43  
24.70  
23.49  
23.67  
23.07  
24.81  
22.54  
23.03  
22.16  
22.52  
22.64  
22.87  
23.17  
23.02  
23.21  
23.58 
21.84  
23.03  
23.45  
22.46  
22.06  
22.21  
22.29  
22.55  
21.94  
21.65 
22.48  
23.38  
23.09  
22.08  
22.83  
22.85  
23.71  
23.66  
22.43  
23.46 
23.33  
21.76  
22.42  
22.31  
22.53  
21.94  
22.33  
22.86  
23.84  
24.52 
21.36  
21.93  
21.42  
23.07  
21.22  
22.50  
21.07  
22.45  
21.65  
22.16 
22.15  
23.74  
22.19  
22.33  
23.68  
23.82  
23.40  
22.98  
24.39  
24.81 
22.79  
21.85  
22.25  
22.59  
23.06  
22.42  
23.18  
24.23  
22.01  
22.64 
20.79  
21.91  
21.43  
22.20  
20.55  
21.60  
21.45  
21.04  
22.12  
22.40 
µ 23.87 22.87 22.35 23.00 22.78 21.88 23.35 22.70 21.55 
ϭ 0.71 0.42 .55 0.56 0.87 0.65 0.92 0.68 0.62 
e 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Table V.37: KPI Human reliability. 
 
Average human reliability 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0.891  
0.916  
0.926  
0.926  
0.890  
0.902  
0.919  
0.907  
0.918  
0.915  
0.919  
0.907  
0.928  
0.911  
0.893  
0.910  
0.912  
0.897  
0.911  
0.898  
0.909  
0.858  
0.897  
0.868  
0.889  
0.889  
0.892  
0.869  
0.879  
0.889  
0.942  
0.934  
0.928  
0.950  
0.933  
0.929  
0.925  
0.914  
0.937  
0.922  
0.917  
0.942  
0.927  
0.927  
0.933  
0.982  
0.926  
0.933  
0.922  
0.949  
0.929  
0.920  
0.911  
0.900  
0.923  
0.915  
0.898  
0.932  
0.919  
0.913  
0.945  
0.926  
0.923  
0.928  
0.935  
0.936  
0.919  
0.916  
0.934  
0.923  
0.926  
0.926  
0.942  
0.929  
0.917  
0.937  
0.928  
0.953  
0.943  
0.942  
0.938  
0.902  
0.917  
0.902  
0.949  
0.941  
0.919  
0.897  
0.928  
0.900  
µ 0.911 0.909 0.884 0.931 0.936 0.916 0.929 0.934 0.919 
ϭ 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.019 
e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
The worst performance for A07 and A08 make it possible to understand 
that the 15-minute pause, while increasing reliability, turns out to be 
excessive. Observing the levels assumed by the factors for the alternatives 
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A01, A04 and A05 it is possible to state that the 10 minute pause is recovered 
partly thanks to the increase in reliability, without the inclusion of a maximum 
time going to affect too much on the result: pausing allows offering a better 
service, in terms of patient safety, also gaining in terms of duration of 
operative activities and without losing excessively as regards the total crossing 
time with respect to the As-Is system. 
 
Figure V.24: ANOVA Results (KPI flow time). 
 
Figure V.25: ANOVA Results (operating activities time). 
 
Figure V.26: ANOVA Results (KPI human reliability). 
Table V.38: Results of the Duncan test for the second campaign. 
KPI total flow time (min). 
Groups 
Alternatives in increasing order of performance 
A03 A02 A01 A06 A04 A09 A05 A081 A07 
µ 56.32 58.81 59.71 62.96 65.25 66.30 67.08 69.55 72.27 
G1          
G2          
G3          
G4          
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G5          
G6          
KPI operating time (min). 
Groups 
Alternatives in increasing order of performance 
A09 A06 A03 A08 A05 A02 A04 A07 A01 
µ 21.55 21.88 22.35 22.70 22.78 22.87 23.00 23.35 23.87 
G1          
G2          
G3          
G4          
G5          
KPI Reliability. 
Groups 
Alternatives in increasing order of performance 
A05 A08 A04 A07 A09 A06 A01 A02 A03 
µ 0.936 0.934 0.931 0.929 0.919 0.916 0.911 0.901 0.884 
G1          
G2          
G3          
G4          
G5          
V.4 Results discussion 
Experimental campaigns and case study underline the major SHERPA 
features, described in the theoretical model. In particular, its versatility is 
useful in revealing the environmental and psycho-physical factors which 
mainly influence the human reliability and may therefore be subject to 
improvement in order to reduce errors. 
Unlike many HRA methods, SHERPA has been implemented for covering 
a wide range of working task, for this reason the six modelled Generic Task 
may represent activities that are more or less reliable. However, the most 
interesting aspect of the SHERPA model, however, is its ability to simulate 
several environmental conditions for the same performed activity. The most 
influential factors (experience, procedures and cognitive ergonomics) have a 
very tight confidence interval, a sign of their strong impact in the calculation 
of the error probability. 
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The analysed results in experimental campaign 4 and in the case study 
provide a wide overview of the potentialities of SHERPA simulator in the 
analysis and evaluation of the work-rest policies, which are influenced by 
several intrinsic system factors such as environmental and individual factors 
as well as the economic value of the process carried out by the worker. Despite 
the best breaks configuration for the system varies as a function of several 
factors and it cannot always be generalized in advance to different working 
environments, the experiment provides the following results: 
 The increase of the total length of the breaks always improves the 
operator reliability while the economic performance is the result of a 
trade-off between cost classes with opposed trends. In fact, HR higher 
values are reflected on the machining quality with lower costs for scrap 
and reworking, but longer breaks reduce the time worked with an 
increase of the break costs and a possible decrease in revenues. 
 The increase of the number of breaks maintaining fixed the total length 
has a positive impact on the worker reliability and involves higher 
profits because the worked hours do not change. This is true especially 
when the recovery rates are medium or fast, while for the slow rate an 
excessive fractioning of the rest time limits the reaching of a 
satisfactory recovery. 
These results cannot be easily compared with the literature due to the 
presence of several criteria of human performance modelling, as seen 
previously. However, it is evident that one or more breaks in the shift provide 
a higher level of human performance, especially with short breaks. The 
proposed recovery modelling, based on an HRA approach, is therefore in 
agreement with the existing literature, even if it analyses this issue from a 
different point of view. The obtained results highlight the importance of 
measuring and evaluating both human reliability and work rate in the break 
scheduling problems, because of their significant economic and qualitative 
impact on the system performance. As well as the choices of the optimal work-
rest policy cannot be separated from economic evaluations in terms of profits, 
considering the cost of lost production due to break and the quality costs 
related to operator errors. 
Furthermore, LFCM module allows simulating a large number of scenarios 
without being resource intensive or time consuming in order to evaluate the 
human performance under the learning and forgetting phenomenon.  
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VI Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
Human reliability is a highly relevant factor with a considerable impact on 
the overall performance of human-intensive working systems. Human error in 
the workplace, in fact, can have more or less serious consequences, such as 
accidents, malfunctions and defects in the quality of the performed task. The 
evidence that human actions are a source of vulnerability for industrial 
systems has led to the birth of many Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
methods, which aim at further examination of the human factor, but they have 
not always been especially useful for this purpose. 
The SHERPA model proposed in this thesis has as its main objective the 
development of a model for quantifying human error probability in any work 
situation and in every context – quantification that today is hardly possible 
given the lack of tools similar to that achieved in this work. SHERPA model 
can be effectively used to evaluate changes in human error probability when 
changes occur in type of activity, contextual conditions, time spent at work 
and breaks assigned during the shift. The main advantage of the model lies in 
its being generic – it is suitable for any environment and working conditions, 
without limitations related to a particular sector or activity. The ability to 
change the values of the multipliers makes it easy to modify the weight of 
each factor PSF, regardless of the values assigned by the SPAR-H method. 
Through SHERPA, the concept of human reliability, often dealt with only in 
theory, is taken up in terms of production capacity or quality index (compliant 
and non-compliant items or retrieved items), and useful information about 
human reliability can be obtained for every kind of working context.  
The break scheduling problems emerge in human-intensive working 
contexts where rest periods are indispensable due to features of the tasks to be 
performed, but despite the impact and the importance of breaks, these are not 
taken into proper consideration and there are ongoing efforts to develop 
models for optimal shift scheduling with multiple rest breaks. The SHERPA 
model efficiently evaluates the impacts of the work-rest policies on the HEP 
and on the economic system performance. It represents a decision support 
system for the break scheduling problem that quickly compares different break 
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configurations, changing number, duration, and placement of rest breaks over 
the work shift, according to whatever sets of constraints imposed by 
legislation or by internal union agreements for the system under consideration. 
The management of breaks provided by the module allows simulation of all 
distributions of unintended breaks and evaluation of its effect on both the 
percentage of non-compliance and the economic return. In this way, different 
scheduling of breaks can be tested and compared, rapidly and with limited 
costs, in order to choose the best solution for the particular domain of work. 
This management can be difficult to apply in some cases but allows you to 
have an idea of the best condition to be used, which can be tested as fixed 
breaks with SHERPA. As evident from the experimental campaigns and case 
study, there are many factors that impact the system performance and the 
results are heavily influenced by the selected work-rest policies. The results 
obtained have led to the first considerations about the impact of different 
work-rest policies on the HR levels, but do not reach a univocal economic 
generalization because of the strong dependence between the value of the 
process performed by the operator and profit obtained. In any case, SHERPA 
results represent many different scenarios and discriminate between the 
different solutions identifying which ones are the more promising.  
The proposed model was not created for a particular industry or application 
and therefore can be easily applied to contexts that vary widely. For example, 
the module can equally represent manual maintenance activity, manual 
assembly tasks, medical task in a surgery room etc., by varying the input 
variables such as performed task, level of contextual factors, or physical and 
mental employee condition and by modelling the specific system considering 
all the working context features. Simulators and tools similar to the one 
proposed do not exist today, either from the theoretical point of view or from 
the point of view of the analysis carried out. 
The limitations of the current research underscore several issues worthy of 
additional studies. Many constraints on break scheduling management were 
relaxed in this first version, given the simulative nature of SHERPA model, 
as for example the maximal working time without breaks or the minimum and 
maximum possible break time. Future research should address the integration 
of these constraints in the simulation model. Furthermore, SHERPA requires 
additional tests for the validation and the calibration of HRA coefficients, as 
for example the impact of contextual and individual factors on human 
performance.  
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Table VIII.1: Optimal break time (male). 
Physical 
Activity 
Psychological 
Demands 
Recovery 
Speed 
Age Groups (male) 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 
Sedentary 
activities 
(office, 
laboratory) 
Low 
Slow 40 42 45 47 43 
Medium 25 27 28 30 28 
Fast 11 11 12 13 12 
Medium 
Slow 34 37 38 41 40 
Medium 23 25 25 27 27 
Fast 11 12 13 14 13 
High 
Slow 28 29 30 31 29 
Medium 21 23 23 24 23 
Fast 13 14 14 14 14 
Activity 
light, 
standing 
(laboratory, 
light 
industry) 
Low 
Slow 44 46 49 52 48 
Medium 29 31 33 35 32 
Fast 16 17 18 19 18 
Medium 
Slow 38 41 42 45 44 
Medium 27 29 29 32 31 
Fast 17 19 19 21 20 
High 
Slow 30 32 33 34 32 
Medium 25 27 27 28 27 
Fast 19 21 21 21 21 
Medium 
activity, 
standing 
(work 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 48 50 54 56 52 
Medium 34 36 38 40 37 
Fast 22 23 24 26 24 
Medium 
Slow 41 44 46 49 49 
Medium 30 33 34 36 36 
Fast 23 25 25 27 27 
High 
Slow 36 35 36 37 35 
Medium 29 30 31 32 30 
Fast 26 27 28 29 27 
Activities 
heavy (heavy 
work on 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 55 59 63 66 61 
Medium 42 45 47 50 46 
Fast 32 34 37 38 35 
Medium 
Slow 48 52 53 57 57 
Medium 38 41 42 46 45 
Fast 34 37 38 41 40 
High 
Slow 39 41 42 43 41 
Medium 36 38 39 40 38 
Fast 39 41 42 43 41 
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Table VIII.2: Recovery rate (male). 
Physical 
Activity 
Psychological 
Demands 
Recovery 
Speed 
Age Groups (male) 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 
Sedentary 
activities 
(office, 
laboratory) 
Low 
Slow 3.49 3.28 3.09 2.94 3.19 
Medium 5.48 5.16 4.85 4.62 5.01 
Fast 12.79 12.04 11.32 10.78 11.69 
Medium 
Slow 4.04 3.73 3.64 3.37 3.42 
Medium 6.07 5.60 5.46 5.05 5.13 
Fast 12.13 11.19 10.93 10.11 10.25 
High 
Slow 5.00 4.71 4.62 4.50 4.70 
Medium 6.43 6.06 5.94 5.79 6.04 
Fast 10.71 10.09 9.89 9.65 10.07 
Activity 
light, 
standing 
(laboratory, 
light 
industry) 
Low 
Slow 3.17 2.98 2.81 2.67 2.90 
Medium 4.70 4.42 4.16 3.96 4.29 
Fast 8.52 8.03 7.54 7.19 7.79 
Medium 
Slow 3.68 3.39 3.31 3.06 3.11 
Medium 5.20 4.80 4.68 4.33 4.39 
Fast 8.09 7.46 7.29 6.74 6.84 
High 
Slow 4.55 4.28 4.20 4.10 4.27 
Medium 5.51 5.19 5.09 4.96 5.18 
Fast 7.14 6.73 6.60 6.44 6.71 
Medium 
activity, 
standing 
(work 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 2.91 2.74 2.57 2.45 2.66 
Medium 4.11 3.87 3.64 3.47 3.76 
Fast 6.39 6.02 5.66 5.39 5.84 
Medium 
Slow 3.37 3.11 3.04 2.81 2.85 
Medium 4.55 4.20 4.10 3.79 3.85 
Fast 6.07 5.60 5.46 5.05 5.13 
High 
Slow 4.17 3.93 3.85 3.75 3.92 
Medium 4.82 4.54 4.45 4.34 4.53 
Fast 5.36 5.05 4.95 4.83 5.04 
Activities 
heavy (heavy 
work on 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 2.49 2.35 2.20 2.10 2.28 
Medium 3.29 3.10 2.91 2.77 3.01 
Fast 4.26 4.01 3.77 3.59 3.90 
Medium 
Slow 2.89 2.66 2.60 2.41 2.44 
Medium 3.64 3.36 3.28 3.03 3.08 
Fast 4.04 3.73 3.64 3.37 3.42 
High 
Slow 3.57 3.36 3.30 3.22 3.36 
Medium 3.86 3.63 3.56 3.48 3.63 
Fast 3.57 3.36 3.30 3.22 3.36 
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Table VIII.3: Optimal break time (female). 
Physical 
Activity 
Psychological 
Demands 
Recovery 
Speed 
Age Groups (female) 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 
Sedentary 
activities 
(office, 
laboratory) 
Low 
Slow 40 39 41 44 45 
Medium 26 25 26 28 29 
Fast 11 11 11 12 12 
Medium 
Slow 35 35 35 39 42 
Medium 23 23 23 26 28 
Fast 12 12 12 13 14 
High 
Slow 28 27 27 29 31 
Medium 22 21 21 22 24 
Fast 13 13 13 13 14 
Activity light, 
standing 
(laboratory, 
light 
industry) 
Low 
Slow 44 43 45 49 50 
Medium 30 29 30 33 34 
Fast 16 16 17 18 19 
Medium 
Slow 38 38 38 42 47 
Medium 27 27 27 30 33 
Fast 17 17 17 19 21 
High 
Slow 31 30 30 32 34 
Medium 26 2 25 26 28 
Fast 20 19 19 20 22 
Medium 
activity, 
standing 
(work 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 48 47 49 53 54 
Medium 34 33 35 37 39 
Fast 22 21 22 24 25 
Medium 
Slow 42 42 41 46 51 
Medium 31 31 31 34 38 
Fast 23 23 23 26 28 
High 
Slow 34 33 33 35 37 
Medium 29 28 28 30 32 
Fast 26 26 25 27 29 
Activities 
heavy (heavy 
work on 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 56 55 57 62 64 
Medium 43 42 43 47 48 
Fast 33 32 33 36 37 
Medium 
Slow 49 49 48 54 59 
Medium 39 39 38 43 47 
Fast 35 35 35 39 42 
High 
Slow 39 38 38 40 43 
Medium 36 36 35 37 40 
Fast 39 38 38 40 43 
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Table VIII.4: Recovery rate (female). 
Physical 
Activity 
Psychological 
Demands 
Recovery 
Speed 
Age Groups (female) 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 
Sedentary 
activities 
(office, 
laboratory) 
Low 
Slow 3.43 3.51 3.39 3.13 3.04 
Medium 5.39 5.51 5.32 4.91 4.78 
Fast 12.57 12.86 12.42 11.46 11.16 
Medium 
Slow 3.97 3.99 4.00 3.58 3.26 
Medium 5.96 5.98 6.00 5.37 4.89 
Fast 11.92 11.96 12.00 10.75 9.79 
High 
Slow 4.92 5.03 5.07 4.79 4.49 
Medium 6.32 6.47 6.52 6.16 5.77 
Fast 10.53 10.78 10.86 10.26 9.61 
Activity light, 
standing 
(laboratory, 
light 
industry) 
Low 
Slow 3.12 3.19 3.08 2.84 2.77 
Medium 4.62 4.72 4.56 4.21 4.10 
Fast 8.38 8.57 8.28 7.64 7.44 
Medium 
Slow 3.61 3.62 3.64 3.26 2.97 
Medium 5.11 5.12 5.14 4.61 4.20 
Fast 7.95 7.97 8.00 7.17 6.53 
High 
Slow 4.47 4.57 4.61 4.35 4.08 
Medium 5.42 5.55 5.59 5.28 4.94 
Fast 7.02 7.19 7.24 6.84 6.41 
Medium 
activity, 
standing 
(work 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 2.86 2.92 2.82 2.61 2.54 
Medium 4.04 4.13 3.99 3.69 3.59 
Fast 6.28 6.43 6.21 5.73 5.58 
Medium 
Slow 3.31 3.32 3.33 2.99 2.72 
Medium 4.47 4.48 4.50 4.03 3.67 
Fast 5.96 5.98 6.00 5.37 4.89 
High 
Slow 4.10 4.19 4.22 3.99 3.74 
Medium 4.74 4.85 4.89 4.62 4.33 
Fast 5.27 5.39 5.43 5.13 4.81 
Activities 
heavy (heavy 
work on 
machines) 
Low 
Slow 2.45 2.51 2.42 2.23 2.17 
Medium 3.23 3.31 3.19 2.95 2.87 
Fast 4.19 4.29 4.14 3.82 3.72 
Medium 
Slow 2.84 2.85 2.86 2.56 2.33 
Medium 3.58 3.59 3.6 3.22 2.94 
Fast 3.97 3.99 4.00 3.58 3.26 
High 
Slow 3.51 3.59 3.62 3.42 3.20 
Medium 3.79 3.88 3.91 3.70 3.46 
Fast 3.51 3.59 3.62 3.42 3.20 
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Figure IX.1: Dialog box microclimate data entry. 
 
Figure IX.2: Dialog box vibration and ionizing radiation and not data 
entry. 
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Figure IX.3: Dialog box lighting data entry. 
 
Figure IX.4: Dialog box workplace data entry. 
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Figure IX.5: Dialog box noise data entry. 
 
